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Post‐phenomenological geographies have critiqued the idea that the world appears for humans alone. In turn, these geographies have begun to develop concepts to investigate the way entities appear to one another in ways that exceed or confound human sense, while recognising that these entities can only be investigated through human modes of access. Addressing the absence of explicit spatial theorisation in this literature, the paper develops a post‐phenomenological account of space. Building on relational and phenomenological geographies and expanding the work of Tristan Garcia, the paper analyses space in terms of the comprehension and form of entities. In doing so, it defines space as a dual process of differentiation and distanciation that produces different modes of nearness and farness that are specific to the intercomprehension of particular entities. Through this analysis the paper offers an account of power as tied to the spatiality of entities, where power is defined as the inequality of comprehensions between entities and how these inequalities are designed to provoke and encourage particular forms of engagement. The paper develops a post‐phenomenological account of space. Building on relational and phenomenological geographies and expanding the work of Tristan Garcia, the paper analyses space in terms of the comprehension and form of entities. In doing so, it defines space as a dual process of differentiation and distanciation that produces different modes of nearness and farness that are specific to the inter‐comprehension of particular entities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines geography’s engagements with phenomenology. Tracing phenomenology’s influence, from early humanist reflections on the lifeworld to non-representational theories of practice, the paper identifies the emergence of a distinct post-phenomenological way of thinking. However, there is currently no clear articulation of what differentiates post-phenomenology from phenomenology as a set of theories or ideas, nor is there a clear set of trajectories along which such difference can be pursued further. In response to this, the paper outlines three key elements that differentiate phenomenology from post-phenomenology and that require further exploration. First is a rethinking of intentionality as an emergent relation with the world, rather than an a priori condition of experience. Second is a recognition that objects have an autonomous existence outside of the ways they appear to or are used by human beings. Third is a reconsideration of our relations with alterity, taking this as central to the constitution of phenomenological experience given our irreducible being-with the world. Unpacking these differences, the paper offers some suggestions as to how post-phenomenology contributes to the broader discipline of human geography. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]