Search

This article explores the relation between testimony and history by considering the recent "ethical turn" toward experience and memory in historical research. By way of a brief history of the concept of testimony in historical research, the article pinpoints current discussions as being about historical understanding rather than factual knowledge about the past. With reference to the revaluation of history within the linguistic turn, influential historical theorists have argued that abandoning objectivism calls for a rapprochement between historical research and attempts to make sense of the past in accounts of memory. Both history and memory accounts, they argue, offer forms of understanding that are equally conditioned by language as well as politics, culture, and identity. Thus, the inclusion of testimony has been framed as not only legitimate but also important for an "ethical" understanding of the past within historiographical discourse. In relation to this development, the article shows that abandoning objectivism in the wake of the linguistic turn cannot justify a general rapprochement between history and memory accounts. On the contrary, abandoning objectivism only increases the importance of appreciating the conceptual distinction between testimony and history as different forms of understanding. For clarifying the conceptual distinction, the article reexamines R. G. Collingwood's (in)famous contention that "testimony ... stops where history begins." Collingwood's main point was not, as previous interpreters have argued, only about epistemology but was about the qualitative difference between historical and practical pasts. In conclusion, the article articulates the importance of the distinction between history and practice in relation to questions about the historian's ethical responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of História da Historiografia is the property of Sociedade Brasileira de Teoria e Historia da Historiografia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The concept of evidence is a cornerstone for the modern idea of history. As the story goes, pre-modem history was based on testimony from authorities in the past - modern history is, in contrast, based on treating material from the past strictly as evidence. Through this transformation history became a science of inference from evidence in the present to causes in the past. This transformation has been labelled the birth of an evidential paradigm in historical research. Understanding the change this paradigm brought about was a central concern for seminal authors such as Marc Bloch, R. G. Collingwood, Michel Foucault, Carlo Ginzburg and Paul Ricoeur. My aim in this essay is to examine a specific idea that is often associated with the evidential paradigm; namely, the idea that the modem historian's relation to material from the past is evidential through and through. The main aim of the essay is to show that this evidentialist idea is deeply problematic. I will argue that the evidentialist idea is in conflict with both the phenomenology and the epistemology of historical research. My central claims are that material from the past does not enter the historian's experience merely in the form of evidence, and that the very possibility of historical knowledge is, in fact, significantly dependent on not treating material from the past only as inferential evidence. 1 will, concurrently, connect these issues with contemporary trends in the philosophy of history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Michael Oakeshott's distinction between the practical and the historical past has been the focus of much discussion in contemporary theory of history. This is primarily due to Hayden White's appeal to Oakeshott's distinction in several recent works. However, the philosophical underpinnings of Oakeshott's distinction are seldom discussed. This essay provides a philosophical elaboration and critique of both Oakeshott's distinction and White's use of it. Oakeshott's distinction is expounded as an integral part of his idealist philosophy. My contention is that in order to properly understand the distinction, we must first understand Oakeshott's theories about different modes of understanding to which different kinds of past belong. Besides comparing White and Oakeshott, this essay will also develop a critique of the distinction between history and practice. The main claim of the essay is that there are important internal connections between history and practice that Oakeshott's distinction neglects. In conclusion, I argue that the ethical and existential dimension of history can only be appreciated by dissolving Oakeshott's absolute distinction between the practical and the historical past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]