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Since the emergence of India and Pakistan as independent states following the end of British colonial rule in 1947, the two countries have been at loggerheads and fought three wars in 1947, 1965, 1971 and a limited war in 1999. They have been engaged in one of the world's most complex and sharply contested rivalries. These two countries became ideological rivals despite the fact that both countries shared a common history, cultural roots, geography, economic systems and strategic environment for centuries. The rivalry between India and Pakistan dates back to the colonial period and has continuously overshadowed their bilateral relationship till date. This paper attempts to examine the two major irritants between India and Pakistan: Kashmir and terrorism. Then it discusses how the inflexible attitude adopted by the two nuclear neighbours towards the resolution of these issues has created perpetual regional instability in the South Asian region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines decision-making mistakes made by U.S. President Nixon and national security advisor Kissinger during the 1971 India-Pakistan crisis and war. It shows that Nixon and Kissinger routinely demonstrated psychological biases that led them to overestimate the likelihood of West Pakistani victory against Bengali rebels as well as the importance of the crisis to broader U.S. policy. The evidence fails to support Nixon and Kissinger's own framing of the 1971 crisis as a contest between cool-headed realpolitik and idealistic humanitarianism, and instead shows that Kissinger and Nixon's policy decisions harmed their stated goals because of repeated decision-making errors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on issues regarding Kargil War 1999 between India and Pakistan and conflict in the spring of 2019 in response to a deadly attack on Indian military forces by the Pakistan-backed terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed. Topics discussed include lessons and implications for future India-Pakistan relations and Kashmir's liberation a central foreign policy objective, Indian airpower had been used against Pakistani forces since the 1971 war and disparity in the size of nuclear forces between two crisis participants. It mentions inadvertent use of nuclear weapons.

This article aims at investigating the correlative relationship between Pakistan's national security and its nuclear capability. In this endeavor, the prism of neorealism has been employed to logically explore and describe the character of Pakistan's national security aspirations with nuclear weapons. Subsequently, this proposed correlative relation has been tested against four empirical accounts. Soon after its inception, Pakistan began to experience grave external security threats to some of its core values - political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Pakistan employed various security tools of internal and external balancing other than nuclear weapons to protect its core values against the threats of war and coercion of India. But, it could not secure the intended results. For example, three major wars with India: 1948, 1965 and 1971 (disintegration of the country and creation of Bangladesh) challenged national security of Pakistan immensely. Further, post India's Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) of 1974 strategic environment decisively influenced Pakistani decision-making elite to exploit the utility of nuclear weapons as a credible tool of internal balancing. Since the configuration of nuclear weapons in its national security policy, Pakistan has successfully neutralized the Indian strategies of war and coercion. For example, the accounts of Brasstacks Exercise of 1986-1987, Kashmir Crisis of 1990, Kargil conflict and military standoff of 2001-2002 demonstrate the centrality of the nuclear weapons viz-a-viz national security of Pakistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]