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The controversial issue of Martin Heidegger's Nazism has posed hermeneutic challenges since well before the philosopher's death. This essay approaches the political-philosophical conflict of Heidegger's early work not through consideration of explicitly problematic statements and writings but through comparison of the structural framework of Being and Time (1927) with Thomas Mann's roughly contemporaneous theoretical accomplishment in The Magic Mountain (1924). Specifically, the essay argues for a deep affinity between the two texts' constellations of language, temporality, and death. By demonstrating the extensively documented ties between the novel's philosophical framework and Mann's politics, the essay claims that any understanding of Heidegger's work must be contextualized alongside its concrete political valences in shifting ideological paradigms of the early Weimar Republic. This analysis suggests a new mode of ethical critique of Heidegger's magnum opus that focuses more on the text's greater theoretical edifice than on the problematization of localized passages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Martin Heidegger's existential account of care in Being and Time (2010) provides us with an opportunity to reimagine what the proper theoretical grounding of an ethic of care might be. Heidegger's account of care serves to deconstruct the two primary foundations that an ethic of care is often based upon. Namely, that we are inevitably interdependent upon one another and/or possess an innate disposition to care for fellow humans in need. Heidegger's account reveals that both positions are founded upon an ontic (meaning factual existence), as opposed to an ontological (which refers to the nature of being), understanding of care. The distinctions between an ontic and ontological understanding of care are significant. Yet, I maintain that they are not completely incompatible. Both Heidegger and care ethicists contend that our existence with others is understood through a relational ontology. Furthermore, there are certain ontological structures from Heidegger which resonate with an ethic of care. Two key existential structures are leaping-ahead and being-guilty. These existential structures are latent in care ethics, and by explicitly revealing them I reinforce the connection between Heidegger's account and care theory. Lastly, I develop the theoretical foundations of care ethics by proposing an existential ethic of care. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing upon the interpretations of Martin Heidegger's Being and Time offered by the favorable commentators such as Hubert Dreyfus, Robert Dostal, Harrison Hall, and Charles Taylor, this paper responds to Heidegger's unsympathetic commentator Herman Philipse's critical interpretation of Being and Time (Sections 12-18 of Division I) and shows the validity of Heidegger's claim for the ontological priority of the practical world over the theoretical world. This has been done by showing that the practical world where readiness-to-hand is the norm, emerges from a selfcorrecting, transient originary situation where readiness-to-hand is primordial to us while we arrive at the theoretical aspect of presence-at-hand when we encounter the unreadiness-to-hand. This paper also shows that Heidegger's text is coherent and consistent. This has been done by looking at the structure of Heidegger's presentational strategies and by making links explicit in them. We have also looked afresh at how he defines certain pivotal elements of his practical world and their relationship with each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper examines Martin Heidegger’s own interpretation of Being and Time in the Black Notebooks. The opening part addresses Heidegger’s singular notions of “thinking” and “questioning” which suggest a critically reflective stance, but involve an initiatory call to surrender to the hidden powers of Beyng. The second part addresses Heidegger’s lament in the Black Notebooks that Being and Time has not produced a “great enemy”, and his critique of the initial existentialist or “anthropological” receptions of his magnum opus. The third part looks at how Heidegger’s thought moves beyond Being and Time, in light of the central role the thinker assigns to the German people in repeating the first “inception” of preSocratic thought, in order to overcome the legacies of Roman universalism, and what Heidegger as early as 1932 was calling “Jewish Christianity”. The final part addresses Heidegger’s conception of “the history of Beyng” as it is developed in the Black Notebooks of the early 1940s, from out of the account of “temporality” in Being and Time: a “history” in which Heidegger’s postulation of a need for the “annihilation“ (Vernichtung)” of the essential enemy of the Volk become the lens through which Heidegger can read the Shoah as the “the peak of self-destruction in history”. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Black Notebooks, Heidegger ascribes in 1938/9 to the Jewish race an “empty rationality and calculative ability,” in his view the cause of its “worldlessness.” To assess this characterisation, I present Heidegger’s theories of history as a decline in Being and Time and in his later history of Being. For this purpose, I discuss his notions of Rechnen (reckoning), Machenschaft (machination), and Geviert (fourfold), several existentialia from Being and Time, and Heidegger’s identification of modern machination and modern technology. Furthermore, I examine Heidegger’s attitude toward the Jews and the Holocaust. I present his alignment of the unconcealment of modernity and the Jewish race, and compare his theory of machination with the texts “Positionality” (1949) and “The Question concerning Technology” (1954). Heidegger’s notes about the Jews in the Black Notebooks after 1944 confirm that he tried “to silence Auschwitz silently,” as I already argued in a paper from 1995. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cassirer is important in 20th Century philosophy for the attention he gives to the fundamental relationship between myth and language. For Cassirer, myth is a non-subjective form of discourse wherein the origin of language coincides with both the human-divine encounter and the event of being itself. In this article, I trace the disagreement between Cassirer and Heidegger on the nature of the magical (or “primitive”) sign, which is at the heart of mythical discourse. While Heidegger initially argues that this form of sign is structurally impossible on the basis of his accounts of signs and language in Being and Time, he later comes to recognize that he had not properly accounted for its possibility within his phenomenological deduction. I conclude by describing how Heidegger’s notion of poetry eventually comes into alignment with the way Cassirer describes the function of myth and the magical sign. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophy, which does not begin again, always unfolds against the background of the ongoing philosophical tradition, which it needs to interpret. I argue that Heidegger's theories, like all philosophical theories, can neither be reduced to, nor separated from, the historical context. In that sense they are like all other philosophical views, perhaps in theory ahistorical but in practice historical, hence always bound up with and inseparable from their historical moment. If, as I believe, Heidegger's theories led him in part toward National Socialism, there is no alternative, if philosophy is to survive in a meaningful sense, to rejecting those aspects of his position, which must now be considered as simply and wholly dead, in favor of other aspects of Heidegger's thinking that, if they are still living, can possibly be saved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Trawny, Heidegger's Black Notebooks show that he turned away from any National Socialism in 1938 and that his thinking could be "contaminated" by National Socialism and anti-Semitism only between 1931 and 1944/1945. However, in this paper it is argued that already in Being and Time (1927) Heidegger had made a case for National Socialism; that he discovered in 1938 the "true" National Socialism, and that Trawny's main criterion regarding Heidegger's anti-Semitism is false. Heidegger's case is compared with Max Scheler, who, because of Hitler, turned from the right to the centre. In addition, alternatives to Trawny's detailed interpretations of three of Heidegger's anti-Semitic remarks are offered, it is shown that Trawny misconstrues and downplays not only Heidegger's National Socialism, but also his anti-Semitism, and the anti-Semitic aspects of Heidegger's history of Being are presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a paper entitled "Emmanuel Faye: The Introduction of Fraud into Philosophy?" (Philosophy Today 59[3] [2015]), Thomas Sheehan accuses Faye of committing many blunders in Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy. In this paper, I address what is according to Sheehan himself the most important part of his paper, namely his charges against Faye's interpretation of Heidegger's Being and Time. I show that they are all wholly unfounded. All the aspects of Being and Time that Sheehan addresses speak not only not against Faye but rather even for Faye. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Martin Heidegger's phenomenology provides methodological guidance for qualitative researchers seeking to explicate the lived experience of study participants. However, most phenomenological researchers apply his philosophy loosely. This is not surprising because Heidegger's phenomenological philosophy is challenging and the influence of his philosophy in shaping the conduct of interpretive phenomenological research is broadly debated. This article presents an exploration of Dasein, a key tenet of Martin Heidegger's interpretive phenomenology and explicates its usefulness for phenomenological research. From this perspective, we present guidance for researchers planning to utilize Heidegger's philosophy underpinning their research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay revisits the question of inheritance, legacy and handing-down ( das Erbe) as it is developed in Heidegger's Being and Time. A careful reading especially of paragraphs 6 and 72-74 allows us to consider whether Heidegger's notion of inheritance might not be far more resistant to modes of premature closure-such as its apparent exclusion of das Erbe from the workings of Destruktion-than readers often have perceived it to be. In a second step, the discussion of Heidegger's inheritance opens onto some of Derrida's fundamental reflections on the mortgage of inheritance, in which Heidegger is never far away, even when his work is not the ostensibly primary topic of analysis. If Derrida suggests that certain difficulties 'never disappear from Heidegger's discourse' and that they 'bring the consequences of a serious mortgage to weigh upon the whole of his thought', the legacies of this Heideggerean inheritance call for perpetual reappraisal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Th e aim of the article is to reconstruct the possible contents of the Second Half of Being and time. Author begins with presentation of the hermeneutical logic of philosophical concept formation, it is formal indication; then describes the announcements of the Th ird Division in Being and Time. Finally, the original Heidegger's concept of philosophy is recalled to stress the meaning of the third division of Part One of Being and Time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent efforts to analyze notions of subjectivity draw on the notions of autonoetic consciousness and episodic memory from the literature in psychology and cognitive science, and on theories of time consciousness and subjectivity from phenomenology. In doing so, leading interpreters have relied primarily on Husserl's theories of time consciousness. This paper outlines the significantly different approach grounded in Heidegger's analysis of the temporality and historicality of the self. Heidegger's framework proves to be fruitful for an analysis of autonoetic conciousness, and challenges several fundamental presumptions of dominant psychological models of episodic memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ideas y Valores is the property of Universidad Nacional de Colombia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article studies the phenomenology of chronic illness in light of phenomenology’s insights into ecstatic temporality and freedom. It shows how a chronic illness can, in lived experience, manifest itself as a disturbance of our usual relation to ecstatic temporality and thence as a disturbance of freedom. This suggests that ecstatic temporality is related to another sort of time—“provisional time”—that is in turn rooted in the body. The article draws on Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception and Heidegger’s Being and Time, shedding light on the latter’s concept of ecstatic temporality. It also discusses implications for self-management of chronic illness, especially in children. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a philosophical re-examination of Ecclesiastes using the work of Martin Heidegger, particularly his early work in Being and Time. Heidegger's focus on death, temporality, and history provides a powerful and compelling framework for understanding these same themes in Ecclesiastes. In elaborating these philosophical motifs and correspondences, this article proposes that (can't convert) should be understood as an analog to Heidegger's concept of Geschichtlichkeit (historicity). If (can't convert) is understood as such, then most of the traditionally puzzling terms in Ecclesiastes (e.g. can't convesrt) can be made sense of using the aforementioned philosophical framework. This framework additionally shows that Ecclesiastes (like Being and Time) cannot be understood as a protoexistentialist text. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

“Laughing at Finitude” interprets Slavoj Žižek’s intellectual project as responding to a challenge left by Being and Time. Setting out from discussions of Heidegger’s book in The Parallax View and The Ticklish Subject, the essay exfoliates Žižek’s response to the Heideggerian version of a “philosophy of finitude”—both finding the central insight of Žižek’s work in Heidegger’s radical proposal for “anticipatory resoluteness” and developing Žižek’s critique of Being and Time as indicating Heidegger’s retreat from that proposal within the very book where it appears. Žižek reads Being and Time’s existential thematic as proposing a radical subjectivism and, unlike other Heidegger-critics, praises this aspect of the project. Indeed, Žižek claims that the weakness of Being and Time as a whole is that it is insufficiently radical in its subjectivism. For him, Heidegger is a thinker of ambiguous value, one who develops a program from whose own demands he hides. “Laughing at Finitude” both articulates this accusation of self-deception in Heidegger and examines the imperatives necessary to avoid it, for a dialectical shift from the “tragic” voice in existential treatments of finitude and for a revolutionary collectivist re-conception of social “Mitsein.” It suggests, in the process, Žižek’s own intellectual itinerary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The articulation of the Discourse (Rede) is taken in Being and Time as a conforming moment of the openness of the world. In this paper we put into question whether we can legitimately assume that an antecedent meaningful articulation is inherent to the world, or whether that introduces an a priori schema lacking concrete phenomenal reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]