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The Law Commission has proposed a new offence of cyberflashing to combat the problem of sending unsolicited images or videos of human genitals to others. It seems that what the Law Commission has in mind is not flashing per se, but cyber-nudity. Its proposal fails to comprehensively evaluate the adequacy of existing law and fails to balance the harm of a criminal conviction against the potential harm of cyberflashing. It shall be argued that the Law Commission seems to have conflated wrong with harm and that its harm claim is supported only by anecdotal evidence. The vast majority of cyberflashing cases, including most Airdropping and Bluetoothing cases, are already covered by existing law, leaving untouched only a handful of one-off Airdropping or Bluetoothing cases where the flasher did not intend to cause distress or anxiety and the victim did not apprehend imminent unlawful force. Thus, it is argued that this very narrowly tailored cyberflashing offence adds very little and that amending existing communication offences or harassment offences would provide more protection to victims as such offences could apply to a wide range of sexually harassing content, not just images or videos of human genitals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The occurrence of a fatal road traffic collision may raise a number of legal issues and result in litigation both in the civil and criminal courts. The role of the different branches of law is distinct, with the aims of the litigation being quite different, but both require causation to be proved. Such cases are examined in this article as a vehicle for discussing how the principles of causation play out in each branch of law. It will be seen that the particular aims of the law dictate how doctrines of causation are applied, with particular problems caused by the legislature's creation of strict liability offences. To resolve these problems, we propose that the criminal law borrow from negligence in adopting a test akin to the 'harm within the risk' test, adapting it to the role of the criminal law by formulating a 'harm within the wrong' requirement for causation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides an analysis of the statement, made in many papers and reports on the use of gene editing in humans, that we should only use the technology when it is safe. It provides an analysis of what the statement means in the context of nonreproductive and reproductive gene editing and argues that the statement is inconsistent with the philosophical commitments of some of the authors, who put it forward in relation to reproductive uses of gene editing, specifically their commitment to Parfitian nonidentity considerations and to a legal principle of reproductive liberty. But, if that is true it raises a question about why the statement is made. What is its discursive and rhetorical function? Five functions are suggested, some of which are more contentious and problematic than others. It is argued that it is possible, perhaps even likely, that the "only when it is safe" rider is part of a deliberate obfuscation aimed at hiding the full implications of the arguments made about the ethics of gene editing and their underlying philosophical justifications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Affirmative action is often implemented as a way of making redress to victims of past injustices. But critics of this practice have launched a three-pronged assault against it. Firstly, they point out that beneficiaries of preferential policies tend not to benefit to the same extent as they were harmed by past injustices. Secondly, when its defenders point to the wider benefits of affirmative action (e.g. destruction of stereotypes, creation of role models), critics maintain that such ends could never be sufficiently weighty to permit violating equal treatment. And, thirdly, critics dispute whether the alleged benefits of affirmative action really ensue. I argue this three-pronged assault is flawed at the conceptual level. Firstly, it operates with an impoverished conception of redress. When X wrongs Y, X does not make exhaustive redress to Y by compensating Y for the harm Y suffered due to X's wrong action. Redress also requires rectification of the wrong: X must put right the wrong done to Y by making adequate amends. While the means of compensation are determined by the extent of the harm for which compensation is due, the adequacy of amends for a wrong is less tightly controlled by the nature of the wrong. So, secondly, it is perfectly right that the choice of amends be informed by the prospect of wider benefits. Whether, thirdly, these benefits are in fact in prospect in the case of affirmative action is an empirical question which philosophy cannot answer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We question the justice of using prison sentences to control hate speech. It is argued that prison sentences should be used only to deter offensive and hateful speech that harms others. However, the harm requirement cannot be satisfied merely by demonstrating theoretical harm in the abstract, as Jeremy Waldron does in his recent book. Instead, factual harm has to be demonstrated because prison is in fact very harmful for the expresser of the offensive and hateful speech. There is noting wrong with penal measures being used to deter this kind of speech, but harmful prison sentences should not be used to deter harmless speech. Waldron asserts that the United States should follow the British model, among others, of using prison to control and chill free (hate) speech. Waldron wants a model of unfree speech for some. We aim to show that the United States should resist enacting hate speech laws similar to the unjust laws found in Britain, where people have received long prison sentences for uttering offensive and hateful thoughts. To use prison sentences is to use a sledgehammer to crack a walnut: it is a grossly disproportionate and unjust penal response. Particular issue is taken with Waldron's harm theory. The core element of the paper is the Waldron debate, because the type of vacuous harm theory he puts forward has the potential to be used by lawmakers to justify unjust penal responses such as harmful prison sentences for harmless (even though grossly offensive) speech. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that there is nothing wrong with perfect voyeurism, covert watching or listening that is neither discovered nor publicized. After a brief discussion of privacy I present attempts from Stanley Benn, Daniel Nathan, and James Moor to show that the act is wrong. I argue that these authors fail to make their case. However, I maintain that, if detected or publicized, voyeurism can do grave harm and to that extent should be severely punished. I conclude with some thoughts on the stubborn intuition that perfect voyeurism is wrong despite the absence of harm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explicates a conception of injury as right-violation, which allows us to distinguish between setbacks to interests that should, and should not, be the concern of theories of justice. It begins by introducing a hybrid theory of rights, grounded in (a) the mobilisation of our moral equality to (b) protect our most important interests, and shows how violations of rights are the concern of justice, while setbacks where one of the twin grounds of rights is defeated are not. It then looks more closely at the substantive moral components of injury, namely harm—damage to one’s interests—and wrong—disrespect for one’s moral equality. It argues that, on the hybrid conception of rights, harm and wrong are individually necessary and jointly sufficient components of injury, and the disvalue of neither is reducible to the other—in particular, it is a mistake to construe the disrespect identified by wrong as another damaged interest. Finally, it distinguishes between the public and private dimensions of harm and wrong, and makes some preliminary suggestions as to whether the remedy for these different dimensions should lie in criminal, distributive, or corrective justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]