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Reassigning responsibility is the most prominent and best-replicated intervention against escalating commitment (i.e., the failure to withdraw from losing courses of action). This intervention is considered effective because it reduces reinvestments after negative feedback in decision scenarios with a single reinvestment decision. However, we argue that any intervention against escalating commitment should fulfill two additional criteria. The first is temporal stability, that is, the beneficial effects of the intervention need to persist beyond a single reinvestment decision. The second is specific effectiveness, that is, the intervention should reduce commitment only if the project continues to fail after an initial setback (structural failure) but not if it recovers and is ultimately profitable (temporary failure). To subject reassignment of responsibility to this critical test of effectiveness, we introduce a modification of the escalation paradigm that allows testing for temporal stability and differentiates between structural and temporary failure. In the first of two experiments, we did not find evidence of temporal stability. Experiment 2 found persistent short-term effects of responsibility reassignment, but these effects were unspecific, reducing commitment to both losing and ultimately successful courses of action. Our findings question the usefulness of responsibility reassignment as an effective intervention against escalating commitment. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Individual performance in controlling complex dynamic systems such as managing production in a company or keeping ecosystems in balance is often suboptimal. In this article, we provide the first unequivocal test of whether groups are superior to individuals when controlling dynamic systems. In addition, we test to what extent performance advantages of groups are simply the result of statistically aggregating a larger number of individual opinions and to what extent they represent true synergy attributable to within-group interaction. In 3 experiments, we compared the system control performance of interacting real groups with that of equally sized nominal groups and with individuals. We provide evidence that groups indeed perform better than individuals in dynamic system control tasks. Furthermore, in comparing real groups with nominal groups, we show that, although the majority of real groups' performance advantage stems from statistical aggregation, there is also evidence of true synergy. Finally, we identify the mechanism by which groups achieve synergy, namely group-to-individual transfer. Discussion allows group members to exchange critical information about the system, leading to an improved individual capability to control the system, which, in turn, improves group performance. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Advice stemming from sources with errors that are dependent on each other is usually less accurate than advice provided by sources with independent errors, while simultaneously exhibiting greater consensus. We investigate whether or not individuals express a preference for advice with dependent errors by choosing it over advice with independent errors and by weighting it more strongly. We test for this preference both in a situation where error interdependence does not negatively affect advice accuracy as well as in a situation where advice with dependent errors is less accurate than advice with independent errors. In a series of six studies, we show that, when being given the opportunity to choose between the two types of advice, participants only prefer advice with dependent errors if this is not detrimental for accuracy. However, when being sequentially provided with both types of advice, they generally weight advice with dependent errors more than advice with independent errors, even if the latter is more accurate. This effect is mainly driven by the fact that advice with dependent errors exhibits greater consensus, leading participants' initial estimates to lie outside the range of the advisors' judgments more frequently. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Although empirical research has investigated what we ideally seek in a romantic partner for decades, the crucial question of whether ideal partner preferences actually guide our mating decisions in real life has remained largely unanswered. One reason for this is the lack of designs that assess individuals' ideal partner preferences before entering a relationship and then follow up on them over an extended period. In the Göttingen Mate Choice Study (GMCS), a preregistered, large-scale online study, we used such a naturalistic prospective design. We investigated partner preferences across 4 preference domains in a large sample of predominantly heterosexual singles (N = 763, aged 18-40 years) and tracked these individuals across a period of 5 months upon a possible transition into romantic relationships. Attesting to their predictive validity, partner preferences prospectively predicted the characteristics of later partners. This was equally true for both sexes, except for vitality-attractiveness where men's preferences were more predictive of their later partners' standing on this dimension than women's. Self-perceived mate value did not moderate the preference-partner characteristics relations. Preferences proved to be relatively stable across the 5 months interval, yet were less stable for those who entered a relationship. Subgroup analyses using a newly developed indicator of preference adjustment toward (vs. away from) partner characteristics revealed that participants adjusted their preferences downward when partners fell short of initial preferences, but showed no consistent adjustment when partners exceeded them. Results and implications are discussed against the background of ongoing controversies in mate choice and romantic relationship research. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Developmental research, like many fields, is plagued by low sample sizes and inconclusive findings. The problem is amplified by the difficulties associated with recruiting infant participants for research as well as the increased variability in infant responses. With sequential testing designs providing a viable alternative to paradigms facing such issues, the current study implemented a Sequential Bayes Factor (SBF) design on three findings in the developmental literature. In particular, using the framework described by Schonbrodt and colleagues (2017), we examined infants' sensitivity to mispronunciations of familiar words, their learning of novel word-object associations from cross-situational learning paradigms, and their assumption of mutual exclusivity in assigning novel labels to novel objects. We tested an initial sample of 20 participants in each study, incrementally increasing sample size by one and computing a Bayes Factor with each additional participant. In one study, we were able to obtain moderate evidence for the alternate hypotheses despite testing less than half the number of participants as in the original study. We did not replicate the findings of the cross-situational learning study. Indeed, the data were five times more likely under the null hypothesis, allowing us to conclude that infants did not recognize the trained word-object associations presented in the task. We discuss these findings in light of the advantages and disadvantages of using a SBF design in developmental research while also providing researchers with an account of how we implemented this design across multiple studies.

We investigated whether Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) of the subthalamic nucleus (STN) influences social validation as measured by a Judge-Advisor task. In contrast to healthy controls and patients with their DBS OFF, patients with their stimulation switched on do not experience a gain of confidence after receiving competent advice.

One benefit of working in groups is that group members can learn from each other how to perform the task, a phenomenon called group-to-individual transfer (G-I transfer). In the context of quantitative judgments, G-I transfer means that group members improve their individual accuracy as a consequence of exchanging task-relevant information. This improved individual accuracy allows groups to outperform the average of a comparable number of individuals, that is, G-I transfer leads to synergy. While there is mounting evidence that group members benefit from G-I transfer in quantitative judgment tasks, we still know rather little about what exactly group members learn from each other during this transfer. Here, we build on the distinction between metric knowledge (knowing what constitutes a plausible range of values) and mapping knowledge (knowing the relative magnitude of the targets) to gain further insights into the nature of G-I transfer. Whereas previous research found evidence that G-I transfer improves group members' metric knowledge, there is, so far, no evidence that group discussion also improves mapping knowledge. Using a multicue judgment task, we tested whether group members would benefit from G-I-transfer and, if so, whether this G-I transfer would manifest in the form of improved mapping knowledge. The results of two experiments suggest that this is the case. Participants who worked in real interacting groups outperformed participants who worked individually, and this increase in accuracy was accompanied not only by improved metric but also by increased mapping knowledge. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

When advice comes from interdependent sources (e.g., from advisors who use the same database), less information should be gained as compared to independent advice. On the other hand, since individuals strive for consistency, they should be more confident in consistent compared to conflicting advice, and interdependent advice should be more consistent than independent advice. In a study investigating the differential effects of interdependent versus independent advice on a judge's accuracy and confidence (Yaniv, Choshen-Hillel, & Milyavsky, 2009), advice interdependence was confounded with another variable, namely closeness of the advice to the judge's estimate. Interdependent advice was not only more consistent than independent advice but also closer to the judge's first estimate. The present study aimed at disentangling the effects of consensus and closeness of the advice by adding a third experimental condition in which interdependent (and, hence, consistent) advice was far from the judge's own estimate. We found that, as suggested by Yaniv et al., accuracy gains were indeed a consequence of advisor interdependence. However, in contrast to Yaniv et al.'s conclusions, confidence in the correctness of one's estimates was mostly a function of the advice's proximity to the participants' initial estimations, thereby indicating a social validation effect. (PsycINFO Database Record

Research in the judge-advisor-paradigm suggests that advice is generally utilized less than it should be according to its quality. In a series of four experiments, we challenge this widely held assumption. We hypothesize that when advice quality is low, the opposite phenomenon, namely overutilization of advice, occurs. We further assume that this overutilization effect is the result of anchoring: advice serves as an anchor, thus causing an adjustment toward even useless advice. The data of our four experiments support these hypotheses. Judges systematically adjusted their estimates toward advice that we introduced to them as being useless, and this effect was stable after controlling for intentional utilization of this advice. Furthermore, we demonstrate that anchoring-based adjustment toward advice is independent of advice quality. Our findings enhance our understanding of the processes involved in advice taking and identify a potential threat to judgment accuracy arising from an inability to discount useless advice.

Notwithstanding the appeal of the “one size fits all” approach that Baumeister et al. propose, we argue that there is no panacea for improving group performance. The concept of “differentiation of selves” constitutes an umbrella term for similar seeming but actually different constructs. Even the same type of “differentiation of selves” can be beneficial for some and harmful for other tasks.

Escalation of commitment denotes decision makers' increased reinvestment of resources in a losing course of action. Despite the relevance of this topic, little is known about how information is processed in escalation situations, that is, whether decision makers who receive negative outcome feedback on their initial decision search for and/or process information biasedly and whether these biases contribute to escalating commitment. Contrary to a widely cited study by E. J. Conlon and J. M. Parks (1987), in 3 experiments, the authors found that biases do not occur on the level of information search. Neither in a direct replication and extension of the original study with largely increased test power (Experiment 1) nor under methodologically improved conditions (Experiments 2 and 3) did decision makers responsible for failure differ from nonresponsible decision makers with regards to information search, and no selective search for information supporting the initial decision or voting for further reinvestment was observed. However, Experiments 3 and 4 show that the evaluation of the previously sought information is biased among participants who were responsible for initiating the course of action. Mediation analyses show that this evaluation bias in favor of reinvestment partially mediated the responsibility effect on escalation of commitment.

A rational strategy to update and revise one’s uncertain beliefs is to take advice by other agents who are better informed. Adults routinely engage in such advice taking in systematic and selective ways depending on relevant characteristics such as reliability of advisors. The current study merged research in social and developmental psychology to examine whether children also adjust their initial judgment to varying degrees depending on the characteristics of their advisors. Participants aged 3 to 6 years played a game in which they made initial judgments, received advice, and subsequently made final judgments. They systematically revised their judgments in light of the advice, and they did so selectively as a function of advisor expertise. They made greater adjustments to their initial judgment when advised by an apparently knowledgeable informant. This suggests that the pattern of advice taking studied in social psychology has its roots in early development.

Considering advice from others is a pervasive element of human social life. We used the judge-advisor paradigm to investigate the neural correlates of advice evaluation and advice integration by means of functional magnetic resonance imaging. Our results demonstrate that evaluating advice recruits the "mentalizing network," brain regions activated when people think about others' mental states. Important activation differences exist, however, depending upon the perceived competence of the advisor. Consistently, additional analyses demonstrate that integrating others' advice, i.e., how much participants actually adjust their initial estimate, correlates with neural activity in the centromedial amygdala in the case of a competent and with activity in visual cortex in the case of an incompetent advisor. Taken together, our findings, therefore, demonstrate that advice evaluation and integration rely on dissociable neural mechanisms and that significant differences exist depending upon the advisor's reputation, which suggests different modes of processing advice depending upon the perceived competence of the advisor.

Response to Minson and Mueller (2012) peerReviewed

For analysis of the morphology of the visual field in advanced glaucoma, we tested 62 eyes of 54 late stage glaucoma patients using program 10-2 on the Humphrey Field Analyzer. The fields, which were already reduced to a small central isle, had mostly typical, asymmetric borders with their largest extend to the temporal lower quadrant and their smallest extend to the upper nasal quadrant. An upper nasal step was very frequent. The boundaries are equivalent to the retinal nerve fiber lines. Actually, the glaucomatous isle is a 'centro-coecal isle', representing a remnant of intact maculo-papillary nerve fiber bundles. A test with a 2 degrees spacing like the Humphrey program 10-2 proved to be useful for routine perimetry in these cases.