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Objectives: We attempt to examine how union membership affects redistributive attitudes. We argue that the impact of union membership on support for redistributive policies is conditional on the economic inequality between the union and nonunion members (between group inequality [BGI]). When BGI is high, unions have less incentive to emphasize the solidaristic redistributive norm because the majority of union members would not be the beneficiaries of government redistribution. Methods: We employ multilevel modeling using the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) datasets that cover 39 countries between 1985 and 2010. Results: We find that the positive effect of union membership on individual support for redistributive policies decreases as the level of BGI increases. Conclusion: Our study demonstrates the importance of group‐level inequality as the contextual factor in explaining the nexus between union membership and preferences for government redistribution. It also suggests that unions play a substantial role in shaping members' attitudes toward government policies in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyzes how political leaders' material backgrounds affect redistributive policies in democracies. Building on political socialization theory, we argue that politicians with personal experience of economic hardship are more likely to have sympathetic attitudes toward redistribution than those without such experience, particularly where political constraints are weak. We posit that firsthand knowledge of economic hardship helps political leaders understand why the poor need government redistribution, and leads them to support more generous social welfare policies. Analyzing an original dataset of leaders' material background in 74 democratic countries between 1980 and 2011, we find that leaders who experienced economic hardship in their youth increase social welfare spending during their tenure, particularly when political constraints are weak. Following prior studies on leaders' personal experiences and policy outcomes, this study provides a new approach to redistribution and welfare policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyzes how economic inequality affects electoral winners and losers' satisfaction with democracy. We posit that both the poor and the rich have more at stake in elections when inequality is high. Electoral losers, whether they are the poor or the rich, are more likely to be dissatisfied with democratic systems when facing greater disparity in wealth. In contrast, electoral winners confronting higher inequality are more likely to express satisfaction with democracy. Employing a multilevel analysis of Comparative Study Electoral Systems (CSES) data, we find that the gap in satisfaction with democracy between electoral winners and losers widens as income inequality increases. Broadening the conventional wisdom that electoral systems mediate the effect of citizens' winner-loser status on their democratic attitudes, we demonstrate that the mediating effects of economic inequality are more critical than the institutional effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyses why income inequality and party polarisation proceed together in some countries but not in others. By focusing on the relationship between income inequality, the permissiveness of electoral systems and party polarisation, the study offers a theoretical explanation for how the combination of income inequality and permissive electoral systems generates higher party polarisation. After analysing a cross-national dataset of party polarisation, income inequality and electoral institutions covering 24 advanced democracies between 1960 and 2011, it is found that a simple correlation between income inequality and party polarisation is not strong. However, the empirical results indicate that greater income inequality under permissive electoral systems contributes to growing party polarisation, which suggests that parties only have diverging ideological platforms due to greater income inequality when electoral systems encourage their moves towards the extreme; parties do not diverge when electoral systems discourage their moves towards the extreme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]