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Whilst a significant amount of work has been undertaken in the field of security dilemma theory, there is a gap in the academic literature concerning the possible scenarios that may result from this phenomenon in international politics. To date, no known systematic attempt has been made to consider the full range of scenarios that may result from the security dilemma. Six possible scenario outcomes may be identified, these being: first, the security dilemma is transcended; second, a security-seeking state leaves itself unilaterally vulnerable to external aggression; third, the inappropriate adoption of diplomatic and military assertiveness to reaffirm deterrence instead arouses the fears of another security-seeking state, thereby leading to inadvertent escalation of a crisis into a conflict; fourth, a ‘deep security dilemma’ based on long-running mutual hostility that does not escalate into conflict; fifth, a security dilemma that escalates to the brink of conflict but is then de-escalated; and sixth, mitigation of the security dilemma between rival states. This article will explore these respective scenarios in terms of their underpinnings, as well as their implications for security and diplomacy.

“A picture says a thousand words”, as the aphorism goes. This certainly applies to the realm of photography. Yet, do photographs speak for themselves, or does the backdrop of photographs matter in underscoring the deeper underlying issues in wartime? As this manuscript shall examine, iconic photographs taken during conflict can have a deeply powerful symbolic impact in seizing the imagination and attention of the public. In so doing, and depending on the context of the conflict being fought, such iconic imagery of war may impact not only on the decision-making process of that conflict, but also be adopted by other observers in the post-conflict to underscore underlying metaphorical themes in warfare. The authors propose to examine this in the form of five particularly iconic photographs from the Viet Nam War (known in Vietnam as “The American War”).

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There are regional fears that Beijing will use its growing clout to embark on an aggressive, expansionist policy in International Relations, hence the possibility of a collision course with the USA reminiscent of how Anglo-German tensions at the beginning of the twentieth century escalated into World War One. Closer scrutiny, however, suggests grounds for downplaying the likelihood of such a scenario. We outline this argument based on the following points: (i) there is a much higher level of economic interdependence between China and the USA today, compared to Britain and Germany, (ii) the corresponding levels of nationalism in China and the USA are lower than in Britain and Germany, (iii) the political alignments of international relations in the Asia Pacific in 2014 are less ambiguous than those in Europe in 1914, hence less potential for diplomatic miscalculation and (iv) the military and economic instruments of power that the USA and China possess, by being far more lethal than those held by Britain and Germany in 1914, would render any conflict between them an unacceptably costly catastrophe.

The recent death of Kim Jong Il and the succession of his son, Kim Jong Un, as Supreme Leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea leaves the Northeast Asian region at a crossroads. Given the younger Kim’s lack of political experience, it is reasonable to believe that his priority will be on consolidation of his political and military power base in Pyongyang. More recently, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has sent mixed signals with regard to its intentions. On the one hand, North Korea has agreed to a moratorium of its nuclear activities and has even invited the IAEA to inspect its nuclear facilities; at the same time, however, the DPRK has also announced its plan to launch a satellite in mid-April, using technology derived from the Taepodong missile. Set against this backdrop, we underline and comparatively assess the importance of the USA, the Republic of Korea, and China, all of which will be going through a political transition in 2012. We conclude that Seoul and Beijing are in the best position to reopen the process of dialogue with the DPRK.