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The transition from a traditional, constant returns technology to modern, increasing returns methods of production in manufacturing not only widens the scale of production but more crucially, it enhances product quality. Such a quality improvement consists mainly in a much higher level of transportability. The fact that products become "lighter" and easier to carry opens foreign markets to manufacturers thereby supporting larger scales of production. We model this situation through a one-stage game where firms distributed across two countries select technologies and fob mill prices. Contrasting with the Big Push approach, such a game is never a coordination game. In addition to cases where all firms adopt either modern or traditional technologies, the standard outcome is an asymmetric situation, where the modern firms in a country eliminate traditional units in the other country. Starting from a situation where all productive activity is traditional, deindustrialization can be viewed as a situation where firms in a country switch to more modern technologies while industrial units in the other country are unable to participate in this movement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main goal of this paper is to provide an integrated survey of the literature devoted to identifying the drivers of structural change, broadly defined as the process of reallocation of economic activity across the three broad sectors agriculture, manufacturing and services. Using the GGDC 10‐Sector Database, this paper first presents the empirical facts associated with structural change in different regions of the world – that is Europe and the USA, Asia, Latin America, and Africa – then reviews four determinants of structural change: (i) changes in income, (ii) changes in relative (sectoral) prices, (iii) changes in input–output linkages and (iv) changes in comparative advantage(s) via globalization and trade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Structural change is a vital element of successful development. Between 1985 and 2015, however, falling barriers to trade and transfer of technology shifted sectoral structures in different directions in different countries by intensifying endowment-related specialization. In skill-abundant developed countries, manufacturing became more skill-intensive and employed fewer workers. In land-scarce developing East Asia, labor-intensive manufacturing expanded, especially and hugely in China. In land-abundant Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, by contrast, manufacturing shares fell, while in land-scarce South Asia labor-intensive manufacturing was constrained by low literacy and inadequate infrastructure. This pattern of structural change contributed to higher average growth rates during this period in land-scarce than in land-abundant developing countries. Future changes in sectoral structures and growth rates will continue to be shaped by differences among countries in land abundance and skill supplies that matter for development policy choices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As developed economies have substituted away from manufacturing towards services, so too have developing countries--to an even greater extent. Such sectoral change may be premature for economies that never fully industrialised in the first place. This article presents evidence that countries with smaller manufacturing sectors substitute away from manufacturing to a larger extent, suggesting a trade channel through which falling international relative prices of manufacturing lead price-taking developing economies to substitute accordingly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article deals with the special requirements for the new role and effectiveness of state management of each country in the context of globalization and system of a forced globalism. Post-socialist states have not fulfilled their duties to protect people and secure development. System strategic modernization, the new industrialization of the economy of Ukraine should be a conscious choice of the state and nation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Like the rest of the poor periphery, Mexico fought with de-industrialization in the century before the 1870s. Yet, Mexican manufacturing defended itself better than did the rest of the poor periphery. Why Mexican exceptionalism? This article decomposes the sources of de-industrialization into productivity events abroad, globalization forces connecting Mexico to those markets, and domestic forces. It uses a neo-Ricardian model to implement the decomposition, advocates a price dual approach, and develops a new price and wage data base. Mexican exceptionalism was due to weaker Dutch disease effects, better wage competitiveness, and the policy autonomy to foster industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the issue of tropical forest destruction, which has both global and local dimensions and has become an important theme for states in the first and third worlds. Contemporary societies are facing the realisation that environmental changes are entering a new phase, one which challenges the old structural order. Whether viewed from the national, regional or international perspective, the modern technologies, institutions and systems of organisation that mediate relationships between people and the environment, have profoundly altered the relationship with the material world, at the same time as affecting how one perceive, understand and attempt to manage environmental resources and services. The concept of "globalisation" forces a re-examination of the concept of the state because, at one level, states are defined only in relation to other states, a situation which presupposes globalised relations and now prompts discussion about their power and autonomy relative to other modern global institutions. Since the emergence of modern nation states on the global stage, state- sponsored bioscience has played a major role in driving the twin processes of industrialisation and capital accumulation, aiding the transformation of nature into ever more managed environments and reformulating traditional nationally-bound relations of production into globally fluid conditions of production "where everything is treated as a commodity, even if it is not produced as a commodity."

Although sociologists have expressed growing interest in globalization, they have devoted little sustained empirical attention to the many claims made in its name. I focus on the link that has been drawn between globalization and the deindustrialization of the advanced industrial societies. To examine this, I employ a pooled time-series of cross-sections data set that combines observations on 18 OECD nations across the 1968-1992 period. Fixed-effects regression models that control for unmeasured country-specific effects reveal support for arguments that implicate foreign direct investment and North-South trade in the declining percentage of the labor force employed in manufacturing in the OECD countries. Regression results also show that deindustrialization across this period is largely explained by a model that combines an attention to the post-Golden Age "troubles" of northern manufacturing with classic generalizations of the process of development. Interpretation of the empirical findings is tempered by an exercise in counterfactual history, which reveals that deindustrialization would have been considerable in these countries even if the upswings in direct investment and southern imports had not occurred or if the performance of the manufacturing sector had been stronger. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on globalization and deindustrialization. The older globalization consisted of a world system of Western nation states and a set of peripheral regions undergoing the first agonies of modernization. The new globalization, by contrast, encourages economic and political elites in Metropolitan centers to slough off those formerly powerful sentiments of national identity and purpose, even as it encourages subaltern classes to celebrate patriotism and sacrifice for their respective nations. Hence, in the name of a "new internationalism," the multinationals are free to pursue communally destructive forms of "flexible accumulation" and speculative gains wherever they find them, while the working class is rendered powerless to fend off these new forces of communal devastation. In each case, the stabilizing cultural conventions and social contracts that once allowed workers some relative sense of security are being dismantled and replaced by a lean set of postmodern social relations that are more in keeping with the new forms of time and space compressions characterizing the emergent New World Order.