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Background. Against the backdrop of edgy disagreements with the military command, for the first time in Russian historiography, the paper examines the views of the Secretary of the North China Bureau of the CPC Liu Shaoqi on the fundamental tasks of the party in the initial period of the Japanese Resistance War, as well as the situation in the vil-lage, designed to become a strong rear of the army, the main source of its supply and re-plenishment soldier material, the basis of all his plans and calculations. The author’s atten-tion is focused on identifying and analyzing the content of the concept of a “united front of special form” put forward by Liu Shaoqi, which later became the general line of the com-munists in allied relations with the Guomindang, as well as on the mood of the village, which did not want to take up arms even in conditions of external aggression. Results. The views of Liu Shaoqi on the situation in the North China, the policy of the united front, the strategy and tactics of the CPC in the War, as well as the situation in the traditional North Chinese village, which continued to vegetate in poverty and lack of rights, are considered. Conclusions. From the point of view of the interests of the party, namely, strengthening the ranks and preserving strength for the still upcoming class battle with the Guomindang, only the orientation towards “independence and separate” in the guerrilla struggle against the enemy, which Liu Shaoqi unswervingly adhered to, could ensure and ensured the success of the party in all its undertakings.

Background. The study, mainly based on original Chinese sources previously inaccessible to Russian historiography, examines the most important stages in the evolution of the enlistment system in the Chinese Red Army during the agrarian revolution using the example of the Central Soviet Region of the CPC. The authorʼs attention is focused on identifying and analyzing the content of both the general line of the communists in the mo-bilization policy, and the specifics of its individual aspects, typical to a particular period of the system’s development. Results. Specific methods and techniques of recruitment into active troops, as well as the accompanying mood of the masses on the background of gro-wing socio-economic difficulties and hardships associated with revolutionary wars, are considered. Conclusions. Excluding the period of its inception, the Chinese Red Army was not built on the basis of volunteerism, but on profit and enforcement; at the same time, the ideological component of the recruitment practically did not play any role.

Background. Based on the sources mostly unknown to Russian historiography, the article examines the socio-economic situation of the Chinese village during the socalled the agrarian revolution and the policy of the Communists, associated with strengthening the stability of the ruling regime of the CCP in the “red enclaves” on the example of the Central base in South China. The author’s attention is focused on identifying and characterizing economic sources and the origin of financial flows that contributed to the consolidation of party dictatorship without significant support from the peasantry and in conditions of economic decline, as well as an analysis of some causes of the collapse of the Soviet project in the country. Results. The article examines the main aspects and methods of “aiding the revolution” (expropriation) of rural rich men (“da tuhao”) and the invasion of market towns (“choukuan”) for hunt for prey of the Chinese Red Army; investigated the material capabilities of the peasantry and its reaction to the alienation of property. Conclusions. Analysis shows that the main task of the CCP’s economic policy was the total confiscation of values from the rural and urban population, regardless of their property status due to the general decline of the countryside.

Background. The CCP’s policy in the framework of two independent political campaigns – the “silent revolution” and the “movement for land reform” – has never been subjected to substantive analysis in Chinese, Russian and Western historiography. Moreover, the very names of these campaigns and, especially, the extent of violence committed during them, do not mean anything to many experts. Studying the topic allows to a certain extent to fill the gap. And in this regard, the work aims at analyzing, at least in general terms, the content of both the “revolution” and the “movement”. Results. The main aspects of the party’s general line, its politics and the socioeconomic activities of the Communists in the specified period, including the use of violence in its various forms as the main way to control the peasant masses by the CCP, are examined. Conclusions. The analysis shows that the main content and the most important condition for the success of both the “silent revolution” and the “movement for land reform” was extremely flexible and selectively dosed violence against the masses during the years of the “revolution” with the transition to total terror in the “old” liberated districts during the final phase of the struggle with Chiang Kai-shek, the absolutely ridiculously marked “land reform”.