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There is growing scholarly interest in what leads to global or national prioritization of specific health issues. By retrospectively analysing agenda setting for India's national burn programme, this study aimed to better understand how the agenda-setting process influenced its design, implementation and performance. We conducted document reviews and key informant interviews with stakeholders and used a combination of analytical frameworks on policy prioritization and issue framing for analysis. The READ (readying material, extracting data, analysing data and distilling findings) approach was used for document reviews, and qualitative thematic analysis was used for coding and analysis of documents and interviews. The findings suggest three critical features of burns care policy prioritization in India: challenges of issue characteristics, divergent portrayal of ideas and its framing as a social and/or health issue and over-centralization of agenda setting. First, lack of credible indicators on the magnitude of the problem and evidence on interventions limited issue framing, advocacy and agenda setting. Second, the policy response to burns has two dimensions in India: response to gender-based intentional injuries and the healthcare response. While intentional burns have received policy attention, the healthcare response was limited until the national programme was initiated in 2010 and scaled up in 2014. Third, over-centralization of agenda setting (dominated by a few homogenous actors, located in the national capital, with attention focused on the national ministry of health) contributed to limitations in programme design and implementation. We note following elements to consider when analysing issues of significant burden but limited priority: the need to analyse how actors influence issue framing, the particularities of issues, the inadequacy of any one dominant frame and the limited intersection of frames. Based on this analysis in India, we recommend a decentralized approach to agenda setting and for the design and implementation of national programmes from the outset. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Efforts to promote the adoption and scale-up of health system innovations must contend with the existing institutional context. But there are no commonly used frameworks to ensure that the insights of actors involved in such institutional efforts connect to one another. To test and modify a potential framework—the 'four-by-four' framework—we interviewed researcher-entrepreneurs involved in the unfolding story of the cardiovascular Polypill. The framework has four types/levels of institutions that affect adoption and scale-up: (1) informal institutions (L1, e.g. social norms), (2) formal institutions (L2, e.g. government policies and regulation), (3) organizational structures (L3, e.g. organizational boards and mission) and (4) everyday exchange (L4, e.g. service delivery), vis-à-vis four potential entrepreneurial strategies in response: (1) abide by existing institutions, (2) evade them, (3) alter them and/or (4) exit entrepreneurial action. Using this framework, we conducted a realist-informed analysis to understand how context (i.e. institutions) and mechanism (i.e. entrepreneurial strategies) influence each other to shape outcomes (i.e. adoption and scale-up). We found that researcher-entrepreneurs began with efforts to abide with existing institutions but encountered institutional obstacles at each level. Efforts to abide were followed by seeking to evade and/or alter unfavourable institutions, with greater success evading and/or altering lower (L3 and L4) than upper (L1 and L2) institutions. Exit considerations followed the failure of the evade or alter strategy. Shifts between strategies were propelled by 'learning'. The 'four-by-four' framework can be used as a scaffold to generate narratives of adoption or scale-up efforts, a sensitizing tool to prospectively map out contingencies and a matrix to synthesize narratives and experiences across multiple innovations or settings. Used in these ways, the 'four-by-four' framework can help to optimize the transferability and cumulation of insights on how to promote the adoption and scale-up of health system innovations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article by Rotulo and colleagues suggests that health sector fiscal decentralisation has been bad for Italy. But given the complexity of fiscal decentralisation, this interpretation is not necessarily so. Their analysis was based on assumptions about causality that are better suited for simple interventions. Assumptions of simplicity show up as misleading artefacts in the conclusion of evaluations of complex interventions. Complex interventions work by triggering mechanisms - eg, reasoning and learning processes - that manifest differently across the units of a decentralised system, contingent on context, evolving over time. Evaluation findings can only be partial and provisional; neither summarily good nor bad. The goal of evaluating a complex intervention - such as decentralised governance - should be to understand how, under what circumstances and for whom they are good or bad - at a point in time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite much lauded change in recent years, Myanmar's national health system still lags behind its regional counterparts. Decades of civil war and military rule have created, at the national level, a 'centralisation by fiat'. This was most recently consolidated prior to the beginning of the country's transition to democracy through the military-drafted 2008 constitution, which centralises power in the military. In part, Myanmar's experience is also one of 'decentralisation by default'. Civil war as well as the country's geographic and demographic circumstances led to greater independence of well over a dozen territories and varying degrees of strength in sub-national structures. In the current period of relative de-confliction and political dialogue, discussions of decentralisation and federalism have never been so important – not the least within political dialogue following the nationwide ceasefire agreement. Moreover, several recent studies have found that public health was a top tier indicator of how Myanmar people of all ethnicities perceive the country's progress. Decentralisation of the health system, as well as some centralisation or convergence of previously separate health systems in terms of information sharing and resource sharing, will be crucial to consolidate the progress made in the peace and democratisation processes. Indeed, the establishment of a decentralised and equitable public health system should be a leading priority for stabilising the country and ensuring its future prosperity. This paper explores decentralisation in Myanmar's health system through current theoretical frameworks. It suggests that Myanmar's experience of 'decentralisation by default' may find similarities in other post-conflict and conflict states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Showing the causal link between community engagement and improved health outcomes is a 'holy grail' of health policy. This article argues that this 'holy grail' has remained elusive because community engagement in primary health care is under-theorized, having been based on positive a priori assumptions, e.g. that people necessarily want to be engaged in governing their health system. By adopting a theory-driven approach and an agnostic premise, we show that understanding why , how and when community engagement may emerge or function spontaneously is important for informing efforts to support community engagement in primary health care primary health care governance. We draw on empirical research on community engagement in Nigeria and on the literature to identify the 'why' (coalition of service users can emerge in response to under-governance); the 'how' (five modes: through meetings; reaching out within their community; lobbying governments; augmenting government support; and taking control of service delivery) and the 'when' (as geographical, socio-economic and institutional context align, such that the benefits of action outweigh costs). Understanding the broad patterns of mechanisms and of contextual factors that apply across communities is, after all, our 'holy grail'—and this understanding should inform efforts to tailor support for community engagement in governance in different settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the mid-1980s, the national health policy in Nigeria has sought to inspire community engagement in primary health care by bringing communities into partnership with service providers through community health committees. Using a realist approach to understand how and under what circumstances the committees function, we explored 581 meeting minutes from 129 committees across four states in Nigeria (Lagos, Benue, Nasarawa and Kaduna). We found that community health committees provide opportunities for improving the demand and supply of health care in their community. Committees demonstrate five modes of functioning: through meetings (as 'village square'), reaching out within their community (as 'community connectors'), lobbying governments for support (as 'government botherers'), inducing and augmenting government support (as 'back-up government') and taking control of health care in their community (as 'general overseers'). In performing these functions, community health committees operate within and through the existing social, cultural and religious structures of their community, thereby providing an opportunity for the health facility with which they are linked to be responsive to the needs and values of the community. But due to power asymmetries, committees have limited capacity to influence health facilities for improved performance, and governments for improved health service provision. This is perhaps because national guidelines are not clear on their accountability functions; they are not aware of the minimum standards of services to expect; and they have a limited sense of legitimacy in their relations with sub-national governments because they are established as the consequence of a national policy. Committees therefore tend to promote collective action for self-support more than collective action for demanding accountability. To function optimally, community health committees require national government or non-government organization mentoring and support; they need to be enshrined in law to bolster their sense of legitimacy; and they also require financial support to subsidise their operation costs especially in geographically large communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Health care costs incurred prior to the appropriate patient–provider transaction (i.e., transaction costs of access to health care) are potential barriers to accessing health care in low- and middle-income countries. This paper explores these transaction costs and their implications for health system governance through a cross-sectional survey of adult patients who received their first diagnosis of pulmonary tuberculosis (TB) at the three designated secondary health centres for TB care in Ebonyi State, Nigeria. The patients provided information on their care-seeking pathways and the associated costs prior to reaching the appropriate provider. Of the 452 patients, 84% first consulted an inappropriate provider. Only 33% of inappropriate consultations were with qualified providers (QP); the rest were with informal providers such as pharmacy providers (PPs; 57%) and traditional providers (TP; 10%). Notably, 62% of total transaction costs were incurred during the first visit to an inappropriate provider and the mean transaction costs incurred was highest with QPs (US$30.20) compared with PPs (US$14.40) and TPs (US$15.70). These suggest that interventions for reducing transaction costs should include effective decentralisation to integrate TB care with services at the primary health care level, community engagement to address information asymmetry, enforcing regulations to keep informal providers within legal limits and facilitating referral linkages among formal and informal providers to increase early contact with appropriate providers. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In Nigeria, the shortage of health workers is worst at the primary health care (PHC) level, especially in rural communities. And the responsibility for PHC – usually the only form of formal health service available in rural communities – is shared among the three tiers of government (federal, state, and local governments). In addition, the responsibility for community engagement in PHC is delegated to community health committees. This study examines how the decentralisation of health system governance influences retention of health workers in rural communities in Nigeria from the perspective of health managers, health workers, and people living in rural communities. The study adopted a qualitative approach, and data were collected using semi-structured in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. The multi-stakeholder data were analysed for themes related to health system decentralisation. The results showed that decentralisation influences the retention of rural health workers in two ways: 1) The salary of PHC workers is often delayed and irregular as a result of delays in transfer of funds from the national to sub-national governments and because one tier of government can blame failure on another tier of government. Further, the primary responsibility for PHC is often left to the weakest tier of government (local governments). And the result is that rural PHC workers are attracted to working at levels of care where salaries are higher and more regular – in secondary care (run by state governments) and tertiary care (run by the federal government), which are also usually in urban areas. 2) Through community health committees, rural communities influence the retention of health workers by working to increase the uptake of PHC services. Community efforts to retain health workers also include providing social, financial, and accommodation support to health workers. To encourage health workers to stay, communities also take the initiative to co-finance and co-manage PHC services in order to ensure that PHC facilities are functional. In Nigeria and other low- and middle-income countries with decentralised health systems, intervention to increase the retention of health workers in rural communities should seek to reform and strengthen governance mechanisms, using both top-down and bottom-up strategies to improve the remuneration and support for health workers in rural communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]