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The introduction of the 'New Thinking' (NT) marked a radical departure from the foreign-policy traditions adhered to by Soviet leaders since the Bolshevik Revolution. Launched by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in 1986, his policy approach of NT changed the nature of East-West relations paving the way for the end of the Cold War. A lesser known facet of NT was the perestroika (restructuring) of Soviet foreign policy – especially the devolution of decision-making from the centre to the union republics. It first intended to release the potential of the Soviet people and improve the 'economic mechanism', but soon it became a communist survival strategy in the context of glasnost and demokratizatsiya that had unleashed the centrifugal forces of nationalism. Indeed, NT proved to be a great gamble: by empowering the republics to conduct their own foreign affairs, it allowed national movements to bring their claims to international fora which in turn undermined the legitimacy of the regime. In this vein, NT not only played a pivotal role in defusing East-West antagonism, but ultimately contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union – with all its wider implications for the Baltic arena, Northern Europe, and the world at large. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The KGB and the rest of the Soviet intelligence and policing apparatus are commonly portrayed as having been among the staunchest of conservative opponents to the reform process in the Soviet Union during the latter half of the 1980s. But while key leaders of the August 1991 effort to oust General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, for example, did come from the security services, this characterization obscures how the KGB rank-and-file responded to and participated in the reforms. This article uses their own words and experiences, recorded in the KGB΄s top-secret in-house journal, Sbornik KGB SSSR, to examine how everyday KGB officers navigated liberalizing reforms in which they in fact played an active and evolving role implementing and shaping. In these firsthand accounts, which cover topics from nationalism to environmentalism, a sense of loss of control is clear, both over events unfolding in the Soviet Union and over their own leading role and privileged position within it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The terms perestroika (literally, "transformation") and glasnost (literally, "transparency") refer to the social change that took place in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. Then USSR leader, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev, introduced perestroika as a necessary action to improve the nation's economy and its international relations. Glasnost was meant to promote effective discussions regarding the country's existing problems and shortcomings. However, only a few years following their instatement, both processes did not improve the sociopolitical situation. On the contrary, they led to the country's collapse. This article seeks to answer why gracious intentions, meant to actualize the hopes and dreams of the Soviet people, eventually resulted in tremendously difficult times. Special attention is paid to the role of the Soviet media, which became a catalyst for many social problems. The authors raise the issue of the media's level of responsibility during this social transformation, which appeared to be one of the most crucial conditions for its successful implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Romania’s foreign policy in the last years of the Communist regime was characterized by improvisation, lack of vision and an unnecessary effort to safeguard the personal position of its leader, influenced by the international isolation in which it plunged. The Romanian-Soviet relation was rather not difficult, but it was dominated by disagreements between Nicolae Ceauşescu and Mikhail Gorbachev. The Romanian president showed signs of obvious lack of realism, while the Soviet leader publicly despise his counterpart’s methods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper reveals the way in wich USSR propaganda campaigns, initiated in 1965, oriented against the, special cours” of Romania and the historiography, the, nationalist” intellectuals and the Moldavian SSR population, became, during M. Gorbachev’s restructuration, a, life and death struggle” with the MSSR movement for democratisation and national emancipation. Realizing that the regime that gave it life was endangered, the CC of the CP of Moldavia tightened its rows in order to defend the soviet status quo, accepting only cosmetic, inessential modifications in the linguistic and cultural policy, in the relation with Romania. The representatives of the CC of the CPUS, delegated in 1988 and 1989 to Chişinău by the imperial center, even if they were more tolerant with the general political requests, had the same position as the leaders of CC of the PCM regarding the recognition of the identity of the language spoken in the MSSR and the Romania and the return to Romanian cultural values. In this sense, the loss of the ideological control over the masses and their rejection of the anti-Romanian moldavianism and of the Russian and Soviet imperial miths meant the irrevocable loss Bessarabia – what Moscow never wanted to accept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Report that how Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev manages the effects of wrenching economic and political reform in Eastern Europe will affect not only the bloc but East-West relations as well. Process of change; Reform.

Discusses the effect of an article entitled `The Cunning Figure' which appeared in the Soviet literary-political journal `Novy mir,' written by Vasili Seliunin and Girsh (Grigori) Itsikovich Khanin which questioned the quality and reliability of the economic statistics that are at the very foundation of the Soviet centrally planned economy. Debate on nature and extent of the achievements of Soviet socialism; Possible effect of Gorbachev's plan of economic restructuring.

Proposes that a government-sponsored corps of retired United States entrepreneurs (similar to the International Executive Service Corps) could aid the Soviet Union in its quest for economic reform under General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. Looks at Gorbachev's proposed reforms. Why the West has a stake in Russian economic reform; Russia's bureaucracy.

The article discusses economic changes in the Soviet Union in the 1980's. Soviet Union President Mikhail Gorbachev's government reversed decades of economic isolation in an effort to entice foreign investors. The Soviet government established a 1987 policy which encouraged joint ventures in the Soviet Union. Another important economic reform was the system of collective leasing, whereby the state enters into a medium-term leasing contract. This option allows the personnel of a state-owned and managed factory to lease the plant and the equipment from the state at a fixed annual rate and to conduct business on its own account.

This article places the first instance of ethnic unrest in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev, the 17-20 December 1986 Alma-Ata events, in historical perspective by examining the Soviet nationalities (national minorities) problem and 300 years of previous Russo-Kazakh interaction in Central Asia. Besides, utilizing both archival sources and interviews, the author specifically shows why Mikhail Gorbachev's 16 December replacement of First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan (CPK), Dinmukhamed Kunaev, with the Russian Gennadi Kolbin was viewed as a political and ethnic challenge by many young Kazakhs--who showed up the next day on Brezhnev (Republic) Square in Alma-Ata (Almaty) to protest the decision. After years of Soviet repressive measures such as Stalinist collectivization and purges, Khrushchev's Virgin Lands program, and the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Polygon, and the destruction of the Aral Sea, the Kazakhs constituted a minority population in their republic. During Leonid Brezhnev's and Kunaev's rule, however, Kazakhs began to gain ground in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (KSSR) both demographically and politically--a fact which the author documents with Soviet census data and ground-breaking archival data relating to the ethnic composition of the CPK--but Brezhnev's death in 1982 and the rise of Yuri Andropov and Gorbachev marked the beginning of an attack on the Kunaev political machine, culminating in the appointment of Kolbin. When tens of thousands of young Kazakhs subsequently took to the streets of Alma-Ata, then, the author concludes that it not only marked the beginning of an independent Kazakhstan--but also the beginning of the end for of the Soviet Union five years later--as Kazakhs were first to exercise their right to have an independent say in the governing of their republic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the interrelationship between communication, democracy and intelligentsia in Russia and its impact on society. Topics discussed include Gorbachev's reform of Soviet society; the forms of public discourse isolated by philosopher Jürgen Habermas; and the criticism faced by intellectuals trying to challenge the normative assumptions of Russian society. Also mentioned is the encouragement of self-censorship by ultranationalists.

Information is provided on the conference titled "Perestroika and Communist Parties in Europe (1985-1990/91). Reception, Reactions and Consequences" at the Friedrich-Meinecke-Institut, Freie Universität Berlin in Berlin, Germany from February 25-26, 2016. Topics, including General Secretary of the Soviet Union Communist Party Mikhail Gorbachev, Western European communist parties, Yugoslav political party leaders and Gorbachev's reforms, are discussed.

The article explores the policy of Mikhail Gorbachev, former General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, toward agriculture, dating from the early years of his program of perestroika. Topics covered include sources to demonstrate that Gorbachev long wanted to decollectivize agriculture and to provide farms with market incentives, the market reforms he initiated to boost productivity, and reasons that Gorbachev was unlikely to have ignored agriculture.

An essay is presented depicting view of former Soviet politician Mikhail Gorbachev glasnost and perestroika and subsequent infusion of a neoliberal capitalist ideology in Eastern Europe. Topics discussed include biblical story of biblical leaders Moses and Ten Commandments; critical juxtaposition between philosopher and Sophist and specific reference of Gorbachev's book "Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World."

The paper discusses the scope and limits of Czechoslovak process of perestroika in the late 1980s. Firstly, the author describes historical condition and obstacles for launching reforms inspired by Gorbachev's 'reconstruction'. Subsequently, it summarises phases of the reform. The election of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, 27th Congress of the CPSU in 1986, plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee in January 1987 and 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU in 1988. All these events represent major milestones of Soviet perestroika and as well as they define qualitatively different phases of Czechoslovak reform process. While the period of 1985-1986 is characterized as a 'waiting game' and neutral attitude toward Gorbachev on the part of Husák's communist elite, during the second stage (1987-1989) the communist leadership admitted to start with modest reforms in the field of both the political system and economy. As a consequence of the reform process, differentiation and fractionalisation within the Czechoslovak communist leadership took place and resulted in personnel changes in Presidium of the KSC Central Committee and in the Czechoslovak government. For the assessment of the Czechoslovak perestroika, the author will analyse the programme of the Communist party, which was approved by members of Presidium of the KSC Central Committee on the 10th November 1989 - one week before the Velvet revolution. Not only the content of so far omitted document, but notably its genesis and internal debates will be analysed. The empirical basis of the paper is largely grounded in the study of archival sources stored at the National Archives in Prague. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that, like the liberalising “Great Reforms” of Russia in the mid-19th century, Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika of the late 20th century was propelled as much by reformist intellectuals' Europe-inspired visions of a more humane society as it was by military-economic crisis. Over the post-Stalin decades, a new policy-academic elite – economists, philosophers, scientists and writers – viewed in the apparent success of East European reforms a model of “socialism with a human face” for their country's eventual reintegration into a “common European home.” Yet their understanding of European integration was too superficial, and their appreciation of communist hard-liners' resistance too belated, to carry their reforms to successful completion. This article also holds that Russian reformers' naiveté was compounded by Western leaders' selfishness and short-sightedness. The latter clung to Cold War beliefs that the Soviet system could not produce a genuine reformist movement. When Gorbachev came to power, his perestroika was considered merely a “ruse,” its ideas of “new thinking” ridiculed, and ultimately only the “shock therapy” of Boris Yeltsin merited significant Western aid despite its broad incompetence and vast corruption. The combined Western-Russian failures in 1990s efforts toward rapid marketisation and integration proved even more damaging than those of the 1980s due to their broad discrediting of Western liberal democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Going through a protracted period of transition since the end of the Cold War, the world order in the making is neither what was nor what it is yet to become. It is in 'the middle of the future.' To get our bearings in this uncertain transition, we explore the two grand post-Cold War narratives-'The End of History' as posited by Francis Fukuyama and 'The Clash of Civilizations' posited by the late Samuel Huntington. Mikhail Gorbachev looks back at his policies that brought the old order to collapse. The British philosopher John Gray critiques the supposed 'universality' of liberalism and, with Homi Bhabha, sees a world of hybrid identities and localized cultures. The Singaporean theorist Kishore Mahbubani peels away the 'veneer' of Western dominance. Amartya Sen, the economist and Nobel laureate, assesses whether democratic India or autocratic China is better at building 'human capacity' in their societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the author discusses various reports within the issue on the topic of former Soviet Union premier Mikhail Gorbachev and the era of perestroika in the late 20th century.

When Gorbachev came to power he inherited not simply a system in crisis, but a structure of symbols that was embedded within the broader political system and which was also in crisis. Given the ideocratic nature of the Soviet system, any change to that system would require symbolic change as well. This essay charts how Gorbachev sought to come to grips with this problem, investing some symbols with new meaning while rejecting others. It shows how ultimately he was unable to produce a new, coherent narrative. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This historiographical article examines the development of the study of the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The analysis is sociological in nature, with the author emphasizing cultural reasons for the dissolution of Soviet power and the end of a specifically Soviet way of life. The author goes on to describe how scholars studying the Soviet Union after 1991 formulated an understanding of Soviet power. She is fairly critical of the work of Sovietologists, who largely focused on economic and structural reasons for collapse. Other topics discussed include perestroika reforms, the leadership of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, and the symbolic power of the Communist Party.

The article discusses the transformation of Central and and Eastern European governments from Communism to democracy during the collapse of the Soviet Union, with emphasis given to developments in Poland. The author is largely concerned with teleological aspects of this transformation, exploring whether or not democracy was ever the ultimate goal of Polish Communism, as was argued by the country's Communist leadership. The history of the Polish anti-communist Solidarity movement, largely led by the Polish Catholic Church, is examined, as is Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika, or restructuring, political platform. The democratization process in various other Eastern European countries is also analyzed.

The article presents a reprint of the article "Gorbachev's Perestroika and the Ceauşescu Regime," by Valery Musatov, which appeared in the 2010 issue of "Novaya i noveyshaya istoriya." It explores the economic relations between Romania and Soviet Union relative to the economic policy imposed by Romania President Nicolae Ceauşescu and Soviet Union President Mikhail Gorbachev. It states that Ceauşescu faced popular discontent, mass protests along with Romanian revolution.

The article offers the author's insights related to socialism in Russia. Topics include the history of socialism in Soviet Union which began during the perestroika and glasnost, the role of former Soviet Union leader Mikhail Gorbachev on the country's ideology, and the defeat of the State Committee on the State of Emergency (GKChP) in the early 1990s which result to certain changes in the society.

The article discusses the Soviet-American summit meeting in Malta in December 1989 to end the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar world. It mentions that U.S. President George Bush has promised to support the Soviet perestroika, to suspend the Jackson-Vanik amendment, and an agreement on investment guarantees during the meeting. However, Soviet Union General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has launched his general philosophical reflections on the promises made by President Bush. Meanwhile, the problems of arms control are not conferred by President Bush believing it was President Gorbachev that should make the concessions. Furthermore, the members of the summit have devoted their time discussing the socio-economic situation in Eastern Europe and the state of Soviet economy.