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Our purpose here is to compare the protection against insider trading in Brazil and the European Union law, specifically the way insider trading is sanctioned in these two jurisdictions. We highlight the different compositions between administrative and criminal sanctions found in the two systems and their implications for the fundamental rights and personal rights (in case of Brazil) of those held liable for the practice of insider trading. The possible cumulation of punishments imposed by criminal courts and administrative regulatory bodies raise the question whether there might be a violation of the ne bis in idem principle. The response to that question is different in each system. We will start by briefly taking stock of the genesis and evolution of anti-insider trading regulation in Brazil and in the EU in order to comprehend the different rationales for the prohibition of insider trading in the two jurisdiction, so as to understand the reasons behind their divergencies and convergencies. Nuestro propósito aquí es comparar la protección contra el uso de información privilegiada en Brasil y la ley de la Unión Europea, específicamente la forma en que se sanciona el uso de información privilegiada en estas dos jurisdicciones. Destacamos las diferentes composiciones entre sanciones administrativas y penales encontradas en los dos sistemas y sus implicaciones para los derechos fundamentales y los derechos de la personalidad (en el caso de Brasil) de los responsables por la práctica del uso de información privilegiada. La posible acumulación de sanciones impuestas por los tribunales penales y los órganos reguladores administrativos plantea la cuestión de si podría haber una violación del principio ne bis in idem. La respuesta a esa pregunta es diferente en cada sistema. Comenzaremos revisando brevemente la génesis y evolución de la regulación sobre el uso de información privilegiada en Brasil y en la UE con el fin de comprender las diferentes razones de la prohibición del uso de información privilegiada en ambas jurisdicciones con el fin de comprender las razones detrás de sus diferencias y convergencias. Nosso objetivo aqui é comparar a proteção contra insider trading no Brasil e na União Europeia, especificamente a maneira como o insider trading é sancionado nessas duas jurisdições. Destacaremos as diferentes combinações entre sanções administrativas e criminais encontradas nos dois sistemas e suas implicações para os direitos fundamentais e da personalidade (no caso do Brasil) dos responsáveis pela prática de abuso de informação privilegiada. A possível acumulação de punições impostas por tribunais criminais e órgãos reguladores administrativos levanta a questão de saber se pode haver uma violação do princípio ne bis in idem. A resposta a essa pergunta será diferente em cada sistema. Começaremos fazendo um breve balanço da gênese e da evolução da regulamentação sobre uso de informações privilegiadas no Brasil e na UE, a fim de compreender as diferentes razões para a proibição do insider trading nas duas jurisdições de forma a entender os motivos por trás de suas divergências e convergências.

Aimed at establishing an effective and consistent enforcement of market abuse regulation, the regime introduced by Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014 (‘MAR’) and Directive 2014/57/EU (‘MAD II’) relies on a mix of criminal penalties and administrative sanctions, both of which are subject to the principles of double jeopardy and due process. In the light of a few cases decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’), the features of this regime are, however, unclear, and it is doubtful whether the current framework is adequate to achieve its goals. This article criticizes the decision to criminalize market abuse at the EU level and argues that a credible EU supervisory system is better served by an enforcement system based on administrative sanctions. Moreover, the article discusses the solution offered by the ECtHR to the trade-off between efficiency and fairness in administrative proceedings and proposes an allocation of prosecution and decision-making to independent bodies within the same supervisory authority as a means to better balance efficiency and fairness.

The accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights is currently being renegotiated, but this remains a rocky and time-consuming process. Mostly relying on doctrinal method, the authors examine various methods advocated in legal theory as a means to ensure a coherent protection of human rights in Europe in the absence of an institutional agreement. The authors focus their attention on the further development of autonomous concepts in the case law of two the European supranational courts as a prerequisite for successful application of the status quo method. The principle of ne bis in idem is selected as a case in point. Finally, authors formulate proposals for approaches regarding autonomous concepts to be utilized by the Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights.

This article discusses the recent developments in the case laws of the European Courts on the principle of ne bis in idem at the interface between criminal and administrative law, in particular with regard to the legitimacy of double-track enforcement systems. It is argued that both, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), have aligned not only in lowering their previously more protective standards, but also in laying down new rules that, though partially converging, remain highly unclear. Through an analysis of the case law following the ECtHR’s judgment in A and B v Norway and the three CJEU 2018 decisions in Menci, Garlsson and Di Puma and Zecca, it is demonstrated that the uncertainty generated as to the precise conditions under which dual criminal and administrative proceedings are permissible leads to unforeseeable outcomes. The potential consequences, most importantly, also tend to put pressure on other aspects of this fundamental guarantee, as well as on the standard of protection of other fundamental rights that to date are considered as given. Against this background, we will discuss at last whether the slight differences in the approach adopted by the CJEU to that of the ECtHR could reveal a silent effort on its part to take a more right-friendly stance.

U ovom radu ćemo se osvrnuti na ustavnosudsku zaštitu onih prava koja spadaju u tzv. „tvrdo jezgro“ ljudskih prava. Naravno, izložićemo i praksu ESLjP o istoj materiji što će nam dati mogućnosti za određene zaključke. Sagledano u svetlu člana 15. stav 2. EKLjP „tvrdo jezgro“ obuhvata: pravo na život (član 2 EKLjP), zabranu mučenja (član 3 EKLjP), zabranu ropstva i prinudnog rada (član 4 EKLjP), kažnjavanje samo na osnovu zakona (član 7 EKLjP) i pravo da se ne bude dvaput suđen ili kažnjen u istoj stvari (član 4 Protokola 7). Ovom prilikom autor se bavi zaštitom prava na život, zabranom mučenja, kažnjavanjem samo na osnovu zakona i postulatom ne bis in idem. Imajući u vidu da pre ustavnosudske zaštite osnovnih ljudskih prava i sloboda u krivičnoj stvari dolazi zaštita koju pružaju redovni sudovi kroz primenu sistemskih zakona, u meri u kojoj je to neophodno za ovaj rad, autor se osvrće i na pojedine odredbe ovih zakona. Osnovna svrha krivičnog prava je zaštita društva od kriminaliteta ali istovremeno ono svojom svrhom ne sme da ugrozi dostignute standarde ljudskih prava. Da li neke negativne kriminalnopolitičke tendencije, kao što su pojačana represija i krivičnopravni ekspanzionizam, kojima se nastoji da se postigne osnovna svrha ustvari ugrožavaju ljudska prava. Na kraju, autor zaključuje da kriterijumi koje postavlja Evropski sud za ljudska prava u velikoj meri proširuju materijalne i procesne garancije i jemstva ne samo u Srbiji, već i u najvećem delu Evrope. In this paper we shall address the Constitutional Court protection of those rights which are considered the so-called “hard-core human rights”. Naturally, we shall also present the practice of the European Court of Human Rights in the same matter, which will make it possible for us to draw certain conclusions. Observed in the light of Article 15, par. 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the “hard core” includes: Right to Life (Article 2 of the Convention), Prohibition of Torture (Article 3 of the Convention), Prohibition of Slavery and Forced Labour (Article 4 of the Convention), No Punishment without Law (Article 7 of the Convention) and the Right not to be tried or punished twice (Article 4 of Protocol 7). On this occasion the author deals with the protection of the right to life, prohibition of torture, no punishment without law and ne bis in idem principle. Taking into account that the protection offered by regular courts through application of framework laws precedes the Constitutional Court protection of the basic human rights and freedoms in criminal matter, the author also addresses, to the extent necessary for this paper, certain provisions of these laws as well. The main purpose of criminal law is to protect society from crime but at the same time this purpose must not jeopardize the achieved human rights standards. Do some negative criminal-policy tendencies, such as increased repression and criminal-law expansionism, which are aimed at achieving the main purpose actually jeopardize the human rights? Finally, the author concludes that the criteria set by the European Court of Human Rights largely expand substantive and procedural guarantees and warranties not only in Serbia, but also in the majority of Europe.

The article deals with the enforcement of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in domestic systems, and particularly with the advisability of a provision that allows the review of a final judgment at domestic level when the Court found that judgment in violation of the Convention. The most relevant provision is Article 46 of the Convention. After showing how the way Article 46 is construed influences the protection of fundamental freedoms (I), the article focuses specifically on Italy, that - unlike other countries - has never provided for any form of review of its final judgments in order to comply with Article 46. Though recently the courts have started filling this gap in the law (II). The thesis is that the only way to comply with Article 46 is to allow a review and an immediate suspension o f the enforcement o f a judgment, with no conditions and for any kind of proceeding, whenever the Court found it was in violation of the Convention (III). Then, the article contrasts the proposed approach to the bills on the matter pending before the Italian Parliament (IV), and concludes by arguing that the proposed legislative reform is advisable both for European federalists and for 'Eurosceptics' (V).

Enhanced cooperation in police and judicial matters within the EU gives rise to instances in which several Member States are liable to prosecute the same subject in respect of the same act. Within the common judicial area that is developing in the EU, a uniform ‘European’ ne bis in idem rule is a necessary instrument for the regulation of transnational justice. However, several differently worded ne bis in idem provisions are found in a number of instruments which exist within the framework of the Council of Europe or within that of the EU. The differences between these provisions could lead to confusion and conflict, potentially jeopardizing the uniform application of the ne bis in idem principle in EU law. The purpose of this study is to further clarify the substance, scope and interpretation of ne bis in idem as a single, autonomous principle within the legal order of the EU, by way of a conceptual and jurisprudential analysis. Particular attention is given to those areas of Community and EU law in which the application of the ne bis in idem principle is of particular relevance: the law of the Third Pillar of the EU and EC competition law.

The deepening and widening of European integration has led to an increase in transborder crime. Concurrent prosecution and sanctioning by several Member States is not only a problem in inter-state relations and an obstacle in the European integration process, but also a violation of the ne bis in idem principle, defined as a transnational human right in a common judicial area. This article analyzes whether and to what extent the ECHR has contributed and may continue to contribute to the development of such a common ne bis in idem standard in Europe. It is also examined whether the application of the ne bis in idem principle in classic inter-state judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the framework of the Council of Europe may make such a contribution as well. The transnational function of the ne bis in idem principle is discussed in the light of the Court of Justice’s case law on ne bis in idem in the framework of the area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Finally the inherent tension between mutual recognition and the protection of human rights in transnational justice is analyzed by looking at the insertion of the ne bis in idem principle in the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant.

Citizens and companies globalize: they are increasingly making use of their rights to free movement, to free settlement, to offer services and goods, to realize financial transactions, etc. Enforcement systems, including the criminal justice system, have to follow suit. They are obliged to go abroad to gather evidence, for the detention and extradition or surrender of suspects, to confiscate assets, to deal with conflicts of jurisdiction and the choice of allocating a criminal investigation and adjudication. Globalizing criminal justice systems increases the risk of double prosecution and/or double punishment. Do (legal) persons have the (fundamental) right not to be prosecuted or punished twice for the same facts in a globalizing and integrating world. Are they protected against these forms of double jeopardy in settings of transnational criminal justice, such as for instance in the EU area of freedom, security and justice? Does the ne bis in idem principle have a transnational reach? If so, what does this mean and what are the obstacles and exceptions thereto? In posing these questions, this article asks whether a (legal) person can derive a right to transnational protection in the area of freedom, security and justice from the different sources of ne bis in idem obligations in domestic law, in public international law (human rights law and mutual legal assistance) and in EU law. By analysing these sources and the case law thereon, I come to the conclusion that (legal) persons are unprotected against transnational double jeopardy, with the exception of the transnational ne bis in idem in the EU area of freedom, security and justice. However, even in the case of the latter exceptions, derogations, reservations and draw back interpretations based on national sovereignty undermine the rationale and scope of a real transnational ne bis in idem principle in a common space of transnational criminal justice.

The deepening and widening of European integration has led to an increase in transborder crime. Concurrent prosecution and sanctioning by several Member States is not only a problem in inter-state relations and an obstacle in the European integration process, but also a violation of the ne bis in idem principle, defined as a transnational human right in a common judicial area. This article analyzes whether and to what extent the ECHR has contributed and may continue to contribute to the development of such a common ne bis in idem standard in Europe. It is also examined whether the application of the ne bis in idem principle in classic inter-state judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the framework of the Council of Europe may make such a contribution as well. The transnational function of the ne bis in idem principle is discussed in the light of the Court of Justice’s case law on ne bis in idem in the framework of the area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Finally the inherent tension between mutual recognition and the protection of human rights in transnational justice is analyzed by looking at the insertion of the ne bis in idem principle in the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant.