A PERENNIAL PROBLEM in studying Indonesian politics is to determine [XV where the action is. Indonesian politics spawns new organs, new symbols, even entire new systems.' It is often an elitist game; yet at times real drama has resided with the masses-for instance, in the Communist Party's unexpected success in marshalling votes in the democratic processes of the 1955 elections, or in the widespread, largely popular, exercise in violence a decade later.2 Analysts have drawn on a variety of methods to bring order to this confusion.3 The Cold War, coup, and personalist explanations have been among the favorites. The Cold War approach needs no elaboration. Recently, however, perhaps due to events of the past two years, some analysts have developed what might be called "the coup theory" of contemporary Indonesian history.4 Thus, I948, I95I, I952, i958, i965 and i966 are considered coup years and the evolution of Indonesian politics is conveniently demarcated, simplified by these crisis points. Equally popular is the personalist theory, wherein Sukarno is seen solely as Sukarno the Dictator.5 With this