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Terrain is central to understanding why some countries experience contentious ethnic divisions and civil war. While existing research specifies a direct effect of rugged terrain on civil war (i.e., it impedes state efforts to counter rebellion), we argue that terrain has an overlooked indirect effect on civil war via its historical influence on the distribution and political status of ethnic groups. We argue that access to variable rugged terrain facilitated the development and survival of more distinct ethnic groups by both restricting interaction among communities in rugged areas and complicating state repression. Both arguments suggest that groups in rugged areas face greater risk of political marginalization. Using geocoded data on civil war, terrain, and the distribution and political status of ethnic groups, we demonstrate that up to 40% of rugged terrain's effects on civil war are mediated by its indirect effect on the exclusion of politically relevant ethnic groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Borders constitute the international system of states. Accordingly, states will, from time to time, take assertive measures to secure the border, with among the most aggressive strategies being the construction of physical barriers, which we refer to as "border walls." Using original data on man-made border wall construction from 1800 to 2014, we theorize and find that in many cases, wall construction is about economic security. Significant economic disparities between the states will create incentives to illegally transport people or move goods readily available in the poorer country but highly regulated in the richer country. We find that economic disparities have a substantial and significant impact on the presence of a physical wall that is independent of formal border disputes and concerns over instability from civil wars in neighbors. In other words, "prominent examples such as the Maginot Line", constructed largely out of fear of attack, is an exception, not the exemplar, of the reasons states construct border walls. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the abundance of evidence that disputed territory matters, we know remarkably little about the origins of territorial claims. We argue that the presence of competing historical border precedents is central to the emergence of territorial claims. We outline why precedents provide opportunity to make claims and provide two possible explanations for why leaders have incentive to claim along precedents. One possibility is consistent with the conventional wisdom that incentive derives from territorial characteristics such as natural resources or strategic significance. A second and more novel explanation is that the persistent coordination effects of historical boundaries provide the incentive to draw claims along them. We use new data on the location of historical boundaries from the peace of Westphalia until the start of the French Revolution to show that historical border precedents drive the emergence of territorial claims after the Congress of Vienna and that persistent coordination effects provide incentive to dispute historical precedents. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article introduces the idea of a compellence dilemma. This dilemma arises when the domestic policies of adversaries-such as hosting violent groups-threaten states' security. Such states often consider coercive instruments to compel their adversary to change those policies. The problem? The prospect of costly punishment makes cooperation more attractive for the adversary. However, if they fail to coerce policy change, harsh punishments can reduce the adversary's capacity to enact policy change and induce harmful domestic instability. These problems are compounded by the fact that both the threatened states' incentive to use costly punishments and the costs of failed compellence increase with the severity of the security threat. The logic of the compellence dilemma applies whenever a state uses damaging coercive instruments but risks failing to achieve its immediate objectives. I analyze the compellence dilemma with a dynamic game-theoretic model of interaction among a target state, host state, and violent group, and show that it is pervasive in equilibrium. I show that the compellence dilemma causes states to refrain from using harsh punishments even when they would compel the host state to cooperate. Concerns about decreasing future host-state capacity and increasing group power drive this result. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors study the influence of domestic political dissent and violence on incumbent dictators and their regimes. They argue that elite with an interest in preserving the regime hold dictators accountable when there is a significant increase in terrorism. To pinpoint the accountability of dictators to elite who are strongly invested in the current regime, the authors make a novel theoretical distinction between reshuffling coups that change the leader but leave the regime intact and regime-change coups that completely change the set of elites atop the regime. Using a new data set that distinguishes between these two coup types, the authors provide robust evidence that terrorism is a consistent predictor of reshuffling coups, whereas forms of dissent that require broader public participation and support, such as protests and insurgencies, are associated with regime-change coup attempts. This article is the first to show that incumbent dictators are held accountable for terrorist campaigns that occur on their watch. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]