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This research aims to analyze the implementation of green banking and the policies implemented in it. The macro approach is carried out through literature studies by collecting secondary data such as scientific articles, planning documents, government policies, and the mass media as well as data related to this research. Data analysis was carried out qualitatively by implementing green banking in several aspects, namely, in the internal bank, in customer service, and during financing. And in its implementation, it has fulfilled the principles of the green banking concept which includes 4 elements of life, namely nature, well-being, economy, and society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Purpose: This paper introduces the concept of policy efficiency of banks as their efficiency in implementing the government's policies. It further compares the Indian public sector banks (PSBs) and private sector banks (PVBs) on two efficiency paradigms, operational efficiency and policy efficiency. Design/methodology/approach: A three-stage analysis is carried out on data collected for 19 PSBs and 16 PVBs for ten years. Non-radial DEA with slack-based measure (SBM) is used to obtain efficiency scores of the banks for the two efficiency paradigms. The efficiency scores and the changes in efficiency and Malmquist index are further analysed by Tobit regression and seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models. Findings: PVBs are found to be more operationally efficient than PSBs. On the contrary, PSBs are found to be more policy efficient. Among the PSBs, the older and larger banks performed better in both the paradigms. Though Indian banks have become more operational and policy efficient over the years, the rate of improvement is slowing down. Practical implications: Results imply that evaluating banks, especially PSBs, only on their operational efficiency is myopic. Their efficacies must also be measured by the roles they play on social and policy front. The loss of efficiency of Indian PSBs in a competitive environment should provoke thoughts of reforms. The study suggests that the proposed merger of PSBs to form large banks might be fruitful. Originality/value: The study contributes to the literature by introducing the measure of policy efficiency. It shows that the Indian PSBs are indispensable as vehicles of government policy implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. federal government response to the 2008 financial crisis, including new laws, prudential regulations, and Federal Reserve monetary policies, has left a lasting impact on the U.S. banking industry. Along with a nearly 50% drop in the number of independent depository institutions since 2000, the industry has become much more concentrated in a few large "systemically important" institutions. At the same time, the largest banks have responded to incentives provided by increased regulatory requirements and the Fed's zero interest rate policy by reducing their lending to the private sector and increasing both their real estate holdings and their reliance on deposits to fund them. For the five well‐known banking scholars who take part in this AEI‐organized discussion, such recent changes have troubling consequences for both the industry and the broader economy. After economic historian Richard Sylla describes a 100‐year movement of U.S. banking toward a system characterized by a few large banks with extensive branch systems, bank authority Alex Pollock points to the growing role and influence of the Federal Reserve and government‐sponsored enterprises in the "banking credit system." And bank consultant Bert Ely points to a number of large and growing industry risks. Along with their unprecedented real estate holdings, Ely notes the massive holdings of U.S. government debt by both the Fed—which is identified as having an enormous interest rate mismatch and exposure—and the banks it supervises. At the same time, low interest rates have been squeezing banks' margins and reducing their capital cushions to absorb losses that may arise from the pandemic. Charles Calomiris, who recently stepped down as Chief Economist of the OCC, views such extreme consolidation as an unhealthy trend—one that, along with banks' growing dependency on deposits (and hence government guarantees and support) and reliance on real estate lending have become the main components of a "three‐legged stool" that are making large banks and banking systems throughout the world ever more subject to government influence. As a result of such dependence, the U.S. banking system is becoming more vulnerable to economy‐wide "shocks" such as the expected effects of a sharp increase in interest rates or a sudden plummeting of real estate prices. As Calomiris argued in his famous book (with Stephen Haber), U.S. banks—and indeed banks in most nations, thanks to "political bargains" with their governments that seem inevitable—appear to be becoming ever more "fragile by design." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this study is to present practical improvement plans for policy fund support in national policy banks through an analysis of the efficiency of policy fund support. It targets small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) that received policy funding from national policy banks in '17 and '18 consecutively. As for the analysis method, characteristic analysis and corresponding sample T-test was performed. The analysis results are as follows. First, as a result of analyzing the characteristics of small and medium-sized enterprises, most of the financial funds were concentrated on the manufacturing industry. By region, the western region of Gyeonggi Province, by credit rating, was A grade, technology grade was T5, and the use of funds was mostly concentrated on facility funds. Second, as a result of efficiency analysis, profitability had a positive effect on total capital return, stability had a positive effect on interest compensation ratio, and activity had a positive effect on total capital turnover. In conclusion, it is expected to provide practical improvement plans to support policy funds to influence the growth and distribution of funds appropriate to the needs of SMEs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The global financial and economic crisis has left deep wounds on the world's economies, whose scars are still being seen today, and the need for economic, financial, political and social stabilization seems increasingly acute. In this context, the ability to smooth the volatility of economic output of automatic stabilizers stands out. If we discuss strictly convergence, the Maastricht criteria can also be included in an automatic stabilization paradigm. In this context, based on previous work, the article aims to develop a way to identify automatic stabilizers for inflation in Romania, starting from the classical instruments of the monetary policy of the National Bank of Romania. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unless priced and administered appropriately, a governmental safety net enhances risk-shifting opportunities for banks. This paper quantifies regulatory efforts to use capital requirements to control risk-shifting by U.S. banks during 1985 to 1994 and investigates how much risk-based capital requirements and other deposit-insurance reforms improved this control. We find that capital discipline did not prevent large banks from shifting risk onto the safety net. Banks with low capital and debt-to-deposits ratios overcame outside discipline better than other banks. Mandates introduced by 1991 legislation have improved but did not establish full regulatory control over bank risk-shifting incentives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Privately-owned Nigerian banks hold 94% of Nigeria banking assets, the world's second largest share of local ownership. Theoretical explanations for the dominance of local firms related to liabilities of foreignness do not explain this phenomenon, as foreign banks do not experience additional costs compared to local Nigerian banks. In search for explanation, we focus on market structure, competitive intensity and their impact on capability development. In-depth exploratory study of Nigeria banking industry, based on interviews with industry experts and practitioners, supplemented by secondary data, suggests that government policies towards both foreign and Nigerian banks resulted in market structure and competitive dynamics that were conducive to capability development by Nigeria banks, whose strength arrested foreign entry. The study throws light on a regulatory approach that incentivizes capability development via discipline imposed by markets rather than by direct government intervention in the form of protectionism or favorable resource provision. It highlights the merits of studying phenomena that are inconsistent with existing theories for theory extension and development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The effectiveness of bank capital adequacy requirements is examined in this paper. Using empirical tests similar to those employed by Peltzman and Mingo, no significant relationship is found between changes in bank capital and the capital standards imposed by regulators. The findings conflict with those of previous studies. The conflict in findings, it is argued, results from the failure of previous studies to account for the effect of binding deposit rate ceilings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents legal developments in marketing relating to the regulation of monopolistic methods. Regarding market control, the case United States v. Trans Texas Bancorporation, Inc., El Paso National Bank, First State Bank, Northgate National Bank of El Paso, and Border City Bank is discussed, in which the United States Department of Justice alleged violations of the Clayton Act. Regarding collusive practices, the case Laveson v. Trans World Airlines is discussed, involving a class action suit charging conspiracy to fix prices. Regarding market exclusion tactics, the case Moore v. Matthews is discussed, involving allegations of monopolization and restraint of trade.

The degree to which governments intervene to contain financial crises varies considerably. We aim to understand why policy-makers choose the level of intervention they do to contain financial shocks. In particular, we want to understand why policy-makers may choose policies that create outcomes they do not want. We focus on a defining feature of financial crisis policy-making that has been largely unaddressed in the literature on policy responses to crises: policy-makers lack good information about the health of their banking systems. So they rely on their bureaucrats and other actors for necessary information. However, information providers may have different policy preferences. To understand the interactions between these actors and the implications for policy choice, we advance a signalling game of financial crisis containment. We use a case study of the recent Irish crisis to demonstrate how information asymmetries can have a significant impact on bailout choices. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article describes and explains a significant tightening in bank capital regulation in the United Kingdom since the 2008 financial crisis. The banks fiercely resisted the new capital regulations but in a novel theoretical contribution we argue that the structural power of business was reduced due to the changing ideas of state leaders, by changing institutional arrangements within the state and by wider open politicisation of banking reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Capital regulation forces banks to fund a substantial amount of their investments with equity. This creates a buffer against losses but also increases the cost of funding. If higher funding costs translate into higher loan interest rates, the bank’s assets are also likely to become more risky, which may destabilize the lending bank. This paper argues that the level of competition in the banking sector can determine whether the buffer or cost effect prevails. The endogenous level of competition may be crucial in determining the efficiency of capital regulation in undercapitalized banking sectors, with excess capacities and correlated risks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has introduced liquidity and funding requirements to work in conjunction with capital, leverage, and large exposure rules. This array of technical regulations seeks to strengthen the financial viability of large, integrated banking organizations in an effort to avert the potentially dire consequences of systemic financial stress. These requirements apply at the holding company level and filter through the entire organization, impacting the broker-dealer businesses as well, causing tensions with other regulatory schemes. As banking organizations integrate these new mandates into their businesses, they rely heavily on technology and systems. Tackling these challenges may drive new innovations in financial products and in the regulation of the industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines the implementation of the Basel I Capital Accord in Africa and evaluates the efficacy and feasibility of adopting the Basel II Accord. It also analyses the relevance of the new Basel III Capital Accord for Africa. Most African countries have implemented Basel I, which has become a valuable component of the prudential regulatory framework. Adopting pillar 1 of Basel II will prove much more challenging because of its complexity and this may not be feasible for most African countries. Basel III raises minimum capital ratios. Although most banks in Africa already hold more capital than the minimum required under Basel III, raising the minimum capital adequacy requirements might still benefit African countries over the long term if it helps to ensure that their banking systems continue to hold high levels of capital to safeguard against the risks they face, which are generally larger than the risks faced by banks in advanced economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reviews the corporate governance guidelines issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision of the Bank for International Settlements in October 2014. The authors recommend that banks should begin to take action based on the guidelines, as they will likely be incorporated in proposals to be released by banking regulators in the U.S. Banks are advised to establish the key components of effective risk governance infrastructure and to develop organizational risk culture.

Purpose -- The purpose of this paper is to examine the emerging Chinese credit rating agencies (CRAs), and their development, regulatory regime and challenges. The Chinese financial system has made many improvements; in particular, the regulatory regime has reached a more effective level. However, it should be admitted that some aspects still require further development. Compared with other developed markets, the Chinese credit rating industry is still young. Under these circumstances, questions are raised about the performance of the CRAs in China. Whether the legal framework is effective enough? A further point, in terms of the development, is what are the major obstacles lying ahead for the Chinese CRAs? Design/methodology/approach -- This paper will concentrate on the study of Chinese CRAs. Starting with a brief introduction and analysis on the Chinese CRAs, it will further examine the rating methodologies of the Chinese CRAs. Following this, the regulatory regimes will be analyzed in detail, from the perspectives of the securities, banking and insurance market. Moreover, the paper will identify the key problems under the current regulatory regime. Last but not least, a conclusion and some future suggestions for the development of the regulatory regime will also be made based on the earlier observations and study. Findings -- The current development stage and future reform requirement of the Chinese credit rating industry. Originality/value -- Provide a full dimension and in depth analysis on the Chinese credit rating industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the implications of crowd funding legislation under the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act in the U.S. Topics discussed include the function of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Congress' effort to improve the economy, and the investment regulations in the country. Also mentioned are the banking system in 2008, economic crisis, and Senator Carl Levin's statement relating to the implementation of JOBS ACT.

We investigate the impact of government agency oversight, such as by the Federal Reserve, on insider trading at the firm level. Regulatory supervision potentially limits trading based on material, nonpublic information, as it provides another layer of corporate governance to mitigate outflows of private information. Yet regulators themselves may serve as a source of information leakage, thereby facilitating insider-trading activity. We find, first, that in comparison to nonsupervised firms, supervised firms exhibit substantially greater trading based on inside information prior to earnings announcements. Second, in the first few days after firms provide private information to regulators or when regulators possess private information inaccessible to corporate insiders, these firms exhibit greater symptoms of insider trading. Finally, within a given supervised industry, insider-trading symptoms appear more pronounced when regulators exhibit greater leniency or operate in states with more political corruption. These insidertrading activities translate into over $1 billion in annual transfers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the costs of government deposit insurance. It focuses upon an economic model known as the Diamond-Dybvig (DD) and examines how the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) differs from the DD, the history of the FDIC, particularly the number of bank failures and the changing costs of deposit insurance fund management, and private deposit insurance as an alternative to government deposit insurance.

On 6 June 2012 the Commission published its long awaited Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms. The envisaged regime rests on 'three pillars': (i) preparatory and preventive measures; (ii) early intervention; and (iii) resolution tools and powers. This paper seeks to provide an overview and critical assessment of the Commission's Proposal. In two parts, it analyses recovery and resolution planning, early intervention measures and resolution tools and powers under the Proposal and in the context of the resolution regimes currently in place, or planned, in the UK and Germany, the two largest economies in the EU. The aim is to ascertain whether and to what extent the implementation of the Proposal would necessitate changes to these regimes were it to become law in its current form, and consequently where the most difficult policy debates are likely to arise in the course of further negotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the financial regulatory developments in Europe as of November 1, 2013. Topics include the proposed regulation of the European Commission on indices used benchmarks in financial contracts and instruments, the publication of the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) in the "Official Journal of the European Union" on September 13 and the release of the commission's work programme for 2014 on October 22, 2013.

The article discusses the government bailouts in response to the 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, including the U.S. government's bailing out U.S. financial institutions. The article examines the forms of capitalism in the U.S. and Europe, suggesting that the U.S. should undertake regulatory reforms. An overview of the government policies on the banking industry in the U.S. and Europe is provided.

In the immediate aftermath of a crisis, one of the most damning and penetrating questions asked of political leaders and senior state officials by the media, opposition parties and other actors is: 'why didn't they see it coming?' The question is often rhetorical, the implication being that warning signs were clear and should have been acted upon. In this article we identify the assumptions underpinning the 'why didn't they see it coming?' narrative as it has been expounded in relation to the global financial crisis in the UK and US. Since 2008 commentators have routinely argued that warning signals of an impending financial crisis were ignored by political elites, treasury officials and financial regulators. Such arguments are made in hindsight and we refer to them as backward mapping perspectives. In this article we advance a counter-narrative, from a forward mapping perspective, where the focus is on placing such 'failures' in the context of the time, without foreknowledge of the crisis that would happen. Accordingly, we argue that warning signals that, with the benefit of hindsight, now seem obvious, were actually ambiguous and fragmented because they were received and interpreted within a very different ideational environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers news briefs related to regulatory developments in the European Union (EU). On July 24, 2013, the EU Commission published its proposal for a new Payment Services Directive (PSD-2) and a policy on interchange fees for card-based payment transactions. On 4 September 2013, the EU Commission published a regulation on shadow banking and a proposal for a regulation on money market funds (MMFs).

The author argues for the simplification of U.S. monetary policy rules and the limitation of the protection of what is called the financial safety net as of autumn 2013. He discusses incentives in investment, calls for the improvement of bank supervision, and argues for the strengthening of capital adequacy standards. The article discusses the U.S. Federal Reserve System, the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and financial crises.

The 2008 global financial crisis produced very different responses in Ireland and Denmark. While both countries embraced depositor guarantee schemes and recapitalisation programmes, these were designed and adopted in significantly different ways. Crucially, the Irish state initially assumed full responsibility for sector losses and only later defined terms for industry contributions. In Denmark, a negotiated settlement from the outset transferred most of the risk associated with banking failures collectively to the banking sector. The article assesses two explanations for these different responses: (1) variations in domestic exposure to the financial industry, notably its relative size, dominant business models and exposure to real estate markets and (2) variations in institutional features, notably banking sector preferences and legacies of collective action. While limited explanatory power can be attributed to the former, collaborative legacies decisively swayed policy responses in Denmark and Ireland in the hectic weeks of late September and early October 2008. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Editor's Note: When Paul Volcker was presented the NABE Lifetime Achievement Award for Public Policy, he was invited to share his views on public policy related to money and banking in an informal context. In addition to his own remarks, he responded to questions offered by Steve Liesman and Kenneth D. Simonson. What follows is an edited transcription of those views. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay explores the concern that in contemporary American Politics, business exercises outsized and historically unprecedented influence. Focusing on the largest sector of our economy, the banking industry, the analysis tracks the systematic, purposeful, and bipartisan deregulation of the financial services industry from the Carter Administration thorough the 2008 financial collapse. The claim of business hegemony is examined from an historical/institutional perspective and placed in the context of political science theory, and the conclusion is that while business, represented in this case by the 'too big to fail' banks, enjoys significant organizational and structural advantages, business power remains both variable and contingent rather than fixed and hegemonic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The virulent European Union hedge fund debate led many observers to suspect a paradigmatic battle between liberal market economies and countries in favour of tighter regulation. By contrast, this article points to the economic interests that drove government agendas. However, national preferences were not defined by the aggregate of a country's economic interests, but by very specific stakeholders only, despite the existence of opponents with considerable resources. This article argues that the unequal success of financial lobbyists depended on how their demands fitted into the government's overarching negotiation strategy. The primacy of government objectives, in turn, resulted from the high saliency of financial regulation and hedge funds in particular. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contingent charges for financial services, such as fees for unauthorized overdrafts, are often controversial. We study the economics of contingent charges in a stylized setting with naive and sophisticated consumers. We contrast situations where the naive benefit from the presence of sophisticated consumers with situations where competition works to subsidize the sophisticated at the expense of the naive, arguably unfairly. The case for regulatory intervention in these situations depends in good part, but not only, on the weight placed on distributional concerns. The economic and legal issues at stake are well illustrated by a case on bank charges recently decided by the U.K. Supreme Court. (JEL D14, D18, G21, G28, L51) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the regulation of derivatives in the U.S. as of January 2012, focusing on the impact of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of the early 21st century and the U.S. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act on the derivatives securities market. The economic struggles and legal issues involving financial services and investment firms such as American Insurance Group (AIG), Lehman Brothers, and J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., are also examined. The U.S. government reportedly did not regulate the trading of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives prior to the GFC.

An article on banking regulations in the US and Great Britain in the 20th century is presented. The author discusses the corporate governance of the banking industry by state and other entities, describes the trend toward deregulation of banks, and compares the British and US regulatory systems to those in Germany. Other topics of discussion include the ethical aspects of banking regulation, the 2008 financial crisis in the US, and the impact of foreign and offshore banking on the financial industry.

The article offers the author's views on governmental policies regarding fiscal and macro-economic consolidation in Ireland. He states that the government needs to keep a check on public spending, and focus on increasing its revenue. He discusses various government policies related to taxation, macro-economics and the Irish banking industry.

The article discusses currency monopolies, where governments have the sole privilege in a country to issue notes, examining economist Milton Friedman's views on the issue and detailing reasons for the abolishment of official paper currency monopolies. The author indicates that Friedman had mild resistance to currency monopolies. Topics include reasons for competitive note issue, banks being allowed to issue their own notes, and the risk of fraud with relation to money. Also discussed is doing away with commodity money.