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This paper describes an agent-based model that investigates group longevity in a population in a foundational way, using theory on social relations and culture. The model is the first application of the GRASP meta-model for social agents, containing elements of Groups, Rituals, Affiliation, Status and Power. It can be considered an exercise in artificial sociality: a culture-general, content-free baseline trust model from which to engage in more specific studies. Depending on cultural settings for individualism and power distance, as well as settings for xenophobia and for the increase of trust over group life, the GRASP world model generates a variety of patterns. Number of groups ranges from one to many, composition from random to segregated and pattern genesis from rapid to many hundreds of time steps. Parallels are discussed between patterns found in GRASP world and patterns found in societies that differ on individualism, power distance and heterogeneity.

In cross-cultural business negotiation, culture is known to influence negotiation processes. As a lens to study this effect we deployed the Lemon Car Game, an online negotiation game developed for this purpose (Hofstede et al. in: Proceedings of 39th international simulation and gaming association conference (ISAGA). Technologia, Kaunas, pp 39–46, 2009a; Hofstede et al. in: David, Sichman (eds) Multi-agent-based simulation IX, international workshop, MABS 2008, revised selected papers, LNAI 5269. Springer, Berlin, pp 1–16, 2009b). In this article we report the results from the game, obtained from over 800 players from more than 70 countries. We employ several complementary analyses in a mixed-methods approach. Our findings show that to make sense of the players’ actions during negotiation, economic rationality falls short. A pan-cultural individual-level analysis of actions and stated intentions also fails to yield a coherent picture. Within countries, however, actions and intentions do cohere, as shown by an ecological country-level factor analysis, from which three factors emerge for the sellers at country level: trustworthiness, opportunism, and fairness. We conclude from these findings that, in this game, players are driven by what we call relational rationality: they are rational from the perspective of the social world in which they live, with interpersonal relationships weighing heavily. Relational rationality changes players’ perspective of economic rationality, and thus their observed behaviour in negotiation. Based on this evidence, we extrapolate that relational rationality significantly influences negotiation processes in all cultures.

This study was undertaken to determine the distinctive user behaviors and patterns of participants communicating using Twitter on a mobile device in a small-group collaborative setting. Participants were from Western and Eastern cultures (the United States and Korea). Tweets were coded and classified and the results analyzed. Several cultural dimensions were utilized to detect subtle differences between participants from these two different cultures in their dynamic mobile exchanges. Systematic differences in microblogging behaviors were found mostly in the direction predicted by the findings of previous studies on differences in national culture; however, we also report new and interesting findings that contribute to the knowledge base. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of our findings and how this mobile communication information technology can be leveraged to the advantage of individuals and organizations. This study extends cultural studies in CMC to mobile communications.This study develops a framework about cultural differences in mobile communications.This study provides a guideline for mobile service design in different cultures.

Negotiations proceed differently across cultures. For realistic modeling of agents in multicultural negotiations, the agents must display culturally differentiated behavior. This paper presents an agent-based simulation model that tackles these challenges, based on Hofstede’s model of national cultures. The context is a trade network for goods with a hidden quality attribute. The negotiation model is based on the ABMP negotiation architecture and applies a utility function that includes market value, quality preference and risk attitude. The five dimensions of Hofstede’s model are the basis for the modification of ABMP parameters and weight factors in the utility function. The agents can observe each other’s group membership and status. This information is used, along with the indices of Hofstede’s dimensions, to differentiate behavior in different cultural settings. The paper presents results of test runs that verify the implementation of the model. The model helps to explain behaviors of actors in international trade networks. It proves that Hofstede’s dimensions can be used to generate culturally differentiated agents. Further validations of the model with case studies from literature and experiments have yet to be conducted. Extensions can make this model a useful tool for training traders who engage in cross-cultural negotiation and for implementation in negotiation support systems.

Simulating consumer decision making processes involves different disciplines such as: sociology, social psychology, marketing, and computer science. In this paper, we propose an agent-based conceptual and computational model of consumer decision-making based on culture, personality and human needs. It serves as a model for individual behavior in models that investigate system-level resulting behavior. Theoretical concepts operationalized in the model are the Power Distance dimension of Hofstede’s model of national culture; Extroversion, Agreeableness and Openness of Costa and McCrae’s five-factor model of personality, and social status and social responsibility needs. These factors are used to formulate the utility function, process and update the agent state, need recognition and action estimation modules of the consumer decision process. The model was validated against data on culture, personality, wealth and car purchasing from eleven European countries. It produces believable results for the differences of consumer purchasing across eleven European countries.

This paper describes an agent-based model to investigate the origins of gender differences in social status. The agents’ basic behaviour is modelled according to Kemper’s sociological status-power theory. Differences in the socializing forces of the surrounding society are modelled using Hofstede’s dimensions of culture. Particulars of play behaviour are modelled using experimental child development studies from various cultures. The resulting model is presented and discussed. Social identity as a group of either non-gendered children, boys, or girls, seems a powerful force, multiplying the effect of biological differences. The model is actually general enough to be applicable to a wide range of social behaviours with minimal changes.

This article introduces the concept of synthetic cultures. These are role profiles for enacting dimensions of national culture. The full profiles are given for 10 synthetic cultures, based on Gert Hofstede’s dimensions of national culture. They can be used for training or simulation/gaming. Examples of their application are presented. Apart from examples of existing games, suggestions are made for creating custom simulations that use synthetic cultures. Experiences of players are mentioned, both in face-to-face and in electronically mediated settings. Special attention is paid to debriefing issues. The article concludes with practical advice to prospective game leaders.

Geert Hofstede’s five-dimensional framework is widely used in social sciences and management science to characterize cultures. It has been suggested to build culturally consistent agent characters based on his framework. This chapter stresses the relevance of culture and trust for trade, substantiates why a dimensional model offers a good basis for cultural differentiation of agents, and presents an approach to apply Hofstede’s model to develop culturally differentiated agents. The approach is based on knowledge acquisition on a dimension-by-dimension basis and a computational method to integrate the acquired knowledge. The approach has been applied to a multi-agent simulation of a trade game. It is instantiated for the processes of partner selection, negotiation, and the interaction between deceit and trust in trade.

The goal of this paper is to propose a method of modelling the evolution of social norms in different cultural settings. We analyse the role of culture in shaping agents' normative reasoning and hence their behaviour. The general notion of 'value' is discussed from the perspective of the BDI framework as a means to represent cultural regularities in social interactions. Culture is described as a system of shared values, which are linked to the Hofstede dimensions of culture. This system is represented by so-called metanorms that define appropriate, culturally-varying, behaviour in different relational contexts. In this way culture affects the possibility of normative changes, in particular the acceptance of policies designed to issue new norms in a society. Throughout the paper a scenario related to the enactment of smoking ban policies in Europe is presented to discuss the evaluation of normative change in specific cultural settings.

Negotiations are known to proceed differently across cultures. A realistic agent model of international negotiations has to take cultural differences into account. This paper presents an agent-based model that tackles this challenge. The context is a trade game where commodities with a hidden quality attribute are exchanged. The negotiation model uses the ABMP negotiation architecture. It applies a utility function that includes market value, quality preference, and risk attitude. The indices of the five dimensions of Hofstede’s model of national cultures are used, in combination with agent’s group membership and societal status, to differentiate negotiation behavior by adaptation of weight factors in the utility function and ABMP parameters. The paper presents test runs with synthetic cultures and a set of actual national cultures. The present version of the model helps to understand behaviors in international trade networks. It proves that Hofstede’s dimensions can be used to generate culturally differentiated agents.

Trust is a sine qua non for trade. According to transaction cost economics, a contract always offers some opportunity to defect. In the case of asymmetric product information, where the seller is better informed about product quality than the buyer is, the buyer either has to rely on information provided by the seller or has to check the information by testing the product or tracing the supply chain processes, thus incurring extra transaction cost. An opportunistic seller who assumes the buyer to trust, may deliver a lower quality product than agreed upon. In human decisions to deceive and to show trust or distrust toward business partners, issues like morality, shame, self-esteem, and reputation are involved. These factors depend strongly on trader's cultural background. This paper develops an agent model of deceit and trust and describes a multi-agent simulation where trading agents are differentiated according to Hofstede's dimensions of national culture.

The criteria that traders use to select their trade partners differ across cultures. The rational criterion of expected profit of the next contract to be negotiated dominates the decision in individualistic, egalitarian, uncertainty tolerant cultures. In other cultures, criteria like personal relations, group membership, status difference and trust may strongly influence trade partner selection. There also exist differences in the level of information about potential partners that traders require before entering into business contacts. This paper models the role of culture at the level of individual agents, based on Hofstede’s five dimensions of culture. The model is applied in multi-agent simulations, that are designed as a research tool for supply chain research. The model is implemented as a random selection process, where potential partners have unequal probabilities of being selected. The factors influencing the probabilities are: expected profit and trust (learnt from previous contacts with potential partners or reputation), common group membership, societal status, and personal relations. Results are presented, that indicate that Hofstede’s model can be used to simulate the effect of culture on the formation and maintenance of business relationships.

This article targets researchers who use culture as a control variable and trainers or consultants who use it when they speak about leadership, communication, management or other aspects of working life. It briefly sketches the state of the art in the study of culture. By and large the dimensional paradigm first introduced by Hofstede and expanded upon by many others has proven very useful. It is unfortunately opposed by some who use dimensions at the level of the individual and thus confuse dimensions with stereotypes. The article then gives some advice to researchers of cross-cultural issues. In these, making a clear separation between the concepts of culture as something implicit and group identity as something conscious is important. Finally, a number of tips for trainers are presented.

Cross-cultural negotiation poses special challenges. In this paper an agent-based simulation model is presented that tackles these challenges. The model represents a trade network for a good with a hidden quality attribute. Agents have culture scripts that are based on Hofstede's dimensions of culture. They have visible group membership and status attributes that are used by their hidden cultural rules of behaviour. They bargain according to the ABMP bargaining model that has a utility function consisting of expected gain, quality, and risk. The paper presents the model and shows results of test runs. These test runs have face validity when compared with real negotiations. Formal tests of correspondence between the model and the trade game on which is it based have yet to be conducted. Extensions will make it a useful tool for training traders who engage in cross-cultural bargaining. The present version is helping to explain the behaviours of actors in international trade networks. It proves that Hofstede's dimensions can be used to generate agents that are believable negotiators.

Trust does not work in the same way across cultures. This paper presents an agent model of behavior in trade across Hofstedes cultural dimension of long-term vs. short-term orientation. The situation is based on a gaming simulation, the Trust and Tracing game. The paper investigates the micro-dynamics of trust in a trade relationship, focusing on one dimension of culture only. This is a deliberate simplification that is made in order to highlight the role of this particular dimension of culture. The dimension is relevant for trade between East Asia and the Western world. The paper discusses the cultural dimension of long-tern vs. short-term orientation and specifies decision rules for trading agents, differentiated across the dimension. The paper contributes to bridging the gap between macro level analysis of intercultural trade and micro level knowledge about culturally determined behaviour. To this end the agent model is implemented in a multi-agent simulation. Potential applications of the model are to be found primarily in research into the formation and performance of supply chains and networks, and secondarily in training, education, and advice systems. The implementation of the model has been verified to qualitatively represent the effects expected on the basis of Hofstedes theory.

Agent-Based Modeling can contribute to the understanding of international trade processes. Models for the effects of culture and cultural differences on agent behavior are required for realistic agent-based simulation of international trade. This paper makes a step toward modeling of culture in agents. The focus is one of the five dimensions of culture according to Hofstede: individualism versus collectivism. The paper presents an analysis based on social science literature about national cultures. For cultural differentiation of agent behavior, rules are formulated for individualist versus collectivist agent behavior with respect to negotiations, cooperation or defection in the delivery phase of transactions, trade partner selection, and trust. Example computations demonstrate the feasibility in multi-agent simulations.

Misunderstandings arise in international trade due to difference in cultural background of trade partners. Trust and the role it plays in trade are influenced by culture. Considering that trade always involves working on the relationship with the trade partner, understanding the behaviour of the other is of the essence. This paper proposes to involve cultural dimensions in the modelling of trust in trade situations. A case study is presented to show a conceptualisation of trust with respect to the cultural dimension of performance orientation versus cooperation orientation.