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This paper develops a model of the Chinese economy using a DSGE framework that accommodates a banking sector and money. The model is used to shed light on the period of the recent period of financial crisis. It differs from other applications in the use of indirect inference to estimate and test the fitted model. We find that the main shocks that hit China in the crisis were international and that domestic banking shocks were unimportant. Officially mandated bank lending and government spending were used to supplement monetary policy to aggressively offset shocks to demand. An analysis of the frequency of crises shows that crises occur on average about every halfcentury, with about a third accompanied by financial crises. We find that monetary policy can be used more vigorously to stabilise the economy, making direct banking controls and fiscal activism unnecessary.

The English and Welsh water and sewerage industry is characterised by indivisible capital which has a long service life. Previous studies of efficiency for the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry take a static framework, assuming all inputs can be adjusted instantaneously. This paper measures dynamic efficiency by incorporating intertemporal links of capital within the production function for the English and Welsh water and sewerage industry for the period 1997–2011. Dynamic Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) considers capital as a quasi-fixed input and is modelled as a contemporaneous output into current production and an input from past production. The results show that the inadequate intertemporal allocation of quasi-fixed inputs is the largest contributor of inefficiency.

This paper uses a sample of matched data of firms-banks in China over the period 1999-2012 to determine the drivers of firms switching behaviour from one bank relationship to another. The findings conform to the extant literature and therefore indicate that the switching behaviour of Chinese firms is no different to firms elsewhere. The results show that the principal driver of a switching action is the credit needs of the firm and a mixture of firm and bank characteristics. The findings support the extant literature that less opaque firms are able to switch more readily than opaque firms. The results also suggest that banks that develop there fee income services are more effective in locking-in their borrowers.

Using a sample of 151 banks over the period 2003 to 2010, this paper estimates a model that examines the effect of switching costs in the Chinese loan market on banking profitability. In keeping with the extant empirical literature it reports a positive relationship between bank profitability and switching costs. Furthermore it reports the estimation of a systems model of switching costs and profitability. The main result is that bank size measured by total assets is has a complex relationship with switching costs. Competition between small banks creates the incentive for lock-in and increased switching costs whereas very large banks are less exercised by lock-in and switching costs. The study also finds that concentration has a negative relationship with switching costs and profitability, confirming the accepted view that the large state-owned banks are concerned with social as well as profit objectives.

The downturn in the world economy following the global banking crisis has left the Chinese economy relatively unscathed. This paper develops a model of the Chinese economy using a DSGE framework with a banking sector to shed light on this episode. It differs from other applications in the use of indirect inference procedure to test the fitted model. The model finds that the main shocks hitting China in the crisis were international and that domestic banking shocks were unimportant. However, directed bank lending and direct government spending was used to supplement monetary policy to aggressively offset shocks to demand. The model finds that government expenditure feedback reduces the frequency of a business cycle crisis but that any feedback effect on investment creates excess capacity and instability in output.

This paper attempts to evaluate the competitiveness of British banking in the presence of cross-selling and switching costs during 1993-2008. It presents estimates of a model of banking behaviour that encompasses switching costs as well as cross-selling of loans and off-balance sheet transactions. The evidence from panel estimation of the model lends support to our theoretical priors on the cross-selling behaviour of British banks, which helps explain the rapid growth of non-interest income during the last two decades. We also find that the consumer faced high switching costs in the loan market in the latter part of the sample period, as a result of lower competitiveness.

This paper presents an empirical assessment of the degree of competition within the Jamaican banking sector during the period 1998 to 2009. We employ a dynamic version of the Panzar - Rosse Model to estimate market power among the sample of banks that constitute over 90 percent of the banking market. Using the conventional statistical tests, we are unable to reject monopoly/perfect collusion for the merchant banking sector in Jamaica but find competitive conditions in the commercial banking sector. This contrasts with earlier findings using alternative estimators that find monopolistic competition in the market as a whole.

Deregulation, re-regulation and continuing globalisation embody an imperative that banks increase efficiency in order to survive. We employ the Simar-Wilson (2007) two-step double bootstrap Data Envelopment Analysis method to measure whether cost efficiency among Jamaican banks has improved between 1999 and 2009 following a number of post-crisis responses aimed at strengthening and improving the sector. Efficiency is extracted from a meta-frontier construction for the full sample period. In addition we conduct tests for unconditional beta- and sigma-convergence and overall, the results suggest that there has been a tendency towards improvement in bank efficiency levels for the industry as a whole but there is also evidence that foreign banks show a higher trend improvement in efficiency.

This paper examines the convergence properties of cost efficiency for Indonesian banks for the period 1992-2007. It employs the Simar and Wilson’s (2007) two stage semi-parametric double bootstrap DEA procedure to estimate cost efficiency. Using panel data estimation, the paper examines β-convergence and σ-convergence, to test the speed at which Indonesian banks are converging, towards the best practice and country average. We find evidence that in general the post-crisis structural reform process improved the average level of efficiency and improved the distribution of efficiency across banks significantly. The Asian financial crisis and the structural reform had the effect of slowing the adjustment speed of bank efficiency.

Risk Management in Chinese banks has traditionally been the Cinderella of its internal functions. Political stricture and developmental imperative have often overridden standard practice of risk management resulting in large non-performing loan (NPL) ratios. One of the stated aims of opening up the Chinese banks to foreign strategic investment is the development of risk management functions. In recent years NPL ratios have declined through a mixture of recovery, asset management operation and expanded balance sheets. However, the training and practice of risk managers remain second class compared with foreign banks operating in China. This paper evaluates bank performance using a Network DEA approach where an index of risk management practice and an index of risk management organisation are used as intermediate inputs in the production process. The two indices are constructed from a survey of risk managers in domestic banks and foreign banks operating in China. The use of network DEA can aid the manager in identifying the stages of production that need attention.

The positive relationship between bank CEO compensation and risk taking is a well established empirical fact. The global banking crisis has resulted in a chorus of demands to control banker’s bonuses and thereby curtail their risk taking activities in the hope that the world can avoid a repeat in the future. However, the positive relationship is not a causative one. In this paper we argue that the cushioning of banks downside risks provide the incentive for banks to take excessive risk and design compensation packages to deliver high returns. Macro-prudential regulation will have a better chance of curbing excess risk taking than controlling banker’s compensation.

Deregulation, re-regulation and continuing globalisation embody an imperative that banks increase efficiency to survive. We employ non-parametric bootstrap DEA to measure technical efficiency among Jamaican banks between 1998 and 2007. In addition, we test for conditional convergence to identify pointing variables for technical efficiency. Overall, the results suggest that there has been a tendency towards improvement in bank efficiency levels for the largest banks. The findings show strong evidence of conditional convergence, which means that each bank is converging to its own steady-state and that GDP growth, ownership and size are the major influences on levels of technical efficiency.

The study examines the changes to total factor productivity of Jamaican banks between 1998 and 2007. Using Data Envelopment Analysis with bootstrap to construct a Malmquist index, bank productivity is measured and decomposed into technical progress and efficiency. The results suggest an inconsistent growth pattern for banks between 1998 and 2007 driven mainly by efficiency gains in the immediate post-crisis period to 2002, and by technological progress towards the end of the sample period. The second largest banks along with merchant and locally-owned banks showed significant productivity growth in some models, with modest growth for commercial and foreign-owned banks.

This paper presents an empirical assessment of the degree of competition within the Jamaican banking sector during the period 1998 to 2007. The popular H-statistic by Panzar and Rosse is utilised to estimate market power among the sample of banks. Using usual statistical tests, we are unable to reject monopoly/perfect collusion for the banking market in Jamaica. This contrasts with earlier findings using alternative estimators. Therefore, the use of a dynamic reformulation of the model with a dynamic estimator highlights some collusive behaviour among banks.

The recent literature on measuring bank performance indicates a preference for sophisticated techniques over simple accounting ratios. We explore the results and relationships between bank efficiency estimates using accounting ratios and Data Envelope Analysis (DEA) with bootstrap among Jamaican banks between 1998 and 2007. The results indicate different outcomes for the traditional accounting ratios and the sophisticated DEA methodology in the measurement of bank efficiency. GLS random effects two-variable regression tests for superiority using a risk index for insolvency suggest an advantage in favour of the DEA.

According to a frequently cited finding by Berger et al (1993), X-inefficiency contributes 20% to cost-inefficiency in western banks. Empirical studies of Chinese banks tend to place cost-inefficiency in the region of 50%. Such estimates would suggest that Chinese banks suffer from gross cost inefficiency. Using a nonparametric bootstrapping method, this study decomposes cost-inefficiency in Chinese banks into X-inefficiency and allocative-inefficiency. It argues that allocative inefficiency is the optimal outcome of input resource allocation subject to enforced employment constraints. The resulting analysis suggests that allowing for rational allocative inefficiency; Chinese banks are no better or worse than their western counterparts.

This study examines the productivity growth of the nationwide banks of China and a sample of city commercial, banks for the eleven years to 2007. Estimates of total factor productivity growth are constructed with appropriate confidence intervals, using a bootstrap method for the Malmquist index. The study adjusts for the quality of the output by accounting for the non-performing loans on the balance sheets of the banks and tests for the robustness of the results by examining alternative sets of outputs. The productivity growth of the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) is compared with the joint-stock banks (JSCBs) and city commercial banks (CCBs). The results show that average total factor productivity for the joint-stock banks was better than that of the state-owned banks for some models of measurement but not others. But the average city commercial banks improved its productivity growth both in terms of frontier shift and efficiency gain throughout the whole period. The study also shows that individual state-owned and joint-stock banks did improve their productivity growth and defined an improving production frontier. Most other banks lagged behind so that the gap between the inefficient banks and the most efficient banks widened. While individual banks improved their productivity growth there is no evidence that the average productivity growth of Chinese banks as a whole improved in the run-up to WTO.

This paper evaluates the performance of the Arab GCC banking industry in the context of the Structure-Conduct-Performance hypothesis in the period 1993-2002. The paper uses panel estimation differentiating between bank fixed effects and country fixed effects. It examines the Relative-Market-Power and the Efficient-Structure hypotheses differentiating between the two by employing a non-parametric measure of technical efficiency, and finds that the banking industry in the Arab GCC countries is best explained by the mainstream SCP hypothesis. The empirical results do not find any support for the Hicks (1935) “Quiet Life” version of the market power hypothesis.

This study demarcates cost-inefficiency in Chinese banks into X-inefficiency and rent-seeking-inefficiency. A protected banking market not only encourages weak management and X-inefficiency but also public ownership and state directed lending encourages moral hazard and bureaucratic rent seeking. This paper uses bootstrap non-parametric techniques to estimate measures of X-inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency for the 4 state owned banks and 10 joint-stock banks over the period 1997-2006. The paper adjusts for the quality of loans by treating NPLs as a negative output. The paper shows that Chinese banks have reduced cost inefficiency and reduced X-inefficiency at a faster rate than rent-seeking inefficiency.

This study examines the productivity growth of the nationwide banks of China over the ten years to 2006. Using a bootstrap method for the Malmquist index estimates of productivity growth are constructed with appropriate confidence intervals. The paper adjusts for the quality of the output by accounting for the non-performing loans on the balance sheets and test for the robustness of the results by examining alternative sets of outputs. The productivity growth of the state-owned banks is compared with the Joint-stock banks and it determinants evaluated. The paper finds that average productivity of the Chinese banks improved modestly over this period. Adjusting for the quality of loans, by treating NPLs as an undesirable output, the average productivity growth of the state-owned banks was zero or negative while productivity of the Joint-Stock banks was markedly higher.

This study demarcates cost-inefficiency in Chinese banks into X-inefficiency and rent-seeking-inefficiency. A protected banking market not only encourages weak management and X-inefficiency but also public ownership and state directed lending encourages moral hazard and bureaucratic rent seeking. This paper uses bootstrap non-parametric techniques to estimate measures of X-inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency for the 4 state owned banks and 11 joint-stock banks over the period 1997-2004. In contrast to other studies of the Chinese banking sector, the paper argues that reduced inefficiency is an indicator that the competitive threat of the opening up of the banking market in 2007 has produced tangible benefits in improved performance. This paper finds evidence of declining trend in both types of inefficiency.

The existing Chinese banking system was born out of a state-planning framework focussed on the funding of state-owned enterprises. Despite the development of a modern banking system, numerous studies of Chinese banking point to its high level of average inefficiency. Much of this inefficiency relates to the high level of non-performing loans held on the banks books. This study argues that a significant component of inefficiency relates to a defunct bureaucratic incentive structure. Using bootstrap non-parametric techniques the paper decomposes cost-inefficiency into X-inefficiency and rational inefficiency caused by bureaucratic rent seeking. In contrast to other studies of the Chinese banking sector, the paper argues that a change in the incentive structure and the competitive threat of the opening up of the banking market in 2007 has produced reduced inefficiency and improved performance.

This paper develops a political economy model of multiple unemployment equilibria to provide a theory of an endogenous natural rate of unemployment. This model is applied to the UK and the US interwar period which is remembered as the decade of mass unemployment. The theory here sees the natural rate and the associated path of unemployment as a reaction to shocks (mainly demand in nature) and the institutional structure of the economy. The channel through which these two forces feed on each other is a political economy process whereby voters with limited information on the natural rate react to shocks by demanding more or less social protection. The reduced form results obtained confirm a pattern of unemployment behaviour in which unemployment moves between high and low equilibria in response to shocks.

Macro models generally assume away heterogeneous welfare in assessing policies. We investigate here within two aggregative models - one with a representative agent, the other a long-used forecasting model of the UK - whether allowing for differences in welfare functions (specifically between those in continuous employment and those with frequent unemployment spells) alters the rankings of monetary policies. We find that it does but that a set of policies (money supply targeting implemented by money supply control) can be found that are robust in the sense of avoiding very poor outcomes for either of the two groups.

We undertake an empirical assessment of the competitiveness and market contestability of the major British banks post-1980 – a period of major structural changes, mergers, demutualizations and acquisitions. Specifically, we estimate and test the Rosse-Panzar model on a panel of 12 banks for the period 1980-2004; furthermore, we buttress the Rosse-Panzar methodology by estimating the ratio of Lerner indices obtained from interest rate setting equations. The sample of banks corresponds closely to the major British Banking Groups as specified by the British Banking Association. Our results confirm the consensus finding that the British banking market can be described as monopolistically competitive. We also find that on the core business of balance sheet activity, British banks have remained as competitive in the 1990s as in the 1980s. This finding is further supported by evidence from the ratio of Lerner indices for loans and deposits. However, we find a significant worsening of competitiveness on the non-core (off-balance sheet) business of the banks.

This paper examines the influence of the real price of beer on violence-related injuries split by gender across the economic regions in England and Wales. It was concluded that alcohol prices and injury sustained in violence is causally related in both males and females. Injury of females is causally related to poverty but injury of males. However, nationwide sports events were associated only with male assault injury. Violence-related harm was significantly and independently linked to other socioeconomic and demographic factors. Our results suggest that the real price of alcohol (using beer as an example) has a part to play in controlling the consumption of alcohol and the incidence of violent injury.

Previous attempts at modelling current observed endogenous financial variables in a macroeconomic model have concentrated on only one observed endogenous variable – namely the short-term rate of interest. The solution method for dealing with more than one observed endogenous variable has thus far been computationally intractable. This paper applies a general search algorithm to a macroeconomic model with an observed interest rate and exchange rate to solve the signal extraction problem. The informational advantage of applying the signal extraction algorithm to all the current observed endogenous variables is examined in terms of the implication for policy from the misperceptions of specific macroeconomic shocks.

This paper investigates the market structure of Arab GCC banking industry during the years of 1993 to 2002 using the most frequently applied measures of concentration kbank concentration ratio (CRk) and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and evaluates the monopoly power of banks over the ten years period using the “H statistic” by Panzar and Rosse. The results show that Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE have moderately concentrated markets and are moving to less concentrated positions. The measures of concentration also show that Qatar, Bahrain and Oman are highly concentrated markets. The Panzar-Rosse H-statistics suggest that banks in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE operate under perfect competition; banks in Bahrain and Qatar operate under conditions of monopolistic competition; and we are unable to reject monopolistic competition for the banking market in Oman.

This study examines the technical efficiency and productivity of domestic and foreign commercial banks in Malaysia 1994-2000. We find that foreign banks have a higher efficiency level than domestic banks, and that efficient banks are characterised by size but not profitability or loan quality. The main source of productivity growth is technical change rather than improvement in efficiency. The productivity of domestic banks is more susceptible to macroeconomic shocks than foreign banks but over the medium term foreign banks are only marginally superior to domestic banks.