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In 2006, responsibility for implementing the Dutch housing allowance system was transferred from the Ministry of Housing to the Tax Authority. It has since been renamed, and is now known as the ‘rent rebate system’. A number of dilemmas have become evident since the 2006 changes. Attention has shifted to how to implement the system effectively: how to limit the overconsumption of housing services, how to avoid moral hazard, how to reduce outright fraud, how to reduce the poverty trap, and how to prevent the escalation of public spending. These new dilemmas have led to the central research question in this article: how to redesign a system of rent rebates? The discussion of these dilemmas points to further changes. Proposals for a redesign of the rent rebate system in the Netherlands are presented. These proposals could also be relevant for other countries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This study explores the role of housing expenses and subsidies with respect to income distribution in Flanders (the northern part of Belgium) and the Netherlands in 2005–2006. It analyses income poverty and inequality by comparing equivalent disposable income before and after housing expenses with a relative poverty threshold and the Gini coefficient. Poverty and income inequality increase in both ‘countries’ when equivalent disposable income is corrected for housing expenses. Furthermore, the relative position of outright owners and social tenants regarding poverty improves. Housing subsidies play a (partly) different role in Flanders and the Netherlands. The implicit social rent subsidy in Flanders and the explicit housing allowance in the Netherlands serve the same goal; however, they both redistribute income relatively strongly in favour of low-income tenants. The tax relief system on the other hand increases income inequality in society, in both Flanders and the Netherlands, whereas our comparative analysis suggests that tax relief does not have a moderating effect on net housing expenses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the application of the concept of competition to social housing in Europe. A distinction is made between competition amongst social housing suppliers and between social housing organisations and commercial suppliers of housing. The competitiveness of social housing is examined using evidence mainly from England and the Netherlands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Housing allowances aim to make rental housing affordable for the recipients. Whether affordability for tenants is achieved in an economically efficient way is the question that is discussed in this essay. Three aspects of efficiency are focused on: disincentives to work, over-consumption of housing and horizontal inefficiency. These topics are tackled through a discussion that focuses mainly on the principles, but also on some of the outcomes, of the means-tested housing allowance systems in six Western countries: Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States and Sweden. Conclusions concern the apparent unimportance of the poverty trap or the unemployment trap specifically for rental housing, the concept of notional rent used to tackle over-consumption, and the frequent existence of some form of horizontal inefficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper the meaning of the term 'housing subsidy' is reviewed and the theoretical and practical problems of measuring the value of housing subsidies and making comparisonsbetween countries is demonstrated.The definitions of both 'subsidy' and 'housing subsidy' are questioned. The paper shows that what is and is not a housing subsidy is often ill defined. More rigorous analysis, it is argued, requires the use of 'benchmarks' against which the changes initiated by subsidies can be judged. The use of alternative benchmarks with respect to home owners, tenants and landlords in several European countries is demonstrated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]