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This paper describes three basic positions that have been held in relation to the place of religious ideas and reasons in public square deliberation by outlining the arguments of major representatives of each position. The three positions are: 'obligatory relegation' (Robert Audi); 'willing translation' (John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas), and 'unreserved declaration' (Nicholas Wolterstorff and Charles Taylor). I conclude by offering an observation from the survey. Even as the question of the place of religious ideas in public square deliberation can be approached from either broader domains of the secularisation/post-secularisation of societies or the essence of liberal democracy, it is not the domain itself but rather specific conceptions of key ideas or notions within each domain that push the representatives to take the position that they do. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: This essay examines how deliberation and recognition contribute to our understanding of democracy as a form of government combining two sources of legitimacy, one based on a legal procedure and the other based on ideological faith commitment. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODS: Although joint deliberation about policy aims and recognition of person's political identities are often assumed to be complementary (Habermas, 1996; Honneth, 2014; Taylor, 1994), I argue that this need not be the case. Political identities oriented by faith commitments pose a challenge to deliberation oriented by rational compromise. A one-sided emphasis on deliberation or recognition as exclusive sources of democratic legitimation threatens to debase the res publica to an arena of identity politics whose populist proclivities are antithetical to liberal democracy. Exacerbating this trend is the phenomenon of political polarization caused in large part by the economic stratification and socio-cultural fragmentation of a global, digital form of capitalism. My method for examining and resolving the problem relies on notable philosophers who have written about the legal and political implications of deliberation and the politics of recognition: Charles Taylor, Jürgen Habermas, and Hans Kelsen. THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENTATION: The paper begins by summarizing the importance of recognition for political life and its ambivalent humanistic and nationalistic (and sub-nationalistic) senses (Part 1). I then turn to Kelsen's critique of recognition as incompatible with the rule of law, followed by his qualified endorsement of recognition, understood as a necessary political ethos underwriting a liberal, deliberative form of democracy (Parts 2 and 3). Turning to our contemporary democratic crisis, I show how structural transformations within and between political parties and the public sphere have given rise to authoritarian forms of populism (Part 4). I conclude by noting how imperatives within digital capitalism produce ambivalent effects regarding the restoration of the res publica to a forum for political deliberation. RESEARCH RESULTS: The paper shows that competition between deliberative and recognitive forms of democratic legitimation is not rivalrous but mutually beneficial. CONCLUSIONS, INNOVATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The paper concludes that the current legitimation crisis has fostered a populist reaction against liberal democracy. It proposes an innovative approach to understanding this reaction in terms of the failings of one-sided deliberative and recognition-based forms of democratic politics. It recommends a restoration (or reinvention) of these forms in healthy combination at the level of party-based political reform and reform of the public sphere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

El presente trabajo busca reflexionar, desde las perspectivas de la filosofía política, sobre las posibilidades de la integración de la religión en el espacio público, específicamente el Islam, en sociedades pluralistas y democráticas. En el artículo se discutirán las ideas de filósofos occidentales –tales como Rawls, Habermas y Taylor– junto con las propuestas de pensadores musulmanes.

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This paper focus on the disputed issue concerning the proper role of religion in politics, confronting the contributions of three major contemporary political thinkers about democracy and secularism. I present, first, Charles Taylor’s characterization of secularist regimes as attempts to secure the basic principles of the modern moral order. Next, I argue that John Rawls’s growing interest in the relation between religion and democracy led him to an even more inclusive view of public reason. Thirdly, I show that Jürgen Habermas preserves a distinction between faith and knowledge that proves essential to grasping the debate over the place of religion in the public sphere. All three thinkers are concerned with the appropriate forum for the basic political language of the secular state. In a nutshell, my interpretation highlights a much greater proximity between Habermas and Rawls on political justification, on the one hand, and between the former and Taylor regarding the normative basis for the secular state, on the other hand, than their various interventions seem to indicate.

O artigo trata da política do secularismo como um componente essencial da ordem moral moderna, contrapondo a caracterização da secularidade em Charles Taylor às abordagens do tema na ideia de razão pública em John Rawls e na concepção pós-secular de democracia em Jürgen Habermas.

In order to endorse political cosmopolitanism we will undertake a critical analysis of the main four premises that support communitarianism: the ontological one, the instrumental one, the ethical one, and the moral-psychological one (1). Then, we warn that communitarianism usually serves as support for nationalist theoretical proposals that just care about the socio-economic interests of their own countries (2). In response to communitarianism, we offer some answers from a cosmopolitan moral approach. However, we conclude that this approach is also insufficient (3). In conclusion, we argue that only a legal and political cosmopolitanism could honor moral universalism (4). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay deals with two conceptions of the political, one that entails a clash of civilizations associated with a Schmittian critique of liberalism and a second which envisions the political as an emerging domain. The latter idea can be associated with the later work of John Rawls which separates the comprehensive from the political. I argue that it is this idea, when reconstructed in relationship to a theory of multiple modernities, that can be appropriated for an emerging notion of global justice. Hence, it is in the domain of the political that we should look for a global concept of justice. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Charles Taylor's attempt to map the complexity and fullness of the modern identity has led him to recuperate its moral sources. This paper explores the zone of ontological contestation Taylor has engaged by defending a notion of the self that does not succumb to a narrowing or partiality of vision. Taylor's criticisms of Michel Foucault and Jürgen Habermas are examined to draw out the features of his project and its own limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]