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The author claims that this work is a “preliminary argument for a new approach” (p. xxi) to the history of the Muslim East, one that runs counter to older Indo-centric views of the Mughals and the contrived “national” histories produced by British and Russian imperial historians (p. 154). Two central themes run through this study. The first is that “tripartite Muslim Asia” (Iran–Turan–Hindustan) of the 16th and 17th centuries was, in terms of the dominant elite culture, one world and not several. The Muslims of Central Asia and northern India in the 16th and 17th centuries “appear not to have thought of each other mainly as foreigners or as subjects of another king. Rather, they considered each other foremost as Muslims and secondarily in terms of family connections or other loyalties” (p. 31). This in part contributed to and permitted the large-scale movement of talent from Iran and Central Asia to the Mughal domain, “where opportunities were perceived as being better” (p. xix). This notion and the elements of “shared economy” and “mental geography of Asian Muslims” are briefly explored in the first chapter and returned to repeatedly throughout the book. The second chapter, “Timurid Legacy and Turko-Mongol Identity,” focuses on one very particular aspect of this special relationship. The Mughal dynasty was founded by Babur, a descendant of Tamerlane and heir to the extraordinary Turko-Iranian culture that flourished under Timurid rule in Central Asia. Having been evicted from his patrimony in Central Asia by the Uzbeks and having failed to regain his ancestral lands, Babur (who viewed India as “inhospitable, uncivilized and heathen” [p. 127]) and his descendants had to make do with Muslim South Asia. This was their “consolation prize.” That is not bad as “consolation prizes” go, especially because the new territory, which Babur's descendants, after a shaky start, soon expanded to include much of the Indian Subcontinent, quickly outpaced their Central Asian patrimony in power and wealth. Uzbek Central Asia, decreasing in importance militarily, strategically, and economically, never constituted a threat to the Mughal regime and was no longer a core zone of world trade. “In strictly material terms the Mughals had little to gain by reconquering the land of their forebears,” Foltz writes, “yet it remained an obsession. Simple nostalgia appears to have been a major factor in determining the Mughal's foreign policy, and may well provide historians with an example of psychology overriding economics” (p. 6). This is the second major theme of this work. Babur, understandably, always dreamed of returning to his Central Asian homeland. Foltz, however, contends that his “obsession was to be the inheritance he bequeathed to his own descendants, which would haunt them mercilessly despite their successes and glories in India for two centuries to come” (p. 14). Another psychological factor, the author suggests, was the need of the Mughals to prove to the Uzbeks and the rest of the world that they had “made good in exile” (p. 68). By the late 16th century, the Mughals controlled a state with some 60 million to 90 million subjects, while Uzbek Turan could only muster some 5 million—and not always under stable rule. In addition to the psychological factors, which, with the exception of Babur's memoirs (a unique source) are difficult to document, there were also very good political reasons for the Mughals to maintain this Central Asian link. They were Timurids, after all, and Timurid descent was an important component of their ideology, especially when facing the Shibanid Uzbeks. Although they considered the Shibanid Uzbeks barbarians, the Shibanids' Chinggisid descent gave them even higher standing. Foltz correctly notes that “in a world where lineage was nearly everything, the Mughal descendants of Timur could not, ideologically speaking, abandon their paramount claim to Central Asia no matter how firmly established in India they became” (p. 22). Viewing themselves as the lawful rulers of Central Asia, the Mughals “were content to let the Uzbeks ‘house sit’ for them” (p. 33), sometimes referring to Uzbek rulers as “governors” or the Wali-yi Turan (p. 127). Although many Uzbeks eventually came to seek their fortunes in Mughal service, they were stereotyped as simpleminded and pious but obstinate ruffians and bigots, given to revolt. Foltz attributes their rebellious inclinations to the egalitarian traditions that they brought with them from the Turkic lands (p. 59).

Neighbours of the steppe The steppe, extending from the Danube to Manchuria, has been uncharitably termed the ‘inhospitable land of the barbarian’. These ‘barbarians’ were largely pastoral nomads whose neighbours viewed them as avaricious and violent marauders. In the west, this nomadic world was framed by Hungary and Rus', the latter an increasingly divided state contested by rival branches of the Riurikid ruling house. Both states included steppe lands and pastoral nomadic populations that had taken service with the Hungarian and Rus' rulers. South of the steppe lands and the fabled Silk Road cities of its southern rim (Samarqand, Bukhara, Kashghar) were the petty states of the Balkans, the fading Byzantine Empire, the Seljukid state of Rūm (Anatolia), Georgian-dominated Transcaucasia, and the fragmented ʿAbbāsid Caliphate and post-Seljuk polities of the Near East. In the east, China was also politically divided. In the north-west were the Tanguts (Chin. Xixia, 1038–1227) in Ningxia, Shaanxi and Gansu, extending to Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang. They spoke a language related to or a branch of Tibeto-Burmese. South of the Yangtze River was the ethnically Chinese Southern Song state (1127–1279), with its capital at Hangzhou. The Manchu-Tungusic Jurchen dominated the north-east, its ruling elite moving between five capitals (including Beijing). In 1125, the Jurchen had toppled the Khitan-Liao dynasty (907–1125), another Inner Asian people of Mongolic, or perhaps ‘para-Mongolic’, ethno-linguistic affiliations and took the Chinese dynastic name Jin (‘Golden’, 1115–1234).

The Khazar Qaganate was, indeed, one of the great powers of the age. It played an important role in Rus' history, in early Hungarian history and the history of the Caucasus. This chapter presents some idea as to what Khazarology has accomplished thus far and to perhaps suggest some future directions. Even a quick glance at modern Khazar studies will show that scholars are far from universal accord on many fundamental issues although there are also some broad grounds of agreement. Any presentation, of the achievements of Khazar studies is necessarily idiosyncratic, inevitably reflecting personal interests, languages, political and cultural education. The chapter begins with some remarks about the Hungarian School . This may strike some as an odd point of departure, but the Hungarians scholars, with their long-standing and understandable interest in the Altaic and Uralic languages of Eurasia, are a logical starting point. Keywords: Altaic languages; Eurasia; Hungarian School ; Khazar Qaganate; Khazar studies; Uralic languages