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The principle that research participants not receive enhanced care compared to non-participants may be challenged by a duty to disclose genetic research results, especially where care is otherwise inaccessible. Autism researchers' attitudes toward providing enhanced care to study participants were analyzed quantitatively using descriptive and multivariate analyses of survey data and qualitatively through thematic analysis of interview data. Approximately half of survey respondents (n = 168, RR = 44 %) agreed they should provide additional knowledge (52 %) or services (48 %) to study participants that may not be available to non-participants. Qualitatively (n = 23), respondents were motivated by the notion of reciprocity but highlighted tensions when research enables access to expertise and therapeutic resources that are otherwise difficult to obtain. For researchers, feeling obliged to report research results may be in conflict with the obligation to avoid special treatment of research participants; this may in turn threaten principles of voluntariness, autonomy, and justice.

Genetic research in autism depends on the willingness of individuals with autism to participate; thus, there is a duty to assess participants' needs in the research process. We report on families' motives and expectations related to their participation in autism genetic research. Respondents valued having a genetic result, as it alleviates guilt, promotes awareness, and may be used to tailor interventions and for family planning. The act of participating was distinctly significant, as it provided personal control, a connection to autism experts, networking with families, and hope for the future. The results of this study highlight complex factors involved in families' decisions to participate in autism genetic research and provide points to consider for this population of research participants.

Background: Research ethicists have recently declared a new ethical imperative: that researchers should communicate the results of research to participants. For some analysts, the obligation is restricted to the communication of the general findings or conclusions of the study. However, other analysts extend the obligation to the disclosure of individual research results, especially where these results are perceived to have clinical relevance. Several scholars have advanced cogent critiques of the putative obligation to disclose individual research results. They question whether ethical goals are served by disclosure or violated by non-disclosure, and whether the communication of research results respects ethically salient differences between research practices and clinical care. Empirical data on these questions are limited. Available evidence suggests, on the one hand, growing support for disclosure, and on the other, the potential for significant harm., Methods: This paper explores the implications of the disclosure of individual research results for the relationship between research and clinical care through analysis of research-based cancer genetic testing in Ontario, Canada in the late 1990s. We analyze a set of 30 interviews with key informants involved with research-based cancer genetic testing before the publicly funded clinical service became available in 2000., Results: We advance three insights: First, the communication of individual research results makes research practices seem like clinical services for our respondents. Second, while valuing the way in which research enables a form of clinical access, our respondents experience these quasi-clinical services as inadequate. Finally, our respondents recognize the ways in which their experience with these quasi-clinical services is influenced by research imperatives, but understand and interpret the significance and appropriateness of these influences in different ways., Conclusion: Our findings suggest that the hybrid state created through the disclosure of research results about individuals that are perceived to be clinically relevant may produce neither sufficiently adequate clinical care nor sufficiently ethical research practices. These findings raise questions about the extent to which research can, and should, be made to serve clinical purposes, and suggest the need for further deliberation regarding any ethical obligation to communicate individual research results.

Even as debate continues about the putative obligation to proactively report genetic research results to study participants, there is an increasing need to attend to the obligations that might cascade from any initial report. We conducted an international, quasi-experimental survey of researchers involved in autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and cystic fibrosis (CF) genetics to explore perceived obligations to ensure updated information or relevant clinical care subsequent to any initial communication of research results, and factors influencing these attitudes. 5-point Likert scales of dis/agreement were analyzed using descriptive and multivariate statistics. Of the 343 respondents (44% response rate), large majorities agreed that in general and in a variety of hypothetical research contexts, research teams that report results should ensure that participants gain subsequent access to updated information (74-83%) and implicated clinical services (79-87%). At the same time, researchers perceived barriers restricting access to relevant clinical care, though this was significantly more pronounced (P<0.001) for ASD (64%) than CF (34%). In the multivariate model, endorsement of cascading obligations was positively associated with researcher characteristics (eg, clinical role/training) and attitudes (eg, perceived initial reporting obligation), and negatively associated with the initial report of less scientifically robust hypothetical results, but unaffected by perceived or hypothetical barriers to care. These results suggest that researchers strongly endorse information and care-based obligations that cascade from the initial report of research results to study participants. In addition, they raise challenging questions about how any cascading obligations are to be met, especially where access challenges are already prevalent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethicists contend that researchers are obliged to report genetic research findings to individual study participants when they are clinically significant, that is, when they are clinically useful or personally meaningful to participants. Yet whether such standards are well understood and can be consistently applied remains unknown. We conducted an international, cross-sectional survey of cystic fibrosis (CF) and autism genetics researchers using a quasi-experimental design to explore factors influencing researchers' judgments. Eighty percent of researchers agreed, in principle, that clinically significant findings should be reported to individual participants. Yet judgments about when a specific finding was considered clinically significant or warranted reporting varied by scientific factors (replication, robustness, intentionality, and disease context), capacity of the research team to explain the results, and type of research ethics guidance. Further, judgments were influenced by the researchers' disease community (autism or CF), their primary role (clinical, molecular, statistical) and their beliefs regarding a general reporting obligation. In sum, judgments about the clinical significance of genetic research results, and about whether they should be reported, are influenced by scientific parameters as well as contextual factors related to the specific research project and the individual researcher. These findings call into question the assumption that the conditions under which an obligation to disclose arises are uniformly understood and actionable. Adjudicating the clinical readiness of provisional data may be a responsibility better suited to evaluative experts at arms' length of the provisional data in question, rather than a responsibility imposed upon researchers themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Developments in genomics research have been accompanied by a controversial ethical injunction: that researchers disclose individually relevant research results to research participants. With the explosion of genomic research on complex psychiatric conditions such as autism, researchers must increasingly contend with whether – and which results – to report. We conducted a qualitative study with researchers and participants involved in autism genomics research, including 4 focus groups and 23 interviews with parents of autistic children, and 23 interviews with researchers. Respondents considered genomic research results ‘reportable’ when results were perceived to explain cause, and answer the question ‘why;’ that is, respondents set a standard for reporting individually relevant genetic research results to individual participants that is specific to autism, reflecting the metaphysical value that genetic information is seen to offer in this context. In addition to this standard of meaning, respondents required that results be deemed ‘true.’ Here, respondents referenced standards of validity that were context nonspecific. Yet in practice, what qualified as ‘true’ depended on evidentiary standards within specific research disciplines as well as fundamental, and contested, theories about how autism is ‘genetic.’ For research ethics, these finding suggest that uniform and context-free obligations regarding result disclosure cannot readily be specified. For researchers, they suggest that result disclosure to individuals should be justified not only by perceived meaning but also by clarity regarding appropriate evidentiary standards, and attention to the status of epistemological debates regarding the nature and cause of disorders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Growth in genetic medicine has provoked debate about how new and emerging genetic services should be provided, and specifically, what roles non-genetic clinicians should assume. We address this question through a qualitative interview based case study of the program in genetic testing for the hereditary cancer syndromes (breast/ovarian and colorectal) in Ontario, Canada. We argue that two communities offer parallel visions of cancer genetic care: one “genetic,” the other “oncologic.” Both communities argue from precedent that cancer genetics is a natural extension of their work: it is “what we do.” Both communities also highlight the importance of their own expertise in providing core elements of cancer genetic care: it requires “what we know.” Further, both communities perceive the need for leadership by their own (or a related) community as genetic medicine expands to include a broader array of more common and complex diseases: it is expanding “where we''re leading.” Yet, the “we''s” articulating these visions are not reducible to professional identity; rather, both represent distinctive “communities of practice and discourse” that are constructed in relation to institutionalized professional roles, and interactions with the genetic technologies (both tests and counselling) themselves. Available literature on the role of diverse health care professionals in the provision of genetic health care presumes a fixed identity and set of approaches for each professional group that might play a role. Further, existing models tend to assume that genetic technologies are given as tools, and that service organization concerns primarily questions of who will have access to these tools and their powers, as well as the consequent professional and ethical responsibilities. Yet questions about who will control genetic technologies are not simply turf battles between the professions: they are also inescapably questions about what the genetic technologies should and will accomplish clinically. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]