Search

This manuscript examines the experiences of Muslims in India with hate on digital platforms. Extant research on Islamophobia on digital platforms offers analyses of the various discourses circulating on digital platforms. This manuscript builds on that research to document the experiences of online hate among Muslims in India based on a survey of 1,056 Muslims conducted by Qualtrics, a panelbased survey company, between November 2021 and December 2021. The findings point to the intersections between white supremacist and Hindutva Alt-Right messages on digital platforms, delineating the fascist threads that form the convergent infrastructures of digital hate. Moreover, they document the extensive exposure of Muslims in India to Islamophobic hate on digital platforms, raising critical questions about their health and wellbeing. The paper wraps up with policy recommendations regarding strategies for addressing online Islamophobic hate on digital platforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay briefly discusses accounts of violence in India before reviewing three recent books that examine the place of violence in Indian political thought. All three books provide insights into the minds of some of the thinkers who have shaped modern India. While two of the authors focus on Mahatma Gandhi and V. D. Savarkar, respectively, the third is more wide-ranging in focus. All three books are important contributions to the study of violence in India, but also a reminder that India's founding figures remain the objects of contestation and appropriation by political parties and movements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the relationship between nation-making and the emergence of Islamophobia in India. Studies on anti-Muslim violence and Islamophobia in India either tend to dismiss the concept or limit its deployment by identifying it within the actions of Hindu nationalist groups situating their rise as an exception to India's secular and multicultural trajectory. Premising on the idea that Islamophobia should be understood as the negation of Muslim political subjectivity this article argues that Hindutva is not an aberration. Rather, it is a continuation of the Indian nation-making project with the Muslim placed as the other of this project. Further, the article frames India as a racial state and this argument would include identifying its systemic nature by looking at the sections of the Indian constitutions and constituent assembly debates. Thus, the Indian state will be understood not as a mere facilitator but as an embodiment of Brahminical hegemony that generates racial conflict and divisions and attempts to exclude or eliminate Muslimness through homogenizing or marginalizing processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A mass protest by farmers camped outside New Delhi in 2020–21 persuaded Prime Minister Narendra Modi's government to repeal laws that aimed to further liberalize Indian agricultural markets. The protests reflected the depth of an ongoing agrarian crisis in the Indian countryside. The Green Revolution introduced in the 1960s and the economic liberalization of the 1990s deepened rural inequalities, creating fertile ground for right-wing populism. More recently, however, economic vulnerability has catalyzed a reassertion of farmer and rural identities over religious affiliations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This manuscript examines the experiences of Muslims in India with hate on digital platforms. Extant research on Islamophobia on digital platforms offers analyses of the various discourses circulating on digital platforms. This manuscript builds on that research to document the experiences of online hate among Muslims in India based on a survey of 1,056 Muslims conducted by Qualtrics, a panel-based survey company, between November 2021 and December 2021. The findings point to the intersections between white supremacist and Hindutva Alt-Right messages on digital platforms, delineating the fascist threads that form the convergent infrastructures of digital hate. Moreover, they document the extensive exposure of Muslims in India to Islamophobic hate on digital platforms, raising critical questions about their health and wellbeing. The paper wraps up with policy recommendations regarding strategies for addressing online Islamophobic hate on digital platforms.

India is facing a period of seismic backlash against feminist and progressive politics and the pace of change, particularly over the last ten years, has been breakneck with serious consequences for women's equality and human rights. Drawing on an examination of the reversals and pushbacks against women's rights in three areas - the citizenship rights of Muslim women, the rights of domestic workers, and the impacts of restrictions on foreign funding on women's rights organising - this article seeks to contribute not just to an understanding of the nature of the backlash faced by women's rights in India, but also to the wider debates on backlash from global South feminist perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study maps the interactions of the Hindutva brand of political populism, which is in rise in India, with the feminist politics and concerns. To study this interaction, the article qualitatively studies the phenomenon of Hindutva-populism and feminist politics and uses the Bhartiya Janata Party, the Hindu-rightist political party, as the site to explore the gendered political culture and the complex relationship that populism and feminism share on the women question in their quest for political and social transformation in India. For this purpose, the article focuses on the broad themes, highlighting the differential visions of both projects, of: the lens through which the problems are diagnosed, the solutions proposed to these problems and the role of the related variables such as power, state and leadership, which puts them in a fundamental clash with each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the intersection of Hindutva politics and Bharatiya Janata Party policies concerning Rohingyas in India. Analyzing the government's approach through official statements, legislative measures, and implementation strategies, it aims to uncover the factors shaping BJP policies toward Rohingyas. Additionally, it explores the Rohingya community's perspectives on government attitudes, political dynamics, and implemented policies, providing a nuanced understanding of the policies' impact. By shedding light on the intricate interplay between political ideology and refugee governance, the article contributes to a deeper understanding of migration, identity politics, and governance challenges in contemporary India. Scrutinizing the interweaving threads of political philosophy and refugee management, the research not only documents the current situation but also offers insights into broader implications for India's political landscape and the lived experiences of the Rohingya community. This exploration is a crucial step toward understanding the evolving socio-political landscape in India concerning the Rohingya refugee crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research paper explores the Hindutva ideology of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) by analysing its implications for Pakistan. BJP’s ascension to power led the Hindu Nationalist government to implement the Hindutva ideological rhetoric. With a substantial Muslim population living in India and rivalry with Pakistan, such policies have significant implications for the Indian Muslim community as well as for Pakistan. These Hindutva-driven policies have not only raised concern regarding minorities' rights in India, affecting Kashmiri Muslims but also raising security challenges for Pakistan. In the past decade, the legislative and executive bodies have been actively engaged in promoting this ideology, as evidenced by the amendment of national citizenship law, growing riots against Muslims, and the Indian government's policy towards Pakistan. By analysing the recent minorities-related events, this paper seeks to assess the impact of the policies of the BJP government towards the Indian Muslim community and its interaction with Pakistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vegetarians developed transnational ties between India and Europe, sharing ideals of purity that also contributed to the formation of today's Hindu nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Book review: Essa A. 2023. Hostile Homelands: The New Alliance Between Israel and India. London. Pluto Press.

This paper explains and corroborates the mechanisms by which civic and political spaces opposed to Hindu nationalism have been attacked, especially after the arrival of the right-wing Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in 2014. Three mechanisms are discerned for replacing pluralistic values with Hindu majoritarian ones. Sometimes institutions are just allowed to drift by interpreting old rules in new ways. For example, no formal rules for media control have changed but the government's control over media has increased substantially. At other times, incremental legal and policy changes are executed to make the change explicit, often building on a new moral purpose. To give another example, the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) was amended and weaponized against NGOs in a layered way in 2020. Finally, when political opposition is weak, institutions that have provided guarantees for protecting diversity have simply been displaced by new and radically different ones. This was the case with abrogating Article 370, which converted the special status of the subnational state of Jammu and Kashmir to the status of two federally administered union territories--Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. These mechanisms place India in a competitive authoritarian frame, where those in power deploy electoral majorities to systematically attack the political opposition, making it more di(cult for it to rise. Despite these propensities, opposition parties have won elections in some of India's subnational states. The challenges facing the world's most populous democracy are significant, even though competitive elements co-exist. These elements in a competitive authoritarian regime, however, are under severe stress. India's democratic credentials can be revived only if the competitive elements of India's democracy stand united against ethno-nationalist Hindu majoritarianism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The months leading to the 2024 Indian general elections have witnessed intense discussions over the implementation of the Uniform Civil Code (UCC). If implemented, the UCC aims to provide a single law governing all civil relationships between citizens who belong to a vast array of communities. This has triggered nationwide media debates among those favouring and opposing the UCC. Whilst the existing literature has primarily focussed on the constitutionality, impact, and necessity -- or lack thereof -- of such a move, this article views the discourse on UCC through a different lens by analysing the media's impact on such discourse on shaping the Muslim identity and rights in India. The main research question posed by this article is: Is there a direct link between the media coverage of socio-political issues concerning Muslims, particularly UCC, and increased polarisation and othering of the Muslim community in the country? Indeed, the overall objective of this article is to underscore how the country's mass media has successfully manufactured the consent for othering the Muslim community. However, tracking the UCC discourse in the humongous landscape of the Indian media in its entirety is not feasible in the short space of this article. Therefore, this article constructs its examination based on the primary and secondary contextual analysis of the mainstream Indian media narrative on the issue to highlight how the media has portrayed Muslims in a predominantly negative light, largely marginalising them. This article also underlines how similar media campaigns have affected other narratives pertaining to widely contested legal issues that impacted Muslims in the recent past. The analysis conducted finds that the Indian media has contributed immensely to the polarisation and othering of the Muslim community in the country. The article concludes by making a case for an urgent need for depolarisation of news in the Indian media landscape to ensure a non-partisan and neutral media that can strengthen democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) was resuscitated in November 2017, it was framed as a minilateral grouping of liberal democratic countries to build a free and open Indo-Pacific in the shadow of China's growing assertiveness. However, this Quad 2.0 had not taken collective action until 2021. The four states neither held leaders' summit meetings nor issued joint statements after lower-level meetings. They took no joint quadrilateral actions to deter China either. From a constructivist perspective, this paper addresses this puzzle by critically revisiting the alleged common identity of the four states. It argues that India's national identity has not been built on the ontological difference between liberal democracy and autocracy but on a complex amalgamation of non-alignment, post-imperial ideology, Hindu nationalism and Indian exceptionalism. India, having held a vision of establishing an India–China partnership in Asia, did not regard China as its significant Other until the deadly border clashes between them in June 2020. China's expansionism has challenged India's identity as the pre-eminent power in South Asia and its vision of an equal China–India partnership. Despite India's increased cooperation with its Quad partners since then, the Quad is built more on geopolitical pragmatism than on shared liberal norms and values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is now well-documented that there is a global trend of right-wing nationalism that perceives minorities, particularly Muslims, as a threat to state identity. India is a pertinent example of this trend wherein its legislation and policies over the last ten years have led to Muslims in India being marginalised -- either through their rights as citizens or in terms of the discrimination and violent attacks they experience at the hands of extremist mobs that believe in the Hindutva ideology. This article will critically explore the scriptural and theological presumptions behind India's laws and assess whether or not these presumptions are true in light of 49:13 of the Qur'an. These presumptions involve a particular conception of religious identity, theological belief and nationalism. 49:13 is a useful verse in the Qur'an that deals with all of these conceptions and by investigating them, one may be able to cut through right-wing nationalist rhetoric and engage in fruitful and truthful dialogue about what exactly the Qur'an states about constructing a harmonious society that involves a majority and minority population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses tension between human rights (including secularism) and Hindutva, the Hindu nationalists’ discourse. Particular focus is put on women’s rights and the right to freedom of expression and dissent in India using the film Water and the controversy associated with it in the north Indian district of Varanasi in 2000. Firstly, the relation between human rights, secularism and Hindutva/Hindu nationalism is discussed conceptually. This is followed by a discussion of the narratives of Hindutva’s followers in Varanasi and their involvement in the controversy surrounding the film Water. Extracts from interviews of Hindu nationalists are included to illustrate this tension. The article concludes by claiming that Hindutva is an antithetical to secularism and human rights.

After the Kashmiri Pandits were driven from their homes by a violent insurgency in the 1990s, the issue of their displacement and potential rehabilitation has featured prominently in mainstream Indian political discourse, and particularly in the messaging of the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The BJP subsequently became the leading political force in India and as the governing party has had ample opportunity to respond to the Pandits' plight. The displacement and possible rehabilitation of the Pandits is thus an appropriate case study to consider how the BJP in government has managed a grievance-based issue that served the party well while it was building its political base. In this article, I apply a critical discourse analysis methodology to the BJP's handling of the plight of the Kashmiri Pandits. I argue that the government has used the plight of the Pandits for electoral advantage while doing little to resolve the issue and failing to create favourable conditions for the community's rehabilitation. The BJP's approach, and the consequent exacerbation of regional and religious polarisation, has instead led to further insecurity for the displaced Pandits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decolonial studies define the coloniality of power as a complex assemblage of dominance and hegemony that emerged during the modern era or the era of colonialism, which stretches from the conquest of the Americas to the present. This article argues that, as part of the critical dialogue between decolonial studies and Islamic liberation theology, the latter should position itself in a decolonial political praxis around the preferential option for the poor that takes both a decolonial turn and a decolonial option seriously. There is a tendency to appropriate certain brands of decolonial studies to engage with forms of nationalism, such as Hindutva, to build a "decolonial option" in the global South by undermining the key insights of the "decolonial turn". This article specifically engages with the claims of "decolonial Hindutva" to critique the nationalist appropriation in decolonial studies, thereby marking its divergence from decolonial Islamic liberation theology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the motivations and actions of Indian Americans who actively oppose Hindutva, that is, a Hindu nationalist vision for India. Diaspora activists who advocate in favour of progressive values for India tend to be underreported in the media and underanalysed in scholarship. The following study addresses this gap. Based on public records, interviews with activist leaders, and participant‐observation, the paper demonstrates how anti‐Hindutva diaspora actors identify and leverage political opportunities in order to engage in moral signalling in local, national and global spaces. By shining a light on ongoing counternarratives to Hindutva, this study highlights contestations within Indian‐origin communities and challenges monolithic portrayals of diaspora politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hindutva, the core political ideology of India's current ruling party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), seeks to transform constitutionally secular India into a Hindu Rashtra ("Hindu nation"). Although Hindutva has all of the features of right-wing extremism (RWE), it is nevertheless viewed as an insular sociopolitical phenomenon, due to the Eurocentric nature of RWE discourse. Recent theoretical and analytical research has sought to showcase the similarity between RWE and Hindutva, but empirical research on their relationship has been largely absent. To fill this gap, in our study, we collected 15 million tweets and used network analysis to identify prominent themes of RWE--including exclusionary nationalism, conspiracy theories, and anti-minority violence and hate speech--among the supporters of Hindutva and the BJP. Furthermore, in our toxicity analysis (performed to understand which themes produced higher levels of toxicity), we found that Hindi-language tweets related to conspiracy theories and anti-minority violence or hate speech were more toxic than English-language tweets. Given that the growing global presence and normalization of RWE-based ideas and movements are sources of concern for everyone invested in the idea of liberal democratic society, our research broadens the discussion on RWE to include the Indian context and invites researchers to further investigate Hindutva from the perspective of RWE. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most significant and confounding anomalies facing experts and commentators is the Hindutva movement’s popularity amongst Dalit and OBC voters. If the Hindutva movement is Brahmanical, how can it be the choice of those it seeks to oppress? This article examines this conundrum. It addresses three central arguments in claims that the movement is Brahmanical, showing how these are based on arbitrary, incomplete data (such as the claim that the Sangh Parivar is against caste-based reservations), or hide conceptual contradictions (such as the argument that the Sangh’s opposition to proselytization is casteist). Furthermore, taken to their logical end, explanations for the movement’s success amongst Dalit and OBC groups raise fundamental questions for/contradictions to the received view on the caste system. This article concludes that describing the Hindutva movement as Brahmanical raises many questions for the received view on the caste system without furthering our understanding of the movement in any way. Una de las anomalías más significativas y confusas a la que se enfrentan expertos y comentaristas es la popularidad del movimiento hindutva entre los intocables y los votantes de OBC (otras clases atrasadas). Si el movimiento hindutva es brahmánico, ¿cómo puede ser el elegido por aquellos a quienes busca oprimir? Este artículo analiza ese misterio. Se ocupa de tres argumentos centrales de las afirmaciones de que el movimiento es brahmánico, mostrando que esos argumentos se basan en datos arbitrarios e incompletos (como la afirmación de que el Sangh Parivar está en contra de las reservas basadas en la casta) u ocultan contradicciones conceptuales (como el argumento de que la oposición del Sangh al proselitismo es castaísta). Además, llevadas a su extremo lógico, las explicaciones del éxito de ese movimiento entre intocables y grupos de OBC suscita preguntas y contradicciones a la visión que se recibe del sistema de castas. Este artículo concluye que describir el movimiento hindutva como brahmánico levanta muchos interrogantes sobre la visión del sistema de castas sin ahondar de ninguna manera en nuestra comprensión del movimiento. Available from: https://doi.org/10.35295/osls.iisl/0000-0000-0000-1334

Published between 1907 and 1910, Rabindranath Tagore's novel Gora reflects its author's evolving cultural, political, and ideological views in the first decade of the twentieth century. This period was significant not only for Tagore's engagement in and disenchantment with the Swadeshi movement, but also in terms of his critical assessment of the viability of a Hindu cultural-national identity for India. Reading the novel in the light of some of his relevant writings in and around the 1900s, this essay puts Tagore's exploration of Hindu identity into perspective in order to distinguish it from the exclusionary Hindutva ideologies later promoted and popularized in Indian politics. Using a dialogic method in the novel, Tagore pits a limited, divisive, and communalist Hindu ideology against an open, liberal, and alternative Hindu selfhood for India which is compatible with the universal-humanist perspective propounded at the end. Despite endorsing the latter perspective, Tagore nevertheless reveals his concerns and uncertainties about the position of minority communities and outsiders within that holistic paradigm of Indian identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article situates the largest political party in the world, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India, within the literature on the populist radical right. After providing a brief overview of Hindutva ideology and organizations, with a particular focus on the BJP, it analyzes how nativism, populism, and authoritarianism are key defining elements in both theory and practice for the BJP. It further examines two important ideological tenets that go beyond these three defining attributes of the (European) populist radical right – anti-colonialism and neoliberalism – which lend towards the success of the BJP. Since holding a majority in national government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the BJP has been able to implement its vision of creating a Hindustan, or Hindu ethnostate. Like other populist radical right parties in power, the BJP is more radical in deeds than in words, but the future of the party without Modi's leadership is uncertain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The post-2014 period in India has seen a clear political shift under the leadership of Modi-led BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party), a ruling party ideologically parented by the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh), a right-wing Hindu-nationalist paramilitary volunteer organization that has millions of members nationwide. These years have been marked by a resurgent Hindu nationalism referred to as Hindutva. Hindutva as an ideology of majoritarian nationalism claims to make India a strong nation and gain international recognition as a rising power. However, both domestically and internationally, it is evident that contemporary that India is marked by a consistent erosion of liberal democratic norms whereby constitutionally guaranteed rights continue to be steadily qualified, undermined, and diminished, alongside a lack of promised improvement in global rankings on various indicators. Moreover, there has been an increase in anti-minority targeting, which is multidimensional and pursued through non/violent and extra/legal means. In this article, I explain the broad backdrop to political transformation and increased violence in India and then specifically focus on explicating two key dynamics--one, the multiple ways in which changes in the sphere of education have been crucial to how dissent is securitized in India and two, how the internalized hierarchical ordering of ideas of citizenship within Hindutva means that Hindu males are seen as the normative citizens and Muslims as the radical Other that can be targeted with exclusion, discrimination, humiliation, even lynching. Using the example of the multiplying vocabularies of "Jihad," I highlight how any aspect of Muslim life or livelihood can be interpreted as a form of sinister "Jihad" deserving a justifiably violent response and/or economic marginalization. I conclude by referring to the sustained and ongoing nature of this transformation of India and call for us to recognize and challenge it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The term 'civilizational state' is used by emerging powers, including India, to mark themselves as distinct from the Westphalian states. This article addresses the following questions: why does India invoke this term despite its association with illiberal states? What ideological foundations and resources inform this narrative? And how does the 'new' India envision its role in international politics? Using an interpretive analysis of select texts and imagery, the article delineates the intellectual roots and aesthetic resources deployed by 'new' India to bring forth a civilizational state narrative which has become an important tool of power projection at both domestic and international levels. It argues that the recent shift from 'civilization' to 'civilizational state' draws its intellectual roots from early Hindutva idealogues. It is based on a conflict-ridden/homogenous understanding of civilization, making it ambivalent towards an inclusive/plural civilizational narrative articulated and nurtured by the nationalists. Internationally, the civilizational state narrative is geared towards reinforcing 'new' India's claim to be in the league of great powers; projecting itself as a power with a difference. Being the world's largest democracy helps in reinforcing this narrative, but signs of a shift towards a homogenous civilizational narrative will have wider implications for India's role in international politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policy hybrids, which combine marketizing and liberalizing reforms with social welfare programmes and state support to boost domestic production, are fast becoming the norm globally. How are neo-liberal and national-developmentalist agendas reconciled as governing practices, and what are their national and international outcomes and implications? This article focuses on the understudied case of India, arguing that a paternalist political rationality, which melds paternalist logics in neo-liberalism and the government's Hindutva civilizationalist politics, underpins its flagship economic policy, the Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan (Self-reliant India Mission). This policy, through production-linked incentives, aims to boost Indian manufacturing. India has benefited from a global push to diversify supply chains and forge new geopolitical partnerships, such as the Quad, to undermine China's manufacturing dominance and geopolitical assertiveness. Yet, its current approach consolidates the dominance of large firms, producing an elitist political economy, and does not address structural weaknesses through public investment in areas like research and education. This has implications for India's development, global trade and geopolitics. These arguments are made by identifying the paternalist logics in the theories and practices of neo-liberalism, and in Hindutva civilizationalist politics; assessing the aims of the Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan as elaborated by government officials; and evaluating the early outcomes of production-linked incentive schemes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India has used civilizational discourses as part of its foreign policy to articulate its rise and rightful place in the world order. This article primarily examines India's civilizational arguments in south Asia. India's civilizational arguments in the region demand scrutiny as the neighbourhood is a theatre of contestation between territorial India and the claims of its civilizational space. Analysing historical accounts on Indian civilization, official documents and domestic narratives in India about south Asia, the article makes three points. First, India's civilizational articulation oscillates between two paradigmatic and contrasting representations of Nehruvianism and Hindutva variants. Second, it is argued that despite the ascendancy of Hindutva 's civilizational symbolism since 2014, India's south Asia policy shows no paradigmatic change. Finally, it points to how the Hindutva project may be detrimental to India's self-image and dealings in south Asia. The article argues that while there is no official corroboration of Hindutva 's claims in India's south Asia policy, the increasing salience of the domestic discussions around Akhand Bharat (undivided India) invites complications for India in its neighbourhood. India's Hindutva -driven civilizational claims raise anxieties of an Indian cultural hegemony in an asymmetric region splintered across territorial and nationalistic lines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers civilizational politics at the interface between nationalism and internationalism. It does this by focusing on some key trends in India's engagements with UNESCO and its flagship conventions for culture. The article builds on existing scholarship regarding the political appropriation of key religious and heritage sites within India by critically examining how Hinduism is presented to UNESCO and other organizations as a religious and civilizational heritage for global recognition and endorsement. We argue that UNESCO's programmes and conventions are being co-opted via a rewriting of history and in the creation of heritage imaginaries of a Hindu nation. From there, the discussion extends previous critiques regarding the conjoining of Hinduism to a Harappan civilization heritage by showing how this geographically extends outwards via a programme of Indian Ocean diplomacy conceived around environmental and historical connectivities. In pulling these various threads together, the article demonstrates the ways in which Hindu civilizational discourses circulate at the international level in seemingly benign and banal ways, and, yet, simultaneously advance the domestic cultural politics now familiar to the Hindutva movement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ambitions for India to enact the role of vishwaguru or 'world teacher' are a conspicuous feature of foreign policy discourse under contemporary Hindu nationalist rule in India. This discourse, and India's foreign-policy practice, engage the international realm with a puzzling intensity given Hindu nationalism's inward-looking and exclusionary emphasis on majoritarian cultural unity. In this article, I leverage International Relations scholarship on social closure, international order and recognition struggles to examine the historical lineages and recent articulations of nineteenth-century religious reformist ideas about India's world mission and spiritual superiority. I argue that different Indian civilizational imaginaries across time produce a pedagogical imperative, aimed at the transformation of global social hierarchies. Centred on a quest to assert social superiority and remake the terms of recognition, any given vishwaguru project nonetheless relies on international recognition. The recent domestic and diasporic appeal of Hindu nationalist foreign policy stems from how it appears to intervene to rectify the longstanding misrecognition of India. In this context, western liberal states' instrumental recognition of India as a democratic partner and defender of liberal order in the face of a 'China challenge' works to endorse and bolster the vishwaguru project of India's current domestic political moment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the religious and spatial politics of contemporary Hindu nationalism through an examination of the construction of the Ram Temple in Ayodhya, India, and the Swaminarayan Mandir in Neasden, UK. Whereas the Neasden Temple is celebrated as a diasporic accomplishment that testifies to British multiculturalism, the Ayodhya temple has been mired by controversy and marred in violence that has spanned decades. Despite these differences, both temples have acquired their specific symbolic, visual and material salience through a global circulation of ideas, goods, peoples and aesthetics. I trace this circulation to show how these two temples serve to concretize and embody a specific historical narrative of 'the Hindu nation' through their shared architectural forms, as well as through the shared processes of their material construction. My argument is that the symbolic, visual and material relationships these temples instantiate across multiple 'national' locations can be read as territorializing mythic formations of 'the Hindu nation' as a global entity. The transnational crossings that secure the local specificities entailed in the construction of these temples demonstrate how contemporary formations of 'globality' are produced by, and in turn become the conditions of possibility for, the transformation of contemporary Hindu nationalism into a global phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hindu civilizationism is more than a century old phenomenon that has been steadily gaining strength. Its recent amalgam with populism has made it ascendant, popular, and mainstream in India. This paper explores how Hindu civilizationism is not only an essential part of the Hindutva and BJP's narrative but also the mainstay of several government policies. The "other" of the BJP's populist civilizationist rhetoric are primarily Muslims and Muslim civilization in India and the aim is to make India "vishwaguru" (world leader) again after 1200 years of colonialism. The evidence of this heady mixture of civilizationism and populism is numerous and ubiquitous. This paper analyzes topics such as Akhand Bharat, the golden age, denigrating Mughals, Hindutva pseudoscience, and Sanskrit promotion to highlight the evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Childhood and time constitute key sites of regulation for nationalist authoritarian regimes. However, the influence of time on contemporary nationalist discourses of childhood located in the Global South remains an underresearched area. This paper critically analyzes two spectacles involving Hindu nationalist Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and secondary school students on the occasions of Teachers Day 2014 and 2015. Temporal language, markers, and symbols rooted in discourses of colonialism/Orientalism, Brahminical Hinduism, and capitalist development are deconstructed to show how nationalist constructions of childhood can penetrate deep into the everyday lives of particular children who are deemed worthy to serve their nation. The paper concludes by highlighting specific ways in which time and temporality are weaponized to reproduce and legitimize a social hierarchy of childhoods that is necessary to sustain Hindu ethno-religious nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes how Hindu nationalists employ fantasy narratives to counteract resistance, with a particular focus on narratives of 'motherhood' and 'pseudoscience'. It does so by first introducing a conceptual discussion of the relationship between fantasy narratives, ontological insecurity, gender, and anti-science as a more general interrelationship characterizing pre- and post-COVID-19 far-right societies and leaders, such as India. It then moves on to discuss such fantasy narratives in the case of India by highlighting how this has played out in two cases of Hindu nationalist imaginings: that of popular culture, with a specific focus on the town Varanasi and the film Water (produced in 2000), and that of the COVID-19 pandemic and the emerging crisis and resistance that it has entailed. Extracts of interviews are included to illustrate this resistance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Has the consolidation of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as the dominant party at the national level since the 2014 Lok Sabha election affected internal security outcomes in India? This question assumes particular significance because of the primacy accorded to the use of force in the BJP's counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy. Using sub-national data on insurgency-related fatalities from 2005–2021, I examine whether states where the BJP received the largest share of votes in the 2014 Lok Sabha election subsequently experienced any significant changes in the pattern of fatalities. Implementing a difference-in-difference econometric specification, I show that the BJP states experienced a relatively sharper decline in security force fatalities from pre-2014 compared to non-BJP states. However, there was no such effect on civilian fatalities or the total number of insurgency-related incidents. Taken together, these findings show that the greater thrust towards militarism in COIN strategy under the BJP, has, paradoxically, increased the security of military/police personnel involved in COIN operations, without commensurate changes in the security of those whom they are mandated to defend. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decolonial studies define the coloniality of power as a complex assemblage of dominance and hegemony that emerged during the modern era or the era of colonialism, which stretches from the conquest of the Americas to the present. This article argues that, as part of the critical dialogue between decolonial studies and Islamic liberation theology, the latter should position itself in a decolonial political praxis around the preferential option for the poor that takes both a decolonial turn and a decolonial option seriously. There is a tendency to appropriate certain brands of decolonial studies to engage with forms of nationalism, such as Hindutva, to build a “decolonial option” in the global South by undermining the key insights of the “decolonial turn”. This article specifically engages with the claims of “decolonial Hindutva” to critique the nationalist appropriation in decolonial studies, thereby marking its divergence from decolonial Islamic liberation theology.

This article makes a case for the inclusion of piety politics and populist masculinities in any analysis of the governance and international relations between two South Asian rivals and nuclear neighbours; Muslim-majority Pakistan and Hindu-majority India. It offers a comparative case-study of the redeemed Sufi masculinity of the recently deposed Pakistani Prime Minister, Imran Khan, and the ascetic Hindutva one performed by the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi. The study finds that the nativist, capitalist and gender discriminatory regimes of both populist leaders depend on subduing any dissenting resistance offered by subaltern masculinist and feminist politics. The conclusion finds that military-pious-heteronormative masculinity serves to stabilize patriarchy in both 'manly states' and underwrites regional security policies. It also points to how subversive movements are constantly challenging these hegemonic masculinities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How and why do right-wing populist parties engage in diaspora outreach? This article uses populism as a lens through to study diaspora engagement, and compares strategies used by right-wing parties in power (Turkey's AKP and India's BJP) to access their diasporas. While we find that polarising and civilisationist discourses are adopted in both cases for uniting the diaspora behind the populist in power, we argue that these strategies are implemented for different purposes. In the Turkish case, the promotion of Turkish and Sunni-Muslim identification serves the purpose of garnering electoral support behind the ruling party, while in the Indian case, identification with Hindutva is used to achieve the financial and developmental goals of the ruling party. By comparing outreach strategies through the analysis of policies and practices employed by the parties as well as the activities of their diasporic organisations, the article contributes to debates on party-led diaspora engagement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of how a country can pursue economic policy while safeguarding its— its national autonomy and identity from foreign influence in an unequal world has assumed new importance in the context of the rise of authoritarian leaders and critical interrogation of globalization in the late twentieth century. The analytic power of terms like neoliberalism and populism is questionable in explaining the economic policy mix or trajectory of an individual nation, especially in the non-Western world. Unearthing the idioms of expression and claims to authenticity of various political interests vying for influence on the scale of the nation-state may be more fruitful. A mosaic of such fragments can help illuminate the opacity of the economic present. Turning back to the period of decolonization in the mid-twentieth century, this article shows how India's recently ascendant Hindu nationalists sought to stake their legitimacy on reconciling economic development to their form of cultural nationalism. It shows how and why Hindu nationalists fashioned a program of small-scale local industrial development and intranational trade as a more authentic alternative to the economic planning being pursued in India and elsewhere. This vision of development focused on the small Hindu trader of North India, the Hindu nationalists' chief constituency. The legacies of this vein of thinking live on, bolstering popular support for Hindu nationalism and posing challenges to efforts seeking to further integrate India into the global economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines India's troubling rise in internet shutdowns. Focusing on internet shutdowns issued outside of the conflict-prone region of Jammu and Kashmir, the article asks two essential questions: One, who issues the shutdowns in India? And two, why are they issued? Using qualitative fieldwork conducted in two Indian states, and quantitative data analysis of recorded internet shutdowns across the country, the article argues that (1) rather than a centrally coordinated, top-down campaign from the central government, India's 28 state governments are largely responsible for the issuing of shutdowns, and (2) the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is both directly and indirectly responsible for many of India's shutdowns. BJP-run state governments issue more shutdowns than non-BJP states, primarily to suppress protest (the direct responsibility), while the party's polarizing rhetoric and policies, coupled with the BJP-built limited regulatory framework governing the issuance of shutdowns, contribute to an environment in which the shutdowns can thrive (the indirect responsibility). Confirming these arguments, my quantitative analyses (2012–2020) reveal that districts in BJP-ruled states experience significantly more internet shutdowns (primarily in response to protests), while Hindu-Muslim conflict triggers internet shutdowns all across the country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India is a multi-religious and multiethnic society, the rise of Hindutva in the country's politics has polarised it in an unprecedented way. The state's inclination towards Hindutva is evident from the plight of Indian Muslims, who constitute one of the largest minority communities anywhere in the world. In today's globalised world, analysing Muslim minority's socioeconomic conditions is imperative especially in the context of the United Nations Millennium and Sustainable Development Goals. This paper primarily examines the post-globalisation socio-economic and political status of the Muslim minority in India. The study focuses on the changing social and political dynamic of Indian society and repercussions for Muslims under the BJP's government. The findings bring forward an alarming situation by highlighting that Muslims minority in India is systematically deprived and by implication, lagging behind vis-à-vis other communities in a state that claims to abide by liberal, secular and democratic norms. Economic and political deprivation, communal riots, prevailing illiteracy, poor health and social conditions are the main characteristics of the Muslim community of India. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We draw from the experience of the Covid-19 pandemic in India to outline that the neoliberal consolidation of the state is enabled by precariousness, violence, and inequality in overlapping planes of marginality. The pandemic showed the abysmal state of public health institutions in India as people experienced an erosion of dignity in both life and death. The harsh and sudden lockdown announced by the Indian state rendered workers jobless, hungry, exhausted, and on the borders of death. Instead of providing social security to workers, the state embarked on a neoliberal agenda of deregulation, weakening job security, and collective bargaining legislation. The state enacted a violent discourse of Hindu nationalism to blame Muslims for the spread of the pandemic in India to deflect attention from its abdication of responsibility in making healthcare and social security available to vulnerable segments of the Indian population. The neoliberal policy response of the state during the pandemic was embedded in the necropolitics of protecting the middle class and elite lives while directing structural violence against the working class and Muslims, making their lives disposable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the impact of social movements on the Indian state's support for cow protection vigilantism, which forms a key aspect of its adherence to the Hindutva ideology. Adopting Varigonda's framework, the paper argues that the movement's impact is determined by its collective action repertoires, politicisation of its affiliated identity and openness of state input structures. The paper tests this framework through a comparative study of two movements: the Dalit-centric post-Una and the Muslim-centric post-Dadri movements. It demonstrates how stronger action repertoires, characterised by protracted mass mobilisation; effective politicisation of the Dalit identity and its propensity towards electoral mobilisation of the Dalit populace; and open state input structures, characterised by the consistent support of major political parties, enabled the post-Una movement – unlike the post-Dadri movement – to impede state support for cow protection vigilantism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hindu civilizationism is more than a century old phenomenon that has been steadily gaining strength. Its recent amalgam with populism has made it ascendant, popular, and mainstream in India. This paper explores how Hindu civilizationism is not only an essential part of the Hindutva and BJP’s narrative but also the mainstay of several government policies. The “other” of the BJP’s populist civilizationist rhetoric are primarily Muslims and Muslim civilization in India and the aim is to make India “vishwaguru” (world leader) again after 1200 years of colonialism. The evidence of this heady mixture of civilizationism and populism is numerous and ubiquitous. This paper analyzes topics such as Akhand Bharat, the golden age, denigrating Mughals, Hindutva pseudoscience, and Sanskrit promotion to highlight the evidence.

Gujarat is Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's home State and training ground. His Gujarat Model is projected as growth and development oriented. This article shows the actual Gujarat Model as top-down, favouring big business and undergirded by violent Hindu nationalism. The cult of the strongman leader – directly attuned to his people and above the corruption of politics as usual – rounds off Gujarat's authoritarian populist playbook. While the antecedents of this playbook are found in recent history, natural and political crises entrenched the Gujarat Model. The leader and his New Gujarat have since been popularised across scale, including nationally. Moving in the opposite direction, the article traces aggressively promoted business and violently repressed dissent in a sub-sub-national district of Gujarat. It then turns to the district's village hinterland, focusing on those who witness and occasionally participate in the Gujarat Model's politics and economics. Here the article finds capitalist development built on precarious labour and jobless growth. It also observes the much-feted Hindu nation riven by contradictions of caste, class, region and gender. Despite such cracks, deepening state authoritarianism, and the populist connect with a larger-than-life leader endure – for now – in the absence of substantive alternatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Social Sciences & Philosophy is the property of Research Center for Humanities & Social Sciences, Academia Sinica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)