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This research builds upon the emerging body of knowledge on organizational assessments of contract management processes. Since the development of the Contract Management Maturity Model in 2003, several DoD, Air Force, Navy, Army, and defense contractor organizations have undergone contract management process assessments as a part of their process-improvement effort. The assessments were conducted using the Contract Management Maturity Model (CMMM) as the initial step in a program of contract management process improvement. The purpose of this research is to use these combined contract management process assessment results to characterize the current state of practice of contract management within the Department of Defense and defense organizations. This extended abstract provides the conceptual framework for the Contract Management Maturity Model (CMMM) and discusses the components of the CMMM. The symposium presentation and resulting research report will summarize the CMMM assessment ratings, analyze the assessment results in terms of contract management process maturity, discuss the implications of these assessment results for process improvement and knowledge management opportunities, and provide insight on consistencies and trends in these assessment results to defense contract management.

Recent research has produced models that improve our ability to identify, describe and explain a diversity of knowledge-flow patterns that manifest themselves in various enterprises, which improves our efficacy in designing organizations and processes. But enterprises do not all operate in the same environmental context and current theory is relatively silent on contextual implications of knowledge flow. The research described in this technical report builds upon current theory to explicitly address the contextual implications of knowledge flow in terms of organization and process design. Using a recently developed, multidimensional model to characterize and delineate a variety of enterprise knowledge flows, we integrate key aspects of Coordination Theory and extend this model to address context. The use, utility and implications of this extended model are described through application to an extreme case in which knowledge flows are embedded within a hazardous, time-critical context with mortal consequences: a military friendly fire incident in Northern Iraq. The extreme nature of this application case provides revelatory insight into the contextual importance of knowledge-flow dynamics, and by using such an extreme case for application, we enhance the generalizability of our model to less extreme environments that are more commonly associated with non-military enterprises (e.g., corporations, governmental agencies)

Network-centric warfare (NCW) emphasizes information superiority for battlespace efficacy, but it is clear that the mechanics of how knowledge flows are just as important as those pertaining to the networks and communication systems used to transmit data and information. Unfortunately, with the strong presumption that knowledge is distinct from data and information, knowledge-flow mechanics in the warfare context are not well understood; even the term knowledge is used in conflicting ways (e.g., to describe information flows) by NCW experts, operational personnel and developers of military doctrine. Mapping key concepts from technologically enabled business models in which NCW is based in large part to the military, we substitute the term understanding flow when discussing the mechanics of how knowledge flows in the NCW context. In one respect, this mapping and terminological substitution enable us to move forward and model knowledge-flow mechanics in a manner that is consistent with the operational Navy's lexicon; in another respect, however, it is clear that Navy lexicon does not yet include the term understanding flow. Hence, naval conceptualization of NCW may be missing a vital element. Informed by recent advances in knowledge-flow theory, the research described in this technical report develops a four-dimensional model of understanding-flow mechanics. This multidimensional model enables a novel capability to recognize a variety of understanding-flow patterns found in the military enterprise, to distinguish such patterns from their counterparts pertaining to information and data, and to enhance the speed and efficiency of NCW understanding flows. Just as understanding the mechanics of electrical flow is critical to developing useful electronic devices, understanding the mechanics of understanding flow is critical to conceiving useful NCW systems.

This report provides a review and analysis of issues affecting the design of a lessons learned system for defense acquisition professionals. It draws both upon studies of existing lessons learned systems and upon the literature of organizational learning and knowledge management. While the discussion focuses on the enterprise of defense acquisition, the report's conclusions may be extended to lessons learned and knowledge management systems in other areas as well. The exploration of these issues suggests that attention to social processes within organizations is as important, if not more so, as the development of information technology processes in the success of a lessons learned system. The conclusions provide a resource for decision makers in considering and determining appropriate requirements for and resources to Support an acquisition lessons learned system.

Knowledge is power. As the U.S. Navy is working to revise its strategy and tactics through knowledge-centric warfare, it is apparent that knowledge flow is key. However, our current state of understanding does not address the phenomenology of knowledge flow well, nor do we have the benefit of knowledge-flow theory and its application to very-large enterprises such as the Navy. Without such basic understanding, one cannot expect to design effective systems and processes for network-centric warfare. The basic research program proposed here addresses this deficiency directly through its three-pronged technical approach: (1) develop and refine a model of knowledge-flow theory, emphasizing the very-large enterprise (e.g., Navy, Department of Defense), (2) develop a contingency model for matching the most appropriate process and system designs to enterprise knowledge-flow patterns, (3) assess the performance effects of alternative knowledge systems and processes through simulation (e.g., of naval warfare, personnel processes). Informed by the basic science of knowledge-flow theory, this work can propel knowledge management toward the methods and tools commonly used for engineering work-a quantum shift from the current state of affairs. This basic research also directly supports ongoing, priority ONR projects (e.g., Sailor-21, advanced command and control, artificially-intelligent systems and decision aids) and should contribute to development of network-centric warfare concepts, systems and operations.

Knowledge is power. As the U.S. Navy is working to revise its strategy and tactics through knowledge-centric warfare, it is apparent that knowledge flow is key. However, our current state of understanding does not address the phenomenology of knowledge flow well, nor do we have the benefit of knowledge-flow theory and its application to very-large enterprises such as the Navy. Without such basic understanding, one cannot expect to design effective systems and processes for network-centric warfare. The basic research program proposed here addresses this deficiency directly through its three-pronged technical approach: (1) develop and refine a model of knowledge-flow theory, emphasizing the very-large enterprise (e.g., Navy, Department of Defense), (2) develop a contingency model for matching the most appropriate process and system designs to enterprise knowledge-flow patterns, (3) assess the performance effects of alternative knowledge systems and processes through simulation (e.g., of naval warfare, personnel processes). Informed by the basic science of knowledge-flow theory, this work can propel knowledge management toward the methods and tools commonly used for engineering work-a quantum shift from the current state of affairs. This basic research also directly supports ongoing, priority ONR projects (e.g., Sailor-21, advanced command and control, artificially-intelligent systems and decision aids) and should contribute to development of network-centric warfare concepts, systems and operations.

Knowledge is power. As the U.S. Navy is working to revise its strategy and tactics through network-centric warfare, it is apparent that knowledge flow is key. However, our current state of understanding does not address the phenomenology of knowledge flow well, nor do we have the benefit of knowledge-flow theory and its application to very-large enterprises such as the Navy. Without such basic understanding, one cannot expect to design effective systems and processes for network-centric warfare. Imagine trying to develop useful electronic devices such as amplifiers or integrated circuits without a good understanding of electrical flow. Or imagine the difficulty of developing useful aircraft devices such as engines or wings without thoroughly understanding air flow. Likewise, how can one expect to develop useful enterprise devices such as knowledge amplifiers or knowledge engines without understanding knowledge flow? Informed by advances in knowledge-flow theory, this work can propel knowledge management toward the methods and tools commonly used for engineering work-a quantum shift from the current state of affairs. The present article takes a step in this direction. It is intended to serve a something of a navigational chart, to help guide communities of practice as they seek out new knowledge to facilitate naval knowledge flow.

This report provides a review and analysis of issues affecting the design of a lessons learned system for defense acquisition professionals. It draws both upon studies of existing lessons learned systems and upon the literature of organizational learning and knowledge management. While the discussion focuses on the enterprise of defense acquisition, the report's conclusions may be extended to lessons learned and knowledge management systems in other areas as well. The exploration of these issues suggests that attention to social processes within organizations is as important, if not more so, as the development of information technology processes in the success of a lessons learned system. The conclusions provide a resource for decision makers in considering and determining appropriate requirements for and resources to Support an acquisition lessons learned system.

This qualitative study explored how knowledge workers communicate goals and strengths to managers, how managers assign work to knowledge workers, and how the assignment of work impacts motivation. Sixteen knowledge workers from the technology field were interviewed. While a majority reported communicating their goals to managers, most did not directly communicate their strengths. Instead, the knowledge workers relied on their managers to infer their strengths based on observable performance. The results of this study indicated that managers’ knowledge of employees’ experience and skills influenced how they assigned work, and the work the employees performed was related to their motivation. When knowledge workers in this limited sample had assignments that allowed them to make progress and deliver tangible results, they tended to feel positively motivated. When there were factors in place that impeded the knowledge workers’ ability to deliver results, they tended to feel demotivated. Those participants who felt they could not achieve results were likely to seek new opportunities and were more likely to leave their companies than those who felt they could achieve results. Furthermore, the study identified possible perception differences between individual contributors and people managers regarding what drives results. Based on this sample, because most of the participants and their managers were not initiating strengths conversations, it is possible that companies may be overlooking qualified candidates and missing opportunities to improve retention, productivity, and profitability.