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This article offers a theoretical intervention in new and emergent approaches to analysing China's coercive nation-building policies under Xi Jinping. The author contends that the recent Western framing of CCP policies as genocidal or necropolitical, predicated on notions of settler colonialism and indigeneity, not only strips minority nationalities of their political agency but also prevents them from pursuing anti-colonial self-determination. By delving into the extensive scholarly work within Chinese anthropology, history, and philosophy that contributes to the reconstruction of a retrotopian Chinese nation with non-Han minority groups at its core, this article argues that the ongoing effort to build a revitalised Chinese national community requires more than merely overcoming obstacles related to minority cultures and identities. It entails actively reimagining the role and participation of minorities in 'self-sacrifice' for the Chinese national community, implying their voluntary relinquishment of identities and rights in order to align with the Chinese nation.

The centralized compilation and use of educational materials for the three subjects of language arts, ethics and the rule of law (ideology and politics), and history are important moves in the fundamental task of creating educational materials to build up the state's authority and instill virtue and nurturing the young. Here, centrally compiled educational materials for language arts have unique advantages with respect to strengthening education in the standard spoken and written Chinese language, enhancing the cohesion of the Chinese nation, and so on, and they play an irreplaceable role in forging a sense of community for the Chinese nation. Centered on the "Five Identifications," this study sets out from the three-dimensional perspective of cognitive factors, affective factors and behavioral factors, to build a framework for analysis of educational materials based on the connotations of the sense of community for the Chinese nation. The characteristics of the representation of the connotative factors of the sense of community for the Chinese nation in centrally compiled educational materials for language arts are: The educational materials comprehensively and emphatically embody the educational content of the "Five Identifications"; the educational content for the different types of identification comprehensively addresses educational objectives in the three areas of cognition, affection and behavior; and educational content on cultural identification is the most enriched. Among the inherent mechanisms for forging a sense of community for the Chinese nation through the centralized compilation of educational materials for language arts, the first is organically integrating the connotative factors of the sense of community for the Chinese nation on the basis of the patterns of the subject of language arts as well as curriculum standards; the second is to use cultural identification as a focal point in promoting education for the "Five Identifications," while highlighting the unique value of the subject of language arts; and the third is to comprehensively strengthen education for identification with the community of the Chinese nation centered on the text selection system, in combination with the design of form factors and educational activities. The main pathways for forging a sense of community for the Chinese nation through the centralized compilation of educational materials for language arts are: (1) Synchronously strengthening identification with the community of the Chinese nation in the process of improving students' language arts skills and accomplishments, based on the learning situation; (2) Creating three-dimensional educational objectives for education in the community of the Chinese nation on the basis of cognitive patterns, to build firm ideological foundations; (3) Applying diverse teaching methods and educational techniques to promote consolidation of the sense of community for the Chinese nation in language arts studies and in life. [Translation by Carissa Fletcher.]

This study applies CDA and story grammar analysis to investigate how Chinese language textbooks for primary schools foster Chinese national identity through their depiction of Chinese people struggling against foreign invaders. The analysis was conducted on 12 textbooks and the findings were based on stories featuring a range of ages, from children to soldiers and artists, who all displayed patriotic spirit and were willing to risk their lives for China. The textbooks also highlight China's past humiliation, such as the Nanjing Massacre and the loss of territories such as Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. The authors of those textbooks seek to encourage the students' national identity by promoting a sense of patriotism, sacrifice, vigilance against foreign threats, affirmation for the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and putting the interests of the People's Republic of China (PRC) ahead of personal interests. Additionally, students are expected to have a strong sense of territorial sovereignty, recognizing Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan as parts of China. However, the results also show that the portrayal of Chinese national identity is Han-centric, excluding ethnic minorities.

Recent research has focused either on the internationalisation of China's higher education (HE) as soft power, or on soft power with 'Chinese characteristics'. There is a paucity of research combining these two foci. This paper fills this gap by: (i) unravelling the meanings and features of the 'Chinese characteristics' embodied in the policies of President Xi Jinping's new regime that seeks to rejuvenate the 'civilisational state' through internationalising HE as soft power; (ii) analysing the implications and complications therein; and (iii) exploring the predicaments and paradoxes as China seeks to construct a Sino-centric world order alongside, if not atop, the Westphalian system. It demonstrates how the internationalisation of HE as soft power with 'Chinese characteristics': finds its legitimacy in a historico-cultural narrative; rides on the tide of the current global norms/practices; builds on national agenda/priorities; and is running into conflict with the West which is pursuing its own similar interests.

Modern children's literature in China has largely been dominated by narratives of the nation and nationalism. The present article sets out to question the dominance of that nationalist stance as the country transitioned into the modern era in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By examining poetic children's literature, the author unravels distinct non-nationalist intellectual sentiments in competition with the mainstream nationalist discourse that point to an imaginative envisioning of modernity. The article starts with a discussion of children's poems and school songs imbued with a strong patriotic zeal in the late Qing and early Republican periods, and then moves on to the May Fourth period when lyricism and romanticism drew the attention of children's literature advocates. Romantic-minded translators and writers, such as Bing Xin, embraced love as a humanist cosmopolitan vision while others, such as Zhou Zuoren and Liu Bannong, turned to local literary heritage, giving rise to a form of children's songs with strong local consciousness. The article concludes by addressing the relevance of the insights derived from the historical case studies for contemporary children's literature in China and beyond. It highlights the possibilities of envisaging modernity in non-nationalist terms and stresses the importance of cultivating in children alternative sentiments in the age of rising nationalism, both past and present.

This paper examines language ideologies underlying the media representation of Chinese citizens speaking multiple foreign languages. It argues that a figure of good citizenship is being articulated via valorization of multilingual competence that is grounded both in the newly cherished moral values of neoliberal globalization -- entrepreneurship, reflexivity and flexibility -- and in the traditional moral values of patriotism and contribution to society. Such configuration of citizenship departs from the nationalist monoglot language ideology, and yet demonstrates a flexible nationalism that links multilingual competence to personal welfare and social harmony. This study shows the importance of paying attention to the dynamic interplay between social class, nationalism, and neoliberal globalization in our analysis of language and citizenship.

In her book on the national cosmology of Hutu refugees in Tanzania, "Purity and Exile," Liisa Malkki argues that in the modern age of nation-states, culture and identity are conceived in fundamentally territorial terms. Thus, being "out of place" disrupts and threatens national identity which attempts to appear pure, whole and natural. The "[v]iolated, broken roots" of displacement "signal an ailing cultural identity and a damaged national identity". This theory of diaspora, of communities outside of their "original" place, the place they call their homeland, is the fundamental basis upon which this study rests. This paper examines the way one diasporic community negotiates the local boundaries of its host country and community, and constructs and expresses a national identity and national cause outside of the territory that defines it. Like the refugees of mass violence in Malkki's study, the community presented here, Tibetan refugees in Nepal, also defines itself in light of a specific history of violence and subjugation. The force of the violence experienced by individuals, and collectively experienced by members of the community produced profound trauma and a particular way of constructing their identity as a group whose cultural and physical survival is at risk, threatened from the outside. The purpose of this paper is to examine the local conditions of Tibetan refugee life in Nepal, and discover how this community constructs its identity as Tibetan. The author's research finds that they seek resources outside of their host nation, from an international network of Western supporters, and eventually define themselves globally. However, the certainty of belonging for exiled Tibetans is ultimately challenged. While the Tibetans embraced the Western aid workers and sponsors as "second parents," ultimately, intermarriage with westerners, for example, was feared and seen as challenging the natural order of national identity. (Contains a bibliography.)

This paper examines the ways in which the ethnic minority group the Tujia in Enshi, China, engages with heritage tourism, as a complex project of designing authenticity. Authenticity is taken as part of the chronotopic phenomena of identity making: the complex interplay of multiple, nonrandom timespace frames of discourses and semiotic performances which condition and offer new potentials to the meanings of authenticity. We show ethnographically the chronotopic nature of the local production of "authentic" heritage for tourism in Enshi. This leads to a historical grounding of the Tujia in China's nation-building and state politics of multiculturalism, which uncovers the anxiety of inauthenticity experienced by the Tujia in Enshi with their own minority status and cultural heritage, as well as their strategic chronotopic incorporation of both "authentic" and "inauthentic" aspects of local identity practices into a new order of authenticity afforded by heritage tourism as a form of new economy. Through such practices, we argue, the Tujia in Enshi chronotopically shift away from the periphery towards a new and reconfigured center of meaning-making, although this reappropriation of authenticity still must be understood within the "cunning of recognition" scheme, i.e. within the constraints of late modernity.

The national curriculum reformers, regarded as members of the social elites and intellectuals, projected their vision of identity onto the curriculum which they constructed and influenced the next generation's national consciousness. In the tangled relationship between politics and education, the selection of the reformers in a sense dictates the direction of the new curriculum. This article interviewed 18 reformers, members of the latest citizenship curriculum of 2010, to investigate their individual views on identities and the monolithically-promoted Chinese configuration in the old curriculum. Although the new citizenship curriculum, renamed "Curriculum Guidelines for Civics and Society," puts nothing in writing in favour of either a Chinese or Taiwanese national identity, according to the discovery in this research, the Curriculum Committee implicitly embedded a transformed inclusive and hyphenated Taiwanese national identity in the new curriculum in the hope of accentuating Taiwan's exclusive sovereignty. The inner thinking of the reformers is uncovered to reveal their reasoning that a broadly constructed national identity can concurrently accommodate diverse personal identities and suits the society better than the previously prescribed Chinese identity. This article also records the evolution of the curriculum from the previous China-centred narratives to Taiwan-centred narratives, something that happened in line with the changes in Taiwanese society.

This article reports the findings the researchers obtained from a study of prominent civic education teachers in Hong Kong with regard to how they perceived national identification and the nurturing of national identification through civic education in Hong Kong schools. A qualitative method of data collection by in-depth semi-structured interviews was engaged. Original quotes are given whenever necessary so that readers can understand how the arguments in the article were derived and can arrive at their own conclusions. The teachers in general believed that national identity is ethnicity-based. But they agreed that national identity should coexist with other local and global civic identities. All of the teachers agreed that their schools worked assiduously in nurturing national identity. However, they also pointed out that a top-down compulsory national education programme, aimed at glorifying the nation, would not work in Hong Kong. Alternatively, students would accept civic education with a fair representation of the nation that allowed for critical judgment.

This article discusses the development of music education in China and the integration of cultural politics and nationalism, using Shanghai, twentieth-century China's most developed city, as a case study; it examines the historical and political processes in Shanghai's music education to show what is cultural about politics and what is political about the culture of singing. Significant internal and external events both have contributed to contemporary Chinese national identity and music education. The former include the 1911 end of the Qing dynasty and establishment of the Republic of China, the 1919 May Fourth Movement and the 1925 May Thirtieth Movement; the latter include the 1842 Sino-British Opium War, the 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese War and the 1937-1945 Sino-Japanese War. By means of historical review and analysis, this article traces the development of music education in Shanghai and examines the political and cultural forces that have, for many years, informed the integration of collective singing and political (anti-imperialist and nationalist) activities. This article argues that singing (in particular the singing of songs that express popular anti-imperialist attitudes) has played a critical role in mobilising Chinese nationalism in school music education, which has, in turn, reinforced national identity in the face of foreign aggression and fostered nation-building. Chinese intellectuals and musicians were the dominant forces in arousing patriotic sentiments through music education from the late Qing dynasty to the 1910s, whilst Chinese social activists and Communist revolutionaries were powerful promoters of patriotic and revolutionary songs from the 1920s to the 1940s. (Contains 7 notes.)

The Han sphere, including Vietnam, Korea, Japan, Taiwan and China, adopted Han characters and classical Han writing as the official written language before the 20th century. However, great changes came with the advent of the 20th century. After World War II, Han characters in Vietnam and Korea were officially replaced by the romanised "Chu Quoc Ngu" and phonemic Hangul, respectively. In Japan, the number of Han characters in use decreased, and the syllabic "Kana" system was promoted to a national status. In Taiwan, although Taiwanese romanisation was developed centuries ago, Han characters remain the dominant orthography in current Taiwanese society. This paper examines Taiwan's orthographic transition from the perspective of the Han sphere. Both internal and external factors have contributed to the different outcomes of orthographic reform in these countries. Internal factors include the general public's demand for literacy and anti-feudal hierarchy. External factors include the political relationships between these countries and the origin of Han characters (i.e. China). (Contains 5 notes.)

In 1932, with the help of the League of Nations, the Chinese government sent an educational mission consisting of five scholars to Europe, in order to investigate education in different countries as reference points for ongoing Chinese educational reform. This article argues that educators in the mission used foreign examples to support their existing educational reform proposals, and that such a situation resulted from their understanding of the function of national education and China's practical situation. In doing so, the article adopts a transntional perspective and focuses on the discussions around national educational aims and general impressions of education in European countries, with a particular emphasis on two educators of the mission – Cheng Qibao and Yang Lian. To begin with, the article introduces the educational reform background of the mission – namely, what the Kuomintang (KMT) wanted national education to contribute. In the second part, the article discusses the understanding of the two educators regarding the social function of education, and reveals that, although they admired idealised internationalism, they considered that Chinese education should still prioritise a nationalist viewpoint. In the third part, the article analyses how the two educators constructed their impressions of education in those European countries, and used these impressions to remind readers about the Chinese situation. In the final part, the article discusses the proposals the two educators put forward and analyses the potential factors that prevented their proposals from having a concrete impact on Chinese educational reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of the article is to study the problem of the development of piano art in China. The methodology of the research is to use historical and biographical methods in the study of this topic. The scientific novelty of the article is to study the expediency of the problem of the development of piano art in China, studying the historical origins of this problem. For the first time, the historical names of the figures who directly influenced the development of piano art in China, which clarified the cultural traditions of the East. Conclusions. On the basis of the study of the problem concerning piano art in China, they discovered the processes of development of his and distinctive culture. Identify the names of the well-known teachers and musicians in China that have influenced the development and development of the country's art. Identify the influence of philosophy on thinking and understanding of piano art. The system of thinking of modern piano art is based on ancient Chinese philosophy. The musical culture of China is in constant search for the nature of sound, timbre palette, form, combining national motives. Through the combination of national features, country philosophy, religious tendencies, elements of vocal and instrumental folklore, theater and composition and piano culture, China's musical piano culture has become well-known in the world. The technique of piano playing is based on strict classical methods and national consciousness, which have been etched in the centuries. It was the Vietnamese school and the Yuege educational system that formed the basis for the development of Chinese musical culture. Thus, a great influence on the development of music education was made by: Shen Shingong one of the first piano teachers, Jeng Jimin, who founded the music school in Shanghai, Lee Shutong taught singing and piano at the Shanghai Women's School and Nanjing Higher School. An important role in the formation of piano art was played by Din Shande, who combined Western and Eastern motifs on the example of his works. These issues are interesting and require further study by scientists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews the history of international mobility of students from China to other countries over the century and a half from 1870 to the present day. Different motivations, goals, courses, and knowledge are considered, together with how the purposes of individuals have matched national policy. Implications for the future development in a globalized context are briefly considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the impact of global conflict in multiethnic port cities using the case of Shanghai, China's imperial diasporas before and during World War I. It examines the social and political conditions of the city's foreign citizens. It also explores the widespread cosmopolitan attitude among the upper class, and the mixture of patriotism and cosmopolitanism in the city.

In response to foreign demands for concessions and territories, China’s last imperial court in the early twentieth century executed reforms to strengthen fiscal, personnel, military, and cultural control over its frontier regions. However, in so doing, it provoked an awakening of the national consciousness of the elites of non-Han ethnic minorities there. Much has changed over the past 100 years regarding the governance of China’s frontier territories of Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang, with the diffusion of nationalist claims among increasing numbers of the ethnic minority populace, heightened focus of foreign actors on the humanitarian and rights situations of the ethnic minorities, and greatly extended reach and firmer grip of the central government. What remained unaltered is the “state integration” purpose of Chinese regimes, as manifested in the practices of “internal colonialism” or “ethnic assimilation,” which has led to grievances and resistance by China’s ethnic minorities against the Chinese state. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

China's rise has been accompanied by a rise in nationalism. But what are the characteristics of this nationalism now being witnessed? Does it support China's constructive engagement with the international order, or does it seek to assert China's supremacy? These questions lie at the hub of a rapidly expanding secondary literature on the emergence of nationalism in China and its impact on China's foreign relations. What is, however, absent from the academic discourse is the voice of the Chinese people themselves. What are their perceptions of the nation-state, and how do these beliefs shape their views of China's relationship with East Asia? To address this gap, we conducted a series of large-scale surveys in Beijing between 2011 and 2013 on the twinned topics of domestic nationalism and international relations. Our findings, as reported below, represent an initial attempt to answer this final and, arguably, most critical set of questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Guangbao, published in Guangzhou between 1886 and 1891, was one of China's earliest native-owned newspapers, with a circulation three times larger than the Xunhuan Ribao. The newspaper, founded by Kuang Qizhao, provides important information on the ideas that were circulating at the time in Guangzhou, a place where a number of reformers were beginning to formulate their thoughts. The newspaper may have sown some of the seeds for the nationalism that would become a powerful force after the Sino-Japanese War. The Guangbao protested against the mistreatment of overseas Chinese and printed stories recommending retaliation against Americans. It opposed Western imperialism, advocated a strong national defence, and even suggested annexing Korea. However, the newspaper was not xenophobic and tried to encourage good relations between Chinese and foreigners in China. Unlike future political newspapers, the Guangbao continued to support the existing political system—not because of fear or ignorance, but because of a sense that democracy may not have been appropriate for China at this time. Although Kuang was not a supporter of many Neo-Confucian traditions or beliefs, because he equated Confucian morality with Christian morality, and morality was needed to combat corruption, the Guangbao emphasized Confucian moral training.The newspaper also served as a platform to promote reform ideas. Kuang carefully picked ideas that he felt were appropriate for China, including: free universal and specialized education, women's rights, economic nationalism/industrialization/business, free trade, entrepreneurship through patent and copyright protection, support for the common people versus corrupt officials, and philanthropy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article re-examines the meanings of Chinese nationalism and its relationship to vibrant and recurring National Products movements in modern China through the case of the Shanghai Coca-Cola protest of 1947–1948. In a campaign to revitalize national industry, the Chinese business community of Shanghai targeted Coca-Cola as a foreign luxury, and asked the Nationalist government to prohibit the importation of raw materials for Coca-Cola. However, archival materials show that not only was the Coca-Cola bottler in Shanghai—Watson's Mineral Water Company—a Chinese company but they had made large contributions during previous National Products movements. Using imported raw materials was also a very common practice in the Chinese soft drinks industry in the first half of the twentieth century. By revealing inconsistencies between the Chinese business community's statement of protest and the actual character of Coca-Cola's Shanghai bottler, this article argues that in this case Chinese nationalism became a pretext and tool for business competition. This research suggests that Chinese nationalism as an analytical lens remains complicated and its role and meaning in history must not be over-generalized. Rather than the existence of a unified and singular nationalism, Chinese nationalisms have been socially constructed over time, with multiple faces, interpretations, and functions for different interest groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on thriving populism and populist nationalism and democracy in East Asia and its comparison with that in the West. It discusses the ignorance of populist governance in post-war East Asian countries such as Japan, Korea and China. It states that history of national humiliation and wartime record are condemned as part of international conspiracy in these countries. It discusses extreme nationalism under leadership of Ja­pan's Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, China's Xi Jinping, and Korea's Park Guen-hye.

The article explores the One Belt One Road initiative (BRI) of China which aims to stimulate economic development as of January 2017. A background of BRI is provided which was established in 2013 that would create a network of infrastructure worldwide that are linked to China. Topics include the lack of understanding of BRI's strategic motivations, its implications for the Eurasian continent, and China's motivations and purposes for BRI. Also discussed are China's efforts to secure its continental backyard, the leadership of President Xi Jinping, and Chinese exceptionalism.

Why is the period from the Opium War through the Republican era in recent Chinese history treated by so many scholars of different stripes as a decline of China itself, rather than as a decline simply of the dynastic order? What is the nature of the Republican period? What role has the centralization and decentralization of power played through these years – and is it limited to the Republican period, or is it part of a much longer trend in Chinese history? Why have so many scholars fixated on the Opium War at the beginning of Chinese modernity? Mizoguchi asks these penetrating questions and makes telling comparisons with Japan over roughly the same period of time. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the multiple meanings of blood transfusion and banking in modern China through the history of the first Chinese blood bank, established by the Overseas Chinese in 1943 to solicit blood for the war effort. Through investigating the attitudes of Chinese soldiers and civilians toward the blood bank, this article argues for the multiplicity of motivations underpinning society's attitudes toward blood banking and donation. Cultural notions of blood were an important but not the sole factor in their consideration. Ideas of nationalism and altruism played a role too. What eventually turned out to be most effective for most donors was the promise of eggs and soy milk for blood. Its economic value in the context of wartime scarcity was enough for many to abandon opposition to blood banking. By drawing attention to socioeconomic concerns in biomedical practices, this article provides an alternative examination of blood banking in modern societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the context of literature on Chinese nationalism. It highlights the arguments between the identification of the English-language literature such as the foreign policy for Chinese nationalism and the threat of erroneous Chinese nationalism. It also stresses the political identity of the literature on Chinese nationalism.

Why has China's foreign policy become more assertive since 2009, and what is driving Beijing's foreign policy orientations? Given the significance of China's rise over the past few decades, it is surprising that this question has not been subjected to systematic analysis as well as general investigation within scholarly research. This article serves to examine the sources of China's assertiveness using a system-level, unit-level and individual-level analysis. This article first looks at system-level explanations such as state power, external threats and national interests, and then considers unit-level factors including bureaucratic competition, struggles of the elite and the surge of nationalism. However, both system-level and unit-level explanations alone fail to account for China's more assertive foreign policy. This suggests that individual factors play a major role in explaining the country's more assertive external behaviour. This is especially the case when the perceptions of the political elite are deeply embedded in the state leader's preferences. This finding can enhance our understanding of why traditional explanations, that do not incorporate the role of the state leader, may fail to predict Chinese foreign policy behaviour. To understand better the implications of China's rise, therefore, we must take into account the role of the state leadership and its impact on China's growing influence in international politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article studies the New Qing History approach that arose in the US in the 1980s and the ensuing responses to it, and how these responses can be understood in the context of American China studies, twentieth-century historiographical trends, and Chinese nationalism. It argues that the New Qing History approach should be considered in a contextualized and de-politicized way. After examining how Chinese-born scholars responded to the controversial issues (sinicization, the nature of the Qing dynasty/Empire, and the definition of China/Zhongguo) provoked by New Qing History, the article suggests that sinicization should no longer be used as an uncontestable interpretative framework for studies of Chinese history. Instead, it favors a historicized conceptualization of China emphasizing its open, inclusive, and integrative character, as well as the uniqueness of Qing China's expansion. The article also demonstrates the New Qing History approach's positive influences in diversifying primary sources and its contribution in promoting borderland and non-Han studies. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Early twentieth-century nationalist intellectuals and politicians in China promoted museums as sites for 'awakening' the masses from their pre-national slumber. Museum hagiographers since that time often imply that the new museums were successful in those terms, and that the Chinese people fully supported the modern, usually state-supervised museums and their nationalist goals. However, as this essay shows, by examining the evacuation of the Palace Museum artifacts from Beiping [Beijing] to Sichuan during the War of Resistance with Japan (1937-45), we see that on the contrary, the Chinese people were hardly convinced that antiquities belonged to the nation-state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Before the establishment of the Cenozoic Research Laboratory (Xinshengdai yanjiushi) in 1929, paleoanthropological research in China was mainly in the hands of foreigners, individual explorers as well as organized teams. This paper describes the development of paleoanthropology in China in the 1920s and 1930s and its transformation from the international phase to an indigenized one. It focuses on the international elite scientist network in metropolitan Beijing whose activities and discoveries led to such transformation. The bond between members of the network was built on shared scientific devotion, joint field experience, and social activities. However, such scientific internationalism was not immune from imperialistic and nationalistic interests and competition as most members of the network also belonged to institutions of the dominant hegemonic powers, such as the French Paleontological Mission and the American Museum of Natural History, operating by the logic of international system of imperialism. While these foreign institutions enjoyed relatively unrestricted access to the Chinese frontier and Mongolia in the early 20th century to discover and collect for the establishment of what they saw as universal scientific knowledge, in the late 1920s rising Chinese and Mongolian nationalisms began to interpret these activities as violations to their national sovereignty. The idea of establishing a “Chinese” institute to carry out paleoanthropological research in China took shape in such milieu. This paper highlights the entanglement between scientific internationalism, imperialism, nationalism in China in the early 20th century and the complicated process of knowledge formation at various national and personal levels. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article re-examines the film theatre companies managed by Chinese individuals but registered under foreign laws, focusing on the representative film theatre owner. He Tingran and his companies. The article elucidates three roles of the foreign-registered film theatre companies: the capitalist, nationalist and social reformer. The owners of these companies occasionally switched between their Chinese and foreign identities to obtain various benefits, enjoying the various privileges of extraterritoriality, as well as maintaining control over the unconditional oligopoly of foreign distributors. This tactic included proclaiming the interests of the entire Chinese film industry within the foreign companies' association, on which they exerted a strong influence. The identity of being a foreign-registered film theatre company became crucial for resisting foreign pressures and protecting the domestic film market and film theatre culture post 1930s. However, these practices by the foreign-registered film theatre companies were not concluded either in terms of simple capitalist activities or blind nationalism; the many owners of those companies aimed to reform society through establishing a universal cinema culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the history of cultural heritage and historical preservation in Russia and China. The author compares policies on the preservation and destruction of churches under communism and postcommunism. Emphasis is given to topics such as protection under state ownership of churches in the Soviet Union, the relationship between modern Chinese nationalism and temples, and religious life in communist China.

This article will explore the evolution of China's border policy through the 1950s and 1960s. Drawing on newly available archival sources and recent secondary literature, it will argue that during the early Cold War, the PRC leadership lacked a clear sense of the concept of national sovereignty, and often attempted to use territorial negotiations with China's neighbours to bargain for broader foreign policy objectives. The article will also examine the historical and political assumptions underlying Mao Zedong's approach to border questions, suggesting that Mao combined longstanding imperial assumptions about universal emperorship with the modern, Marxist idea of a world revolution. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on the politics of China in the early twentieth century when there was enough threat from foreign powers in the of imperialism with the Chinese intellectuals opting for interaction of cultures with theories of nationalism, Marxism, and cosmopolitanism.

This paper starts from the assumption that geostrategic and security interests alone are not sufficient to explain China’s foreign policy choices. It argues that ideas about what China’s role as an actor in the increasingly globalised international system should be, and about world order in general, have a deep influence on China’s foreign policy decision-making process. Taking the North Korean issue as a case study, the paper postulates that China is currently engaged in a search for a ‘new’ identity as a global player. China’s actor identity is composed of various partly contradictory role conceptions. National roles derived from China’s internal system structures and its historical past lead to continuity in foreign policy, while the ‘new’ roles resultant from China’s rise to global power require an adaptation of its foreign policy principles. In the case of its relationship with North Korea, China’s foreign policy is oscillating between the two roles of ‘socialist power’ – as thus comrade-in-arms with its socialist neighbour – and ‘responsible great power’, which leads to it being expected to comply with international norms, and thus to condemn North Korea’s nuclear provocations and related actions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article seeks to spark a conversation about shifting conceptualizations of disaster under modernizing states. It employs case studies of two major disasters, the North China Famine of 1876–79 and the Yellow River flood of 1938–47, to map changes and continuities in Chinese responses to disaster. State approaches to the late-Qing famine both drew on a millennium of Chinese thinking about disaster causation and anticipated new issues that would become increasingly important in twentieth-century China. The catastrophic Yellow River flood occurred when China's Nationalist government deliberately breached a major dike in a desperate attempt to “use water instead of soldiers” to slow the brutal Japanese invasion. The Nationalist state's technologization of disaster, its rejection of cosmological interpretations of calamity, and its depiction of flood victims as heroes sacrificing for the nation mark departures from late-imperial responses to disaster, but foreshadow features of the devastating Mao-era Great Leap Famine of 1958–62. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The expeditions of foreign explorers and archaeologists along China's borderlands during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have long been a lightning rod for debates over cultural sovereignty, imperialism, and nationalism. This study attempts to move beyond such cultural and moral glosses by placing the expeditions of Aurel Stein and Sven Hedin to the northwestern province of Xinjiang back into the domestic geopolitical context of the Nanjing Decade (1927–37). Newly available archival material demonstrates how the discourse of cultural sovereignty, far from sabotaging such expeditions, instead became the handmaiden of domestic geopolitical competitors who attempted to turn Stein and Hedin into exploitable resources for their own agendas. The logistical pragmatism revealed in these sources relegates principled nationalist intellectuals and their imperialist targets to the background, and shows how a new approach to a familiar topic can help paint a fuller portrait of some of the most contested episodes of transnational cultural interactions throughout Eurasia. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This study explores how the government of mainland China values Chinese nationalism as a component of its historical memory and traces its relationship with music education from the twentieth century to the global age within broader social contexts. In a rapidly commercializing and modernizing China, nationalism remains the main driving force shaping Chinese music education, while historical nationalism and familial relationship have been reinforced by the current regime's educational socialization. Love for country and family and an emphasis on nationalism and Confucianism are the pragmatic tools employed by Chinese authorities to maintain their primacy in and power over education, particularly song teaching. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Mantetsu Employees' Association, founded in 1926 by a group of elite university-educated employees of the South Manchuria Railway Company, was an organization of unprecedented scope and vision which provided for the development of a limited form of self-government by the Japanese in the Kwantung Leasehold and Rail Zone during Japan's occupation of northeast China. Its founding principles resembled the ideological tenets of the metropole's movement of Taishō Democracy which had since the post-Russo-Japanese War energized supporters of widened popular access to the job of national governance. This paper traces how the Mantetsu Employees' Association reflected the political zeitgeist of post World War I metropolitan society whilst simultaneously developing in response to heightened Chinese nationalism in the northeast throughout the 1920s. It shows how the Association encompassed a wide range of employee ambitions—from increased involvement in imperial decision-making to labour advocacy on behalf of the Company's lowest-ranking Japanese workers to a critique of colonial policy as dictated by Tokyo's political parties. The paper introduces key Association players and their ideas as a means of questioning the nature of democracy in an imperial setting. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Over the last three decades, a considerable body of English-language academic work has shed much light on Japan's empire-building project in Greater China during the first half of the twentieth century. At the same time, Japanese-language studies of the country's pre-war financial history have also grown in leaps and bounds. Yet, to date, neither body of literature seems to have fully examined what might appear to the naked eye as one of the critical pre-war junctures, where Japanese financial history converged on imperial policy and Chinese nationalist responses thereto.1 This paper will therefore aim to fill part of the gap by examining how the Yokohama Specie Bank, arguably the backbone of Japanese finance in China Proper, was affected by Chinese anti-foreign boycotts throughout the pre-war era (1842–1937). [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

By tracing the origin and evolution of Chinese nationalism, this paper finds that the dialectical relationship between the Chinese "self and the foreign "other" has provided the cultural-institutional context for the construction of its national identity. The positional change of the Chinese actor in the self-other interaction--resulting from the institutional shift from the tianxia order to the Westphalian system--and the consequent national humiliation have been embedded in the Chinese collective memory and given rise to the consensual norms ingrained in the national identity. Viewed through the lens of political sociology and identity politics, China's tenacious struggle for national rejuvenation can be construed as a social practice guided by these memory-encoded social norms. Due to the protracted and ambivalent nature of the state's purposive action in attaining great-power status on the international stage, the confidence of the resurgent state is compromised by an acute sense of frustration. This identity predicament has engendered a peculiar Chinese state emotion, which has profoundly influenced the in-group members' evaluation and perception of out-group entities and their behavior in the antagonistic intergroup relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]