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The problem of the foundation of human rights in times of «eclipse of reason» is more like an enigma than a philosophical reflection. Bobbio renounces the very possibility of a foundation of human rights, proposing that we limit ourselves to defending them and transferring the role of the thinker from the philosophical level to the political level. What has happened afterwards is enough to show that the reductive approach is not satisfactory and can even legitimize abuses and misunderstandings: a new philosophy of human rights is needed, and a new confidence in our reason. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is often thought that the lack of agreement about the 'why' of human rights, led the drafters of the Universal Declaration in 1948, to avoid any attempt to establish any kind of metaphysical claims about human rights. This paper shows how the drafters of the Declaration built a complete but unfinished argument about the foundation or about the rational justification of human rights. They have articulate a description of a real 'being', which is possible 'to know', that justify a 'duty'. The practical agreement reached by the drafters is only possible, if they state minimum metaphysical truths, admit a practical knowledge, and sustain deontic commitments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In this paper, the author begins by summarizing Luigi Ferrajoli's proposal on the philosophical foundation of fundamental rights. He later makes a critical analysis of the principal points. Mainly, the author studies the instrumental character of this founding strategy, its debatable logical coherence, its undeniable relativism, its limitations towards the subjects of rights and, finally, the impossibility to overcome, consistently, the positivist reductionism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While positions on the public role of religion in Western societies are polarized primarily into the secular and secularism, for some years there have been a series of arguments that do not seem to fit either in one or the other category. They therefore suggest a revision of the model that the West has assumed to be secular and politically correct when encompassing the relationship between politics and religion. These ideas are held by non-Catholic intellectuals, including some who are not believers. They argue for the re-visioning of secularization from different scientific and epistemological positions: historical, philosophical, sociological, political theory, theological and others. The objective of this paper is to briefly describe these and also set forth the problems associated with this discussion when establishing human rights, an area of particular sensitivity due to the interaction between politics and religion in the contemporary context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The philosophical basis of human rights is the reflection we want to outline along this paper. We are trying to answer the criticism on this same topic made by Norberto Bobbio. Our task is carried out through a philosophical proposal that makes us discern two types of foundations. First we will draw a theoretical basis which will constitute the referential frame for a theoretical and practical reflection on human rights and second we want to outline the foundation emerging from the praxis and defense of human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article pursues the recount of ethic's search for the fundament of Human Rights in its effort to contribute with the overcoming of the problem presented by the pretended universality of such rights in a World characterized by multiculturalism. In this context, some attempts for explaining the human rights foundations are presented; along with the discussion arisen about the universalist and pluralist-relativist positions. There is also an elaboration on the fundaments and conceptions of human rights and some hints about the debate between the iusnaturalist and the iuspositivist proposals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]