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Attributing affectively neutral mental states such as thoughts (i.e., cool theory of mind, cool ToM) to others appears to be rooted in different processes than the ones involved in attributing affectively charged mental states such as emotions (i.e., hot ToM) to others. However, no study has investigated the developmental pattern of hot and cool ToM abilities using a similar task and the relative contribution of cool and hot inhibitory control (IC) to cool and hot ToM development. To do so, we tested 112 children aged 3.5 to 6.5 years on a cool and a hot version of a ToM task and on a cool and hot version of an IC task. We found that hot ToM abilities developed more rapidly than cool ToM. Importantly, we found that hot IC abilities mediated the relation between age and hot ToM abilities. Taken together, our results suggest that the ability to attribute emotions to others develops more rapidly than the ability to attribute thoughts and that the growing efficiency of hot ToM with age is specifically rooted in the growing efficiency of hot IC abilities.

International audience; To determine whether the growing ability to take a third-person perspective (3PP) is explained in part by the growing ability to inhibit a first-person perspective (1PP), 10-year-old children (n = 49) and 22-year-old adults (n = 52) performed a negative priming adaptation of the own body transformation task. Both children and adults were less efficient in adopting a 1PP after they adopted a 3PP-with a smaller amplitude of the negative priming effect with older age-and adults' and children's performances in the own body transformation task were predicted in part by their Stroop interference scores. These results suggest that the growing efficiency to adopt a 3PP is rooted in part in the growing efficiency to inhibit the 1PP.

International audience; Most researchers assume that deception involves a conflict between a predominant truth response and a deliberate deceptive response. Such a view is consistent with dual process theories that state that high-order cognition operates through fast-automatic processes that may conflict with slow-deliberate ones. In the present study, we tested whether one must inhibit the truth to deceive in light of inconsistent findings in the literature. One hundred and eighty-nine participants were tested across two Negative Priming paradigms that rest on the logic that the activation of a fast-automatic process will be hampered on a given display if it is inhibited on the previous display. Our findings suggest that truthful responses are predominant in healthy adults, which is why inhibitory control is required to activate a deliberate deceptive mode. We argue that the findings from deception studies could be best accounted for by dual process theories.

We investigated whether alexithymia is at the root of the decision-making deficit classically reported in pathological gamblers.Alexithymia has been shown to be a recurrent personality trait of pathological gamblers and to impair the decision-making abilities of nonpathological gamblers, but no previous studies have investigated whether alexithymia significantly affects pathological gamblers' decision making. Although investigations of pathological gamblers typically have studied those seeking treatment, most pathological gamblers do not seek treatment. Thus, to study people representative of the general population of pathological gamblers, we conducted our study in "sportsbook" casinos with a small sample of gamblers who were not seeking treatment.We recruited gamblers in sportsbooks and classified them based on their scores on the South Oaks Gambling Screen and the Toronto Alexithymia Scale: 3 groups of pathological gamblers (6 alexithymic, 8 possibly alexithymic, and 6 nonalexithymic) and 8 healthy controls. All of the participants completed an adaptation of the Iowa Gambling Task.The alexithymic group chose less advantageously on the task than the other groups. The severity of the deficit in decision-making abilities was related to the severity of alexithymia, even when we controlled for the effects of anxiety and depression.Our findings provide preliminary evidence that alexithymia might be a critical personality trait underlying pathological gamblers' decision-making deficits.

The aim of this study is to see if: (i) alexithymia is associated with PG and with the severity of gambling behavior; (ii) alexithymia is associated with strategic and non-strategic gambling.Two hundred and twenty-six gamblers were recruited in different gambling locations. First, pathological gamblers (PGs) (n = 106) were compared to non-pathological gamblers (NPGs) (n = 120). Second, strategic gamblers (n = 92) were compared to non-strategic gamblers (n = 96).After controlling for being or not depressed, PGs have significantly higher alexithymia scores. Alexithymia is positively correlated to the intensity of gambling behavior and associated with PG: being alexithymic (OR = 4.21, SEB = .32, p .001), "difficulty identifying feelings" (OR = 1.07, SEB = .03, p = .038), and "externally-oriented thinking" (OR = 1.07, SEB = .03, p = .026) factors. Nevertheless, while alexithymia is associated with PG in strategic gamblers (being alexithymic (OR = 6.80, SEB = .50 p .001) and "difficulty identifying feelings" (OR = 1.12, SEB = .05 p = .026) factor), this is not the case in non-strategic gamblers. In the latter, only depression is associated with PG (OR = 3.43, SEB = .50 p = .013).The results highlight the importance of taking into account the gambling type in the relationship between alexithymia, depression, and PG.In non-strategic PGs, specific therapies targeting depression could be appropriate, while for strategic PGs, specific psychotherapeutic techniques like body-centered psychotherapy could help them to differentiate feelings from bodily sensations. (Am J Addict 2017;26:152-160).

International audience; Inhibitory control (i.e., the ability to resist automatisms, temptations, distractions, or interference and to adapt to conflicting situations) is a determinant of cognitive and socio‐emotional development. In light of the discrepancies of previous findings on the development of inhibitory control in affectively charged contexts, two important issues need to be addressed. We need to determine (a) whether cool inhibitory control (in affectively neutral contexts) and hot inhibitory control (in affectively charged contexts) follow the same developmental pattern and (b) the degree of specificity of these two types of inhibitory control at different ages. Thus, in the present study, we investigated the developmental patterns of cool and hot inhibitory control and the degree of specificity of these abilities in children, adolescents and adults. Typically developing children, adolescents, and adults performed two Stroop‐like tasks: an affectively neutral one (Cool Stroop task) and an affectively charged one (Hot Stroop task). In the Cool Stroop task, the participants were asked to identify the ink color of the words independent of color that the words named; in the Hot Stroop task, the participants were asked to identify the emotional expression of a face independent of the emotion named by a simultaneously displayed written word. We found that cool inhibitory control abilities develop linearly with age, whereas hot inhibitory control abilities follow a quadratic developmental pattern, with adolescents displaying worse hot inhibitory control abilities than children and adults. In addition, cool and hot inhibitory control abilities were correlated in children but not in adolescents and adults. The present study suggests (a) that cool and hot inhibitory control abilities develop differently from childhood to adulthood – i.e., that cool inhibition follows a linear developmental pattern and hot inhibition follows an adolescent‐specific pattern – and (b) that they become progressively more domain‐specific with age.

Cognitive development is generally conceived as incremental with knowledge of increasing complexity acquired throughout childhood and adolescence. However, several studies have now demonstrated not only that infants possess complex cognitive abilities but also that older children, adolescents, and adults tend to make systematic errors even in simple logical reasoning tasks. Therefore, one of the main issues for any theory of typical cognitive development is to provide an explanation of why at some age and in some contexts children, adolescents, and adults do not express a knowledge or cognitive principle that they already acquired when they were younger. In this review, we present convergent behavioural and neurocognitive evidence that cognitive development is more similar to a non-linear dynamic system than to a linear, stage-like system. In this theoretical framework, errors can emerge in problems similar to the ones infants or young children were succeeding when older children, adolescents, and adults rely on a misleading heuristic rather than on the correct logical algorithm to solve such problems. And the core mechanism for overcoming these errors is inhibitory control (i.e. the ability to inhibit the misleading heuristics). Therefore, typical cognitive development relies not only on the ability to acquire knowledge of incremental complexity but also to inhibit previously acquired knowledge.

International audience; In this study, we tested the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) by using an adaptation of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) in which the emotional context associated with primary inducers was systemati- cally manipulated. In this modified version of the IGT, a picture of either a happy face or a fearful face was presented after each feedback. Critically, the expression of the face was either congruent or incongruent with the feedback delivered. Analyses of participants' choices revealed that the congruency of the emotional context with the feedback affects performance on the IGT: The ability to choose advantageously increases when the emotional context is congruent with feedback (i.e., happy faces after rewards and fearful ones after punishments), whereas this ability is impaired with an incongruent emotional context (i.e., fearful faces after rewards and happy faces after punishments). These findings provide evidence that decision making under ambiguity is driven by emotion-related signals, as postu- lated by the SMH.

International audience; Dual-process theories have suggested that emotion plays a key role in the framing effect in decision- making. However, little is known about the potential impact of a specific positive or negative emotional context on this bias. We investigated this question with adult participants using an emotional priming paradigm. First, participants were presented with positive or negative affective pictures (i.e., pleasant vs. unpleasant photographs). Afterward, participants had to perform a financial decision-making task that was unrelated to the pictures previously presented. The results revealed that the presentation framed in terms of gain or loss no longer affected subjects' decision-making following specific exposure to emotionally pleasant pictures. Interestingly, a positive emotional context did not globally influence risk-taking behavior but specifically decreased the risk propensity in the loss frame. This finding confirmed that a positive emotional context can reduce loss aversion, and it strongly reinforced the dual-process view that the framing effect stems from an affective heuristic belonging to intuitive System 1.