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In the latter part of the nineteenth century, diverse sciences grounded in natural history made a virtue of field research that somehow tested scientists' endurance; disciplinary change derived from the premise that witnesses were made reliable by character-molding trials. The turn to the field was a function of structural transformations in various quarters, including (but hardly limited to) global politics, communications systems, and scientific institutions, and it conduced to biogeographical explanations, taxonomic schemes that admitted of heterogeneity, and affective research styles. Sociocultural anthropology, which took specialized shape at the beginning of the twentieth century, shared many properties with other field sciences, but its method--participant observation--was distinctive. Critical to the method's definition were the efforts of the British experimental psychologist-anthropologist W. H. R. Rivers, who relied on notions then widespread in Europe and the United States. The discipline's future mythic hero, Bronislaw Malinowski, embraced Rivers's model. For both men, proper fieldwork meant using the researcher's body as an instrument and entailed understanding both the anthropologist's body and the research subject's body as energy systems; this symmetry facilitated a relativist perspective. Participant observation remains central to sociocultural anthropology, but the discipline's pedagogic habits contributed to loss of memory of its energetic conceptualization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent surge of interest in the history of the social sciences reflects the unsettled conditions which obtain within these disciplines. Historical analysis may prove an aid to the resolution of these conditions, but only if it does not fall into the genre generally called "whig history"—mythologized history which functions to legitimate contemporary practices by assimilating all previous developments to a stylized narrative of continuous, inevitable "progress." Because "whig history" is intrinsic to the "scientific ethos," its rejection entails a reconsideration of the nature of the scientific enterprise in general, and of social science in particular. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]