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Legal rules on the attribution of conduct determine whether conduct is considered an act of the State for the purpose of holding it responsible under international law. This thesis analyses the standard and function of attribution rules in the case law of human rights courts, quasi-judicial human rights bodies, and international criminal courts with jurisdiction over violations of humanitarian law. More specifically, this thesis analyses whether human rights courts on the one hand, and international criminal tribunals when dealing with humanitarian law on the other, have followed the standards of attribution as laid down in customary international law or, rather, whether these courts and tribunals have adopted or recognized special rules to determine whether certain conduct constitutes an act of the State. Additionally, this thesis examines whether these courts, tribunals and bodies apply attribution rules from the law of State responsibility to determine the applicable law and consequently enable the exercise of their judicial function. The latter is a question of the function of attribution rules.

The use of force during maritime operations has traditionally been approached from the perspective of the law of the sea, even though this area of law does not have explicit rules on the application of force. Arguably, the standards that the Courts have used in cases to define the use of force during maritime operations were the human rights law standards. As human rights law has, however, always been regarded to apply within the territory of a State, and although this includes the jurisdiction of a State over its vessels and planes, the use of force in actions circumstances at sea between vessels were apparently never explicitly set within realm of human rights law. Today, it is clear that the standards for the application of the use of force flow from the legal regimes of human rights law or the law of armed conflict.

This chapter examines the extent to which the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) has developed in its approach to the protection of women in the post-1993 Vienna Conference era. At that time although the topic of women and human rights law was assuming prominence, there was a vast “silence” on the adequacy of LOAC to address women’s distinctive experiences of armed conflict. This chapter identifies and analyzes the significant areas of change, namely, the recognition of the gendered impact of armed conflict on women; the developments in the criminalization of sexual violence in armed conflict through international criminal law; the work of the United Nations, in particular Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security; and the changing approach of the military establishment of states and the International Committee of the Red Cross to women and LOAC. Finally, the discussion identifies the ongoing challenges for further progress.

In the context of military medical care, Eisenstein and colleagues have introduced the notion ‘left of bang intervention in trauma’, which refers to interventions administered before trauma to reduce morbidity and mortality after injury. This paper responds to Eisenstein and colleagues’ ethical analysis of such interventions, highlighting the difficulty in distinguishing between purely prophylactic and enhancing interventions. This response also addresses legal issues that arise from left of bang interventions under human rights law and the law of armed conflict, in particular the questions as to whether the consent of service members would need to be obtained and whether the adversary would as a consequence be authorised to resort to more injurious weapons.

Howard M. Hensel (ed.), The Law of Armed Conflict: Constraints on the Contemporary Use of Military Force (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007). Pp. xiv + 266. £25. ISBN 0754671135. James Beckman, Comparative ...

This article argues that an internal armed conflict exists in Pakistan and the law of armed conflict together with human rights law applies to it. It is further argued that both the security forces of Pakistan and the Pakistani Taliban have and will continue to violate these laws and to expose the Taliban's violations alone is only a half-truth. To conclude, the reasonable prospects, or lack thereof, of the war crimes committed in this conflict to be prosecuted are discussed.

Howard M. Hensel (ed) The Law of Armed Conflict: Constraints on the Contemporary Use of Military Force (Hampshire: Ashgate 2007) Elizabeth Wilmshurst and Susan Breau (ed) Perspectives on the ICRC S...

This chapter clarifies the ethical requirements concerning the legal protection of the environment in armed conflict. It takes as its starting point a number of assumptions. The first is that there is an ethical underpinning for the law relating to the protection of the environment in armed conflict. The second assumption is that certain principles can be derived from these underpinnings. Finally, the third assumption is that such principles have inspired and continue to inspire the objectives of designing and applying a legal regime. The chapter demonstrates whether, and if so why, these assumptions are correct. The important principles of the law of armed conflict derived from Rousseau's concept of war are the principle of distinction and the prohibition of 'unnecessary suffering'. It has been shown that the ethical foundations of international humanitarian law and of environmental law have some points in common. Keywords: armed conflict; ethical requirements; international environmental law; international humanitarian law; legal protection; legal regime; Rousseau's concept of war

This chapter considers a range of situations which arises in international armed conflicts (IACS) and non-international armed conflicts (NIACS), specifically in relation to whether fighters able to prevent their transfer to a particular State against their will. For example: State A is the potentially transferring State. In the build-up to an armed conflict, State A wishes to expel nationals of the State with which there will be an armed conflict who are members of its armed forces. It should be remembered that armed conflicts often do not come out of nowhere. The nationals of State B whom State A wishes to expel do not as yet have combatant/prisoner of war status. They are simply a sub-group within the group of nationals of State B. This potentially raises questions of discrimination but, if the conflict is sufficiently certain and imminent, it may be regarded as a justified difference in treatment. Keywords: fighters; international armed conflicts (IACS); non-international armed conflicts (NIACS); war status

This thesis examines the adequacy of the laws of armed conflict to prohibit environmental damage in non-international armed conflict. The overall conclusions is that the laws of armed conflict are not adequate in this regard because they do not apply in equal measure to state and non-state actors and they only provide piecemeal indirect environmental protection, which conforms to the requirements of the principle of legality and the rule of international law in only very specific circumstances. The thesis begins by tracing the historical development of the environmental dimension of the laws of armed conflict, to explain the absence of direct environmental protection provisions and to contextualise the discussion the subsequent chapters. It also briefly outlines the nature of the environmental damage caused by state and non-state actors in non-international armed conflict. Subsequently, the treaty-based and customary laws of armed conflict that have the potential to indirectly protect the environment in non-international armed conflict are identified and discussed. In this regard, Common Article 3, provisions of Additional Protocol II, some regulations on the methods and means of warfare, the Martens Clause, the principles of distinction, humanity, military necessity, proportionality and precautions in attack are interrogated, in addition to customary rules identified by the ICRC in their Customary Law Study.This examination of the laws of armed conflict is supplemented by analysis of the extent to which the proscriptive gaps in the laws of armed conflict can be filled by other branches of international law and mechanisms of international accountability. In particular, international human rights law, international environmental law, international criminal law, international civil compensation mechanisms and environmental ¿safe zones¿ are explored in Chapters 6 and 7. The conclusion summarises the main findings in the thesis, proves the research statement in answer to the research question, identifies limitations to the study and implications for future research.

The division between peace and war has become increasingly blurred in factual terms in recent decades. Similarly, the law has progressed in a manner that has not necessarily been consistent. The author reviews how the laws covering the use of force in both peace and war have developed separately under the respective headings of the laws of war (also known as the law of armed conflict or international humanitarian law) and human rights law. The increasing overlap between these two bodies of public international law has led to tensions particularly in relation to the conduct of hostilities. The author suggests a way forward to ensure the applicability of the highest standards of protection whilst still enabling military operations to be carried out efficiently within a legal framework.

The International Committee for Military Medicine (ICMM) decided at the 32nd Congress in Vienna in 1998 to give the Surgeon General of the Swiss Armed Forces the mandate to organize its international courses on the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). The Swiss Federal Government fully honored and endorsed its obligation to organize these important international courses. It is in the continuing tradition of Switzerland, as a small neutral state, to support humanitarian help and all efforts to prevent war. As decided by the head of the government on April 3, 1998, the mandate of the LOAC Courses will be funded by the Swiss Confederation.

This chapter provides a brief commentary on the concept of 'collateral damage' in the context of the Law of Armed Conflict and recommend that 'collateral damage' be criminalized and designated an international crime. The term 'collateral damage' refers to the killing of persons, who are civilians or non-combatants. The Law of Armed Conflict draws a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate targets via the notion of a threat. According to Ronald Munson, as a general rule, four conditions must be satisfied before the doctrine of double effect is applied. First, it must be objectively demonstrated that the action that results in a collateral damage itself is morally indifferent or morally good. Second, the bad effect is the means by which the good effect is achieved. Third, the motive is the achievement of the good effect only and, fourth, the good effect is at least equivalent in importance to the bad effect. Keywords: collateral damage; international crime; Law of Armed Conflicts

This chapter explores the possibilities presently available for the protection of civilian educational institutions in International Humanitarian Law (IHL) during the hostilities of international armed conflict. It examines protecting narrow and specific types of schools or places of instruction, for instance those providing education in the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), ordinary civilian schools and universities. The chapter also deals with the wider meaning of educational institutional facilities within cultural property protections or institutions containing that property which provides educational services such as museums or libraries. The chapter considers and identifies the means and mechanisms available to afford international legal protection to the buildings or facilities of the educational institution, rather than addressing the protections or available to persons benefiting from education, the continuance of education in wartime, or the education itself and its contents. Keywords: civilian educational institutions; cultural property protections; hostilities; international armed conflict; International Humanitarian Law (IHL); international legal protection; Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC); wartime

A realistic approach to humanitarian principles in the field of the Law of Armed Conflict should take into account "military necessity." Does military necessity also play a role in the medical field? The provisions regarding the treatment of the wounded and sick seem definite because they are at the core of International Humanitarian Law. The conduct of military medical personnel, the attention to be paid to the wounded and sick, as well as to medical equipment or facilities are provisions that derive from unyielding principles of care, respect, protection, and equality of treatment. To what extent may this analysis be considered as contrary to the common realism of LOAC? How far should medical personnel be requested to implement the Geneva standards in any circumstance? In fact, unless otherwise specified, military necessity can never lead to a reduction in these standards in the course of battle.

Recent reports published by Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) charge that NATO forces in ALLIED FORCE selected and attacked targets in violation of the Law of Armed Conflict. If these allegations are true, it follows that the CINC with responsibility for ALLIED FORCE--and his planners--violated the law, with potential liability for themselves and NATO and the U.S. Additionally, if the AT and HRW charges are true, then current CINCs and their planners cannot look to ALLIED FORCE as a model for targeting in any future military operation. An examination of the Al and HRW allegations, however, reveals that they are incorrect for two reasons: either the two organizations are wrong on the facts or, alternatively, they have misstated the law. Targets selected during ALLIED FORCE were legitimate military objectives, and were lawfully attacked. As a result, ALLIED FORCE is a proper and valid model for future targeting operations.

INTRODUCTION: AN OUTMODED LEGAL PARADIGM 676 I. BACKGROUND 687 A. The Law of Armed Conflict 687 B. National Security Law 695 C. The Assumption of Clear Boundaries 702 II. CHANGES: GLOBALIZATION AND ASYMMETRICAL THREAT 705 III. THE BREAKDOWN OF BOUNDARIES 711 A. “International” Versus “Internal” Armed Conflicts 711 B. Crime Versus Conflict 715 C. Geographical Boundaries 720 D. War Without End: Temporal Boundaries 725 E. We Are All at War: Distinctions Between Persons 729 F. The Boundaries Between National Security and Domestic Affairs...... 736 IV. IMPLICATIONS: WAR EVERYWHERE; RIGHTS NOWHERE 744 V. WHAT CAN BE DONE? HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AS A BASIS FOR CRITIQUE 746 VI. REINVENTING THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 755 CONCLUSION 760

The Henry Dunant Institute is inaugurating its collection of scientific works with an important book by F. Kalshoven which is reviewed in this issue. We are pleased to publish below a paper which this writer delivered at the International Congress on Humanitarian Law in San Remo last September. (Ed.)