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In this study, the liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) accident in Wenling, Zhejiang Province, China, on June 13, 2020, was analyzed and simulated. An LPG tank truck overturned and collided with the concrete guardrail; the subsequent explosion of the tank released 25.36 t LPG. Shortly afterward, the LPG tank was shot into the air, and the gas cloud ignited, thereby triggering a fire and vapor cloud explosion (VCE). This accident killed 20 people, injured 175 people, and caused significant property loss. The accident timeline was established based on multiple accident images, and the accident process was discussed in detail. The distribution of tank debris, evaporation and spreading of the LPG pool, dispersion of the LPG gas cloud, and VCE were simulated with the EFFECTS and ALOHA software. The images of the accident scene helped to determine and analyze the accident process. In the particular case in which a tank is shot into the air with a continuous two-phase jet, the actual flight distance of the tank is much greater than the prediction of the debris distribution model. The gas cloud distribution simulated with the SLAB model approximately corresponds to a major part of the severely damaged zone. In this accident, the TNO multi-energy method and ALOHA provide relatively consistent predictions with the actual building damage distribution when models use a specific confined explosive mass.

To determine and optimize the emergency evacuation path of personnel in the case of vapor cloud explosion caused by pipeline leakage and improve the safety control measures in the high-consequence areas of gas pipelines, this study was conducted. This work mainly studied two questions: whether various research methods applicable to the solid explosive explosion are also applicable to vapor cloud explosion and the influence of different building layouts on the overpressure propagation law of vapor cloud explosion. First, the applicability of several empirical models and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) methods in vapor cloud explosion overpressure prediction is systematically compared and analyzed. Second, the finite element models based on the fluid-structure interaction are established to study the overpressure propagation law under the influence of different building layouts. Finally, based on the overpressure propagation law, the determination and optimization principle of the emergency evacuation path of personnel when an accident occurs are given. The results show that the CFD method and empirical model based on equivalent assumption between trinitrotoluene and combustible gas are not suitable for the study of gas-phase explosion, while the mixed gas method based on CFD is more suitable for exploring the overpressure problem of vapor cloud explosion. Buildings arranged perpendicular to the direction of blast wave have the most obvious enhancement and weakening effect on overpressure, and the maximum increase rate and decrease rate are about 90%. The maximum increase rate of overpressure between two vertical layout buildings is more than 60% higher than that between two horizontal layout buildings. When determining the emergency evacuation path, the non-explosive side of the building perpendicular to the shock wave layout should be given priority. If it is necessary to pass through the building gap, the gap between the two horizontal layout buildings should be preferred to ensure that the damage of overpressure to personnel is minimized. The research results can provide a theoretical basis for the improvement of personnel safety control measures in high-consequence areas of the gas pipeline.

Safety is the primary concern during the processes of storage, transportation and application of liquid hydrogen. The flammable vapor cloud formed by liquid hydrogen spill poses serious threat to life and property, and it is vital to determine safe distance (the maximum downwind distance of flammable vapor cloud to the spill source) for risk assessment and safe protection. Three-dimensional CFD simulations predicting liquid hydrogen spill in open environment are performed, and variation characteristics of safe distance with different parameters are analyzed. The wind transporting, the atmospheric turbulence, and the shear force between cloud and air are all enhanced by increased wind speed, and consequently the safe distance increases in the first phase and then decreases with wind speed. Safe distance is positively related to liquid spill rate, while the increase rate slows down gradually. A correlation that relates safe distance with wind speed and spill rate is then established for the real-time guidance in a liquid hydrogen spill accident.

Flammable gases and liquids are widely used in industry and have serious leakage hazards. When a leaking gas cloud accidentally encounters an ignition source, it results in vapor cloud explosion accidents and multiple explosions. Pressure and flow field monitoring of a primary exploding spherical gas cloud and the secondary explosion of the gas cloud were conducted using the pressure acquisition system and schlieren system, and the impact of different influencing factors on exploding were analyzed. It was found that the larger the size of the primary exploding gas cloud, the smaller the distance between the primary exploding gas cloud and the secondary explosion gas cloud, and the larger the explosion intensity of the two gas clouds. Ignition on both sides of the primary exploding gas cloud was more likely to cause a blasting effect than was central ignition. The change in sparking ignition energy had no obvious effect on explosion propagation. When multiple gas clouds were exploding, the position of the primary exploding gas cloud had a considerable influence on the chain effect of exploding. If the primary exploding gas cloud was located in the middle of multiple gas clouds, interaction occurred between the primary exploding spherical gas cloud and the secondary explosion gas cloud because the angle formed by the secondary explosion gas cloud decreased, and the explosive intensity of the exploding gas cloud was higher. When the primary exploding gas cloud was on the side, the smaller the angle, the closer the lateral gas cloud was to the flame development path of the explosive gas cloud, which increased the likelihood of a blast and increased explosion intensity.

Current industry accepted methods for predicting structural blast damage to pre-engineered metal buildings (PEMBs) subject to vapor cloud explosions are quick and cost-effective to perform. However, they also tend to be overly conservative; while costs may be saved on analysis, the results may prompt unnecessary mitigation. This paper investigates the effectiveness of using more advanced computational techniques with increasing levels of refinement and sophistication to produce more realistic estimates of structural damage and corresponding human injury. The goal is to reduce the amount of over-conservatism in results and avoid the degree of costly mitigation measures that may be unnecessary. In this study, a typical PEMB is selected and assessed for selected loads using a variety of approaches of increasing analytical sophistication. The extent of building damage is determined by each method and the results are compared to demonstrate the benefit of each analytical method. The use of refined analytical methods is shown to estimate significantly less damage in the PEMB for the loads considered.

Different kinds of derivative accidents due to reaction runaway happen frequently. The research and the prediction of such accidents and their consequences are useful in the determination of safety distances and the establishment of emergency plan. The present paper takes into account the complex components and their dynamic change in the reactor, and proposes a new quantitative analysis method for the derivative accident consequences of reaction runaway. The so-called “simulated process for derivative accidents of reaction runaway” (SPDA-RR), based on the logic diagram of accident judgement, relies on Aspen Plus to describe the process simulation. The hazard analysis of such accidents involves many mathematical models for overpressure explosion, fireball, vapor cloud explosion, harmful gas dispersion, etc. The governing parameters of the mixture used in the mathematical models, such as the component content, temperature, pressure, enthalpy and entropy, can be obtained from SPDA-RR. Furthermore, in order to analyze other cases of reaction runaway, this SPDA-RR can be easily extended by an adequate parameter adjustment.

The vapor cloud explosion (VCE) usually results in large financial and environmental damages. There are many methods to evaluate the consequences of VCE and one of them is the TNO Multi-Energy method (MEM). In the practical applications, the MEM has some weaknesses. For example, it is assumed that the explosion model is hemispherical, which is usually inconsistent with the actual situations. In order to examine the effect of the geometrical shapes on explosion characteristics, a constant volume of clouds with different height-width ratios and length-width ratios were studied. For the vapor cloud with a given volume (32 m3), the geometrical shapes have a great influence on the explosion overpressure, but little on the explosion temperature. When the height-width ratio is 0.5 (the corresponding geometrical shape is 4 m × 4 m × 2 m), the explosion peak overpressure reaches the maximum of 1.57 bar, which is 3.6 times of that (0.44 bar) for the 2 m × 2 m × 8 m vapor cloud. For a constant volume of clouds with the four different height-width ratios in this paper, the MEM predictions correspond to three different initial explosion strengths. As effect of the geometrical shapes on the vapor cloud explosion was not taken into account in the MEM, its predicted results have a greater deviation, especially in the far field. For the scenarios calculated in this study, the relative error for the explosion overpressure predicated in the MEM reaches 150%.

In recent decades, vapor cloud explosions (VCEs) have occurred frequently and resulted in numerous personnel injuries and large property losses. As a main concern in the petrochemical industry, it is of great importance to assess the consequence of VCEs. Currently, the TNT equivalency method (TNT EM), the TNO multi-energy method (TNO MEM), and the Baker-Strehlow-Tang (BST) method are widely used to estimate the blast load from VCEs. The TNO MEM and BST method determine the blast load from blast curves based on the class number and the flame speed, respectively. To quantitatively evaluate the flame speed for the BST method, the experimental data is adopted to validate the confinement specific correlation (CSC) for the determination of the class number in the TNO MEM. As a bridge, a quantitative evaluation correlation (QEC) between CSC correlation and the flame speed is established and the blast wave shapes corresponding to different flame speeds are proposed. CFD software FLACS was used to verify the quantitative correlation with the numerical models of three geometrical scales. It is found that the calculated flame speeds by the QEC are in good agreement with the simulated ones. A petrochemical plant is selected as a realistic scenario to analyze the TNT EM, TNO MEM, BST method and FLACS simulations in terms of the positive-phase side-on overpressure and impulse at different distances. Compared with the flame speed table, the predicted overpressure from BST curves determined by the proposed QEC is closer to that from FLACS and more conservative. Furthermore, the predicted results of different methods are compared with each other. It is found that the estimated positive-phase side-on overpressure and impulse by the TNO MEM are the largest, and the estimated impulse by the TNT EM is the smallest. Moreover, the estimated overpressure and impulse are larger in the higher reactivity gas.

Vapor cloud explosions (VCEs) can cause significant damage to nearby buildings, facilities and infrastructure with potential loss of life and significant business interruption, so the accuracy of predicting blast loads on facility buildings is critical in estimating these losses. Closely spaced buildings and process equipment outside of the congested region of a VCE provide a complicated flow field for an expanding blast wave. Their presence can channel and shield the blast, resulting in significant effects on the blast load magnitude and waveform shape. Currently, the most common way to estimate applied blast pressures resulting from VCE's is to use simplified methods that account for the total energy from the stoichiometric portion of the vapor cloud, fuel reactivity, and level of congestion and confinement, such as the TNO Multi-energy, equivalent TNT, CAM, and BST methods. These simplified tools assume an unobstructed line-of-site condition, which can overestimate and/or underestimate blast loads. This paper illustrates the use of a fast-running Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) approach that can account for channeling and shielding effects without having to use a turbulent combustion model. This approach provides a convenient tool for designers and process safety planners to more accurately quantify the hazard from postulated VCE hazards that include site-specific channeling and shielding effects. The accuracy of the approach is demonstrated via comparisons of CFD simulations to experimentally measured waveforms. Computed pressure and impulse are also compared to the BST predictions for unobstructed and obstructed sites.

Cylindrical tanks are widely used to store liquids in industry, where liquefied natural gas (LNG) poses a unique hazard to personnel, assets, and the surrounding community because of its flammability and cryogenic nature. There are regulations, such as National Fire Protection Association standard NFPA 59A, requiring dikes to mitigate the risk in the case of a catastrophic failure of an LNG tank. Dikes help to control pool spreading, limit vaporization, and mitigate the vapor cloud, but these effects would be undermined if the liquids overtopped the dikes. Previous studies of overtopping involved small-scale tests and a medium-scale quadrant setup. In this work, the overtopping study was further enhanced by investigating dike and tank configurations, dike materials, and liquid types through both laboratory-scale and field tests. A CFD model was developed to understand the physics, and the results of CFD simulations were compared with experimental results. The findings of this work can help to provide scie...

In the chemical process industry, flammable gases are handled or stored in many production- or storage facilities. They can cause a vapor cloud explosion (VCE) accident if they come free from their containment and there is an ignition. A knock-on effect propagation from a primary VCE to one or more subsequent VCE(s) forms the cascading effect of VCEs. A new methodology of probabilistic Petri-net (PPN), which is an extension of Petri-net, is proposed to model the cascading effect and estimate the probabilities of escalation VCEs. The definition of what is a PPN is provided and three types of probabilistic relationships based on PPN are modeled. Further, the VCE cascading analysis approach based on Petri-net reasoning (execution of transitions) is discussed. The approach is illustrated by an example analyzing a VCE cascading effect in atmospheric tanks containing gasoline.

A large vapor cloud explosion (VCE) followed by a fire is one of the most dangerous and high-consequence events that can occur at petrochemical facilities. As the size and complexity of facilities increase, designs must consider the potential adverse effects associated with vapor cloud explosions in large congested areas and understand the potential for more devastating deflagration-to-detonation transitions (DDTs) on these facilities. While the likelihood of DDTs is lower than deflagrations, they have been identified in some of the most recent large-scale explosion incidents including: 2005 Buncefield explosion, 2009 San Juan explosion, and 2009 Jaipur event. The consequences of DDTs can be orders of magnitude larger than deflagration because they have the ability to self-propagate outside the region of high congestion/confinement. Hence, it is critical to understand how a facility's geometry or equipment layout can affect explosion consequences and assist in their mitigation and/or prevention. Due to the inability to predict such devastating phenomena on the large scale, owners and designers cannot evaluate installations for risk of DDTs and provide “inherently safer” layout or mitigation measures to significantly reduce or eliminate such hazards. However, there is a lack of data at the large scale to validate the necessary design tools used to predict the risk of DDT. One of the main goals of this research project is to provide large scale DDT explosion data and validate the tools necessary to predict vapor cloud explosions in early design phase. This paper will present the results of large scale testing being conducted in a newly developed test rig of 50,000 ft3 (1500 m3) gross volume under award Subcontract 12121-6403-01 provided by the Research Partnership to Secure Energy for America (RPSEA). These tests involve evaluation of deflagrations and DDTs involving stoichiometric, lean and rich mixtures, with propane and methane fuels. The effectiveness of mitigation techniques such as solid inhibitors or deluge is evaluated for preventing DDTs.

The possibility that Deflagration to Detonation Transition (DDT) occurs in vapor cloud explosions (VCEs) in industrial accidents has generally only been recognized for very reactive fuels such as hydrogen and ethylene. Assessment of the explosion hazards and risks associated with less reactive fuels such as propane and other alkanes has generally been based around the assumption that, in practice, only a deflagration can occur. This has the benefit that the magnitude of the maximum hazard to surrounding areas is defined by the physical parameters of any congested process region and not by the extent of the vapor cloud, as would be the case if there was a sustained detonation. However, following the Buncefield incident in the UK in 2005, a considerable amount of effort was expended in explaining the major VCE that occurred. This initially involved gathering and interpreting the evidence from the incident but then extended to experimental and theoretical research over two phases and lasting five years. Further research since showed that DDT can be achieved within dense vegetation and regions of pipework with a relatively small extent (of the order of a few meters). The results from this project will be summarized, indicating why the only explanation that is consistent with all of the evidence is a DDT soon after ignition of the cloud, with a sustained detonation then propagating through the majority of the cloud. Reference will be made to other incidents where similar evidence was observed. Awareness of the significance of such evidence will be important in the investigation of future VCEs. In addition, the possibility of DDT needs to be recognized in the methodologies used to assess VCE hazards. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 292–300, 2017

In this study, the authors used a specially designed experimental device to detect the amount of diesel that evaporated at different diesel and environmental temperatures and quantify the distribution of diesel at different heights within the subsequent vapor cloud. They also examined the relationship between the total diesel concentration of the vapor cloud and the amount of diesel evaporated, the relationship between the explosive threshold of the diesel vapor cloud and the environmental temperature, and the formation of the vapor cloud. Finally, the authors investigated the conditions relevant to the formation of an explosive vapor cloud after diesel spillage.

In this article, a new concept is presented with the intent to suppress the generation of damaging overpressures during a vapor cloud explosion via triggering ignitions at additional locations within the vapor cloud immediately after the primary ignition has occurred. The resulting lower explosion overpressures would then be less damaging to buildings and their occupants. The results of early experimental work support the hypothesis underlying this new concept. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 54–61, 2017

Chained explosions happened occasionally, leading to heavy casualties and huge property losses. However, the development regime of the chained explosions is unclear. Experiments of both single and two vertically distributed vapor clouds with different sizes, volume concentrations and ignition conditions were conducted. The experimental results show that the maximum overpressure generated by the primary methane/air mixture explosion increases with vapor diameter, but hardly changes with the ignition energy. The effect of ignition position on chained explosions is significant since the development trajectory of the primary explosion varies with the ignition position. The secondary explosion is more likely to be triggered in the case of ignition at the center of the primary vapor cloud. Because of the enhanced ignition and turbulence induced by the primary explosion, the maximum overpressure and rate of pressure rise of the secondary explosion are larger than that of the primary explosion and increase with a decrease in the separation distance between the two vapor clouds. In addition, the development of the explosion flame for the secondary explosion induced by a primary explosion is asymmetric due to the uncertain ignition point.

The oil industry operates installations and processes with important quantities of flammable substances within a wide range of pressures and temperatures. A particular hazard for this type of installations is an accidental release of a large quantity of flammable material resulting in a devastating vapor cloud explosion. Extensive research was conducted to assess the efficiency of chemicals for inhibition of flames. Especially alkali metal compounds (especially carbonates and bicarbonates of sodium and potassium) have shown to be one of the more efficient flame inhibitor species. In this paper, the principles of flame inhibition by alkali metal compounds are briefly explained. Based on these principles, a practical implementation of an industrial system for chemical inhibition of vapor cloud explosions is discussed. This implementation is based on the use of dry powders of carbonates and bicarbonates of sodium and potassium as flame inhibitor species. The efficiency of the final design of the inhibition system was tested and confirmed on a very large scale in Vapor Cloud Explosion tests in California (US) in September 2016. Several projects in TOTAL were identified in which the VCE inhibition technology is implemented (new cracker units in Daesan (South-Korea) and in Port Arthur (United States)).

Storage tank separation distance, which considerably affects forestalling and mitigating accident consequences, is principally determined by thermal radiation modeling and meeting industry safety requirements. However, little is known about the influence of separation distance on gas dispersion or gas explosion, which are the most destructive types of accidents in industrial settings. This study evaluated the effect of separation distance on gas dispersion and vapor cloud explosion in a storage tank farm. Experiments were conducted using Flame Acceleration Simulator, an advanced computational fluid dynamics software program. Codes governing the design of separation distances in China and the United States were compared. A series of geometrical models of storage tanks with various separation distances were established. Overall, increasing separation distance led to a substantial reduction in vapor cloud volume and size in most cases. Notably, a 1.0 storage diameter separation distance appeared to be optimal. In terms of vapor cloud explosion, a greater separation distance had a marked effect on mitigating overpressure in gas explosions. Therefore, separation distance merited consideration in the design of storage tanks to prevent gas dispersion and explosion.

This study is related to consequence analyses of accidental natural gas explosions and used to assess the risk of the long-distance transmission pipeline system. In these consequence analyses, it is indispensable to adequately predict the blast wave propagation of gas vapor cloud explosions (VCEs) in open space. In this study, a new theoretical prediction method for natural gas VCEs in open space was developed and a full-scale experiment involving explosion in a natural gas pipeline was carried out. The predictions by the improved theoretical method agreed well with the results of the full-scale experiment. On the basis of damage criteria, to demonstrate the probability and potential damage range to humans and surroundings, risk analysis of this case was performed on the PHAST simulator. We conclude that a nearly 100% fatality is expected in a blast wave zone of within 160 m, while the explosions made serious effects on the surrounding construction, causing all of the buildings to collapse with the radial...

This paper presents an analysis and simulation of an accident involving a liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) truck tanker in Kannur, Kerala, India. During the accident, a truck tanker hit a divider and overturned. A crack in the bottom pipe caused leakage of LPG for about 20 min forming a large vapor cloud, which got ignited, creating a fireball and a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) situation in the LPG tank with subsequent fire and explosion. Many fatalities and injuries were reported along with burning of trees, houses, shops, vehicles, etc. In the present study, ALOHA (Area Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres) and PHAST (Process Hazard Analysis Software Tool) software have been used to model and simulate the accident scenario. Modeling and simulation results of the fireball, jet flame radiation and explosion overpressure agree well with the actual loss reported from the site. The effects of the fireball scenario were more significant in comparison to that of the jet fire scenario.

Although industrial denotations in semi-open and congested geometries are often neglected by many practitioners during risk assessment, recent studies have shown that industrial detonations might be more common than previously believed. Therefore, from the explosion safety perspective, it becomes imperative to better assess industrial detonation hazards to improve robustness of explosion mitigation design, emergency response procedures, and building siting evaluation. Having that in mind, this study aims to review current empirical vapor cloud explosion models, understand their limitations, and assess their capability to indicate detonation onset for elongated vapor clouds. Six models were evaluated in total: TNO Multi-Energy, Baker-Strehlow-Tang (BST), Congestion Assessment Method (CAM), Quest Model for Estimation of Flame Speed (QMEFS), Primary Explosion Site (PES), and Confinement Specific Correlation (CSC). Model estimations were compared with large-scale test data available in the open literature. The CAM model demonstrated good performance in indicating deflagration-to-detonation transition (DDT) for test conditions experiencing detonation onset without any modification in the methodology. Some suggestions are provided to improve simulation results from PES, BST and QMEFS.

Toxic gas-containing flammable gas leak can lead to poisoning accidents as well as explosion accidents once the ignition source appears. Many attempts have been made to evaluate and mitigate the adverse effects of these accidents. All these efforts are instructive and valuable for risk assessment and risk management towards the poisoning effect and explosion effect. However, these analyses assessed the poisoning effect and explosion effect separately, ignoring that these two kinds of hazard effects may happen simultaneously. Accordingly, an integrated methodology is proposed to evaluate the consequences of toxic gas-containing flammable gas leakage and explosion accident, in which a risk-based concept and the grid-based concept are adopted to combine the effects. The approach is applied to a hypothetical accident scenario concerning an H2S-containing natural gas leakage and explosion accident on an offshore platform. The dispersion behavior and accumulation characteristics of released gas as well as the subsequent vapor cloud explosion (VCE) are modeled by Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) code Flame Acceleration Simulator (FLACS). This approach is concise and efficient for practical engineering applications. And it helps to develop safety measures and improve the emergency response plan.

Not all accidental releases of flammable gases and vapors create explosions. Most releases do not find an ignition source, and of those that do ignite, most of them result in deflagrations that generate low or moderate overpressures. Under some circumstances, however, it is possible for deflagration-to-detonation transition (DDT) to occur, and this can be followed by a propagating detonation that quickly consumes the remaining detonable cloud. In a detonable cloud, a detonation creates the worst accident that can happen. Because detonation overpressures are much higher than those in a deflagration and continue through the entire detonable cloud, the damage from a DDT event is more severe. This paper first provides a brief summary of our knowledge to date of the fundamental mechanisms of flame acceleration and DDT. This information is then contrasted to and combined with evidence of detonations (detonation markers) obtained from large-scale tests and actual large vapor cloud explosions (VCEs), including events at Buncefield (UK), Jaipur (India), CAPECO (Puerto Rico), and Port Hudson (US). The major conclusion from this review is that detonations did occur in prior VCEs in at least part of the VCE accidents. Finally, actions are suggested that could be taken to minimize detonation hazards.

Chemicals used in paint industry are generally comprised of toxic and inflammable substances; they may cause serious problems for humans and environment if safety conditions are neglected. In 2012, rupture of a toluene tank in a paint factory in Iran claimed lives of two workers near the tank. The present study is formulated in order to model the incident. The results showed the area prone to flash fire occurrence and extension. Furthermore, radiation was measured in terms of distance to the tank. A bund wall is also assumed around the vessel in order to determine its influence on evaporation in flash fire area, radiation, and maximum concentration of vapor cloud. The results provided important hints on minimum and required distance of electrical equipment or electrical enclosure (PLC) installation from vessels as well as suitable distance between the vessels. Finally, preventive recommendations were proposed to reduce the risk of potential accidents.

In the last two decades, several serious accidents at large-scale technological systems that have had grave consequences, such as that at Bhopal, have primarily been attributed to human error. However, further investigations have revealed that humans are not the primary cause of these accidents, but have inherited the problems and difficulties of working with complex systems created by engineers. The operators have to comprehend malfunctions in real time, respond quickly, and make rapid decisions to return operational units to normal conditions, but under these circumstances, the mental workload of operators rises sharply, and a mental workload that is too high increases the rate of error. Therefore, cognivitive human features such as situation awareness (SA)—one of the most important prerequisite for decision-making—should be considered and analyzed appropriately. This paper applys the SA Error Taxonomy methodology to analyze the role of SA in three different accidents: (1) A runaway chemical reaction at Institute, West Virginia killing two employees, injuring eight people, and requiring the evacuation of more than 40,000 residents adjacent to the facility, (2) The ignition of a vapor cloud at Bellwood, Illinois that killed one person, injured two employees, and caused significant business interruption, and (3) An explosion at Ontario, California injuring four workers and caused extensive damage to the facility. In addition, the paper presents certain requirements for cognitive operator support system development and operator training under abnormal situations to promote operators’ SA in the process industry.

The methods used to evaluate the consequences of a vapor cloud explosion assume deflagrations within congested process pipework regions and consequently a significant effort has been invested in developing models to estimate the severity of these deflagrations. Models range from the simpler screening approaches to detailed Computational Fluid Dynamics. There is clear evidence from large scale experiments and incidents that transition from deflagration to detonation is credible and has occurred and it is the contention of this paper that deflagration is only the first stage in many major vapor cloud explosions and that detonation is readily foreseeable. Why does this matter? The methods currently used in the design and location of buildings on and around process sites are based on an incomplete picture of vapor cloud explosions. Whilst this might not have a significant effect in some cases, it is shown that there is the potential to significantly underestimate the explosion hazard. This will result in occupied buildings either being placed in the wrong location or under-designed for the explosion threat, increasing the risks to personnel on these sites.

A failure of a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) tanker can occur due to collision or rupture in loading/unloading lines resulting in spillage of LNG on water. Upon release, a spreading liquid can form a pool with rapid vaporization leading to the formation of a flammable vapor cloud. Safety analysis for the protection of public and property involves the determination of consequences of such accidental releases. To address this complex pool spreading and vaporization phenomenon of LNG, an investigation is performed based on the experimental tests that were conducted by the Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center (MKOPSC) in 2007. The 2007 tests are a part of medium-scale experiments carried out at the Brayton Fire Training Field (BFTF), College Station. The dataset represents a semi-continuous spill on water, where LNG is released on a confined area of water for a specified duration of time. The pool spreading and vaporization behavior are validated using empirical models, which involved determination of pool spreading parameters and vaporization rates with respect to time. Knowledge of the pool diameter, pool height and spreading rate are found to be important in calculating the vaporization rates of the liquid pool. The paper also presents a method to determine the vaporization mass flux of LNG using water temperature data that is recorded in the experiment. The vaporization rates are observed to be high initially and tend to decrease once the pool stopped spreading. The results of the analysis indicated that a vaporization mass flux that is varying with time is required for accurate determination of the vaporization rate. Based on the data analysis, sources of uncertainties in the experimental data were identified to arise from ice formation and vapor blocking.

A devastating crude oil vapor explosion accident, which killed 62 people and injured 136, occurred on November 22, 2013. It was one of the most disastrous vapor cloud explosion accidents that happened in Qingdao's storm drains in China. It was noted that blast overpressure and flying debris were the main causes of human deaths, personal injuries and structure damages. Two months after the accident, it was reported that there were three contentious issues in the investigation report. First issue was the discrepancy between the temperature of the crude oil vapor explosive limits which were measured by the investigation panel and the temperature reported by the local fire department. Second issue was the contradiction between the upper explosive limit and vapor pressure of the crude oil vapor. The last issue was the location of the ignition source which led to the explosion. In the present study some specific features of this accident and various causes led to the explosion, high casualties and severe damages were analyzed. Three contentious issues in the official investigation report were investigated and tested in detail. The first element tested was the explosive limits and limiting oxygen concentration of the crude oil vapor at different temperatures. Based on theoretical analysis and field investigations, the last two elements in the report were analyzed from multiple perspectives. Based on the TNO Multi-Energy model and PROBIT equations, damage probability of affected people at the leaking site was also estimated. The investigation concluded with a result that precautions need to be taken to prevent flammable gas explosions in the drainage systems. Key steps were explicitly discussed for improving the hazard identification and risk assessment of similar accidents in the future.

The common rift between academia and industry has existed in all fields of engineering. However, ultimately that can be seen as more of a lag; it is not so much a question of academia research, which ends up finding its way into the practical world of industry years if not decades later. On the topic of detonations or Vapor Cloud Explosions (VCE), this is indeed a true statement. A little more than a decade ago the common belief in the chemical process industry was that detonations were not possible unless you had some very reactive process materials such as hydrogen or acetylene. When some industry and consulting experts began to challenge this view, they soon found out that a more common and less reactive process material such as ethylene could in fact be made to detonate as well. The key was that the environment had to be just right for an ignited flame to accelerate and transition to a detonation. In fact, academia had known this since the early 1960s and so the question remains, what else can we learn? Industry has retuned itself and made use of a several common explosion modeling tools which for some can be made to predict detonations. In others, they must be inferred and only very knowledgeable users can determine detonations. This paper will review the basics of detonations, the academic perspective and the industrial applications. Additionally, several of the various and commonly used models for explosion prediction will be reviewed, in the light of detonation.

A model for predicting vapor cloud explosion blast loads is described extending a previously developed model. The model considers the contribution of a Primary Explosion Site (PES) as well as the bulk effect of the total flammable cloud. The model results are then compared with historical accidents and other commonly used models considering a single PES. Four historical events are examined: the Flixborough accident of 1974, the Texas City accident of 2005, the Phillips 66 accident of 1989, and the Buncefield incident of 2005. It is found that the combined model produced pressure and impulse values consistent with the damage observed. If the contribution of the total cloud is not considered, the far field pressure, which included overpressures up to 0.35 bar, was underpredicted and impulse was significantly underpredicted. The other methods, produced, in general, significantly lower overpressures and impulses when compared with the damage indicators seen in the explosion accidents. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 34: 147–153, 2015

Owner/operators of chemical processing and petroleum refining sites often ask whether unconfined hydrogen vapor cloud explosions (VCEs) can actually occur. This question normally arises during the course of a consequence-based facility siting study (FSS) or a quantitative risk assessment (QRA). While it is generally recognized that a hydrogen release within a process enclosure could lead to an explosion, the potential for an external hydrogen release to cause a VCE is not as widely recognized and is often questioned. This uncertainty appears to stem from the impression that a hydrogen release always ignites quickly and near the point of release such that a flammable cloud does not have time to develop prior to ignition and/or that a hydrogen release never produces a flammable cloud of any significant volume due to its positive buoyancy. Unfortunately, neither impression is correct. Hydrogen releases are actually susceptible to delayed ignition, and hydrogen releases can form significant flammable gas clouds near grade level. Unconfined hydrogen VCEs can and do occur. Furthermore, given the potential for rapid flame acceleration associated with hydrogen, the consequences of a hydrogen VCE can be severe. Consideration of such events in FSS and QRAs is, therefore, warranted. Prior accidental hydrogen VCEs are reviewed to establish that such events do occur. Selected hydrogen VCE tests are also discussed to establish the potential severity of such events. Moosemiller and Galindo [10th Global Congress on Process Safety, 2014 Annual AIChE Meeting, New Orleans, LA, March 30–April 2, 2014] reviewed the ignition characteristics of hydrogen relative to the potential for a delayed ignition, and only the conclusions from that article are presented here. Example dispersions, using both simplified dispersion and computational fluid dynamics methods, are presented to illustrate the flammable gas volumes that can be created by hydrogen release scenarios. Blast load predictions are presented to illustrate the range of loads that could result from a hydrogen VCE due to such a release. © 2014 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 34: 36–43, 2015

Amuay refinery disaster (2012) is another recent example of Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE) and fire accidents preceded by Buncefield (2005), Puerto-Rico (2009) and Jaipur (2009), respectively [9]. The incident has left many safety issues behind which must be repeatedly addressed. Unfortunately, the lessons taught by previous similar events are just not understood carefully. It reveals that the proper safety measures for such facilities were either underestimated or were not accounted seriously. Consequently, the resulting overpressures from explosion and the subsequent thermal radiation from tank fires have once again proved to be disastrous to both mankind and infrastructure. This article highlights the aftermaths of Amuay incident and addresses the challenges put forward by it. Furthermore, a comparative study is performed between such incidents to analyze the similarities and how they could have been avoided.

A test was conducted which demonstrates that a detonation wave, once formed due to a deflagration to detonation transition (DDT) within a congested region, will propagate as a detonation from the congested region into an uncongested region. This is the expected behavior based on the general behavior of detonation waves as well as other tests reported in literature. The impact of a detonation wave propagating beyond the congested volume in which it is initiated on the resulting blast load was evaluated parametrically. As would be expected, the impact on the blast load is large for flammable clouds which extend well beyond the congested volume. The test rig was 16.5 m (54 ft) long with the first 9.1 m (30 ft) of the rig length comprised of a congested section 3.7 m (12 ft) in width and 1.8 m (6 ft) high. The congestion was made up of a regular array of vertical circular tubes [6 cm (2.375 in.) diameter, pitch-to-diameter ratio of 4.1, area and volume blockage ratios of 23% and 4.2%, respectively]. The last 7.3 m (24 ft) of the test rig length was completely uncongested. The test rig was configured without any confinement (i.e., no wall or roof sections). A near-stoichiometric ethylene-air mixture completely filled both the congested and uncongested portions of the test rig. Prior testing with a similar rig configuration had shown that this flammable mixture would undergo a DDT within the congested portion of the rig. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2013

API Recommended Practice 752 is one of the most referenced practices for evaluating vapor cloud explosion (VCE) impacts to site occupied buildings. This reference introduces generic VCE frequencies for different types of process units that are based on VCE incidents database. Although these reported VCE frequencies are not capable of illustrating all parameters that affect explosion likelihood, they are widely used in risk analysis studies and software packages. This paper delineates the structure of a more realistic method for estimation of local VCE frequencies for independent congested spaces or units as a function of process, site, and meteorological variables. Compared to traditional methods for VCE frequency estimation, the new proposed approach is supported by an obviously more populated and precisely categorized database of leakage frequencies and features a multi-variable functionality of process/plant conditions. Contrary to previous procedures that aimed at finding the frequency of occurrence for a single VCE incident, this proposed methodology characterizes each congested space with a local VCE frequency. This frequency is an integration of the frequencies pertaining to VCE's that are likely to be initiated by each congested space. This new VCE frequency can also be used to determine the level of explosion hazard in each unit and in risk matrix analysis.

It is very important and necessary to perform quantitative hazard analysis for possible accidental leakage from an underground gas storage cavern in salt rock. An integrated quantitative hazard analysis method for natural gas jet release from salt caverns is presented in this paper, which was constituted by a revised model for gas leakage rate calculation, a consequence analysis and a model of probability assessment for harm. The presented method was validated by comparing the analytical results with the data collected from the real accidents (including the leakage, jet fire, fireball and vapor cloud explosion). It is indicated that the proposed method was more accurate than the TNT equivalence method for vapor cloud explosion and gave more reasonable results when applied to the consequence analysis for the thermal radiation from jet fire and fireball.

The safety and security of liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities has prompted the need for continued study of LNG mitigation systems. Water-spray curtains are widely recognized as an effective mea...

The first edition of the CCPS book Guidelines to Evaluating Vapor Cloud Explosions, Flash Fires and BLEVEs was published in 1994. The second edition was completed in October 2010. It is a major revision of the Guideline with contents completely reorganized, recent research results added, revised and new prediction methods inserted, with sample problems worked for each prediction method. The treatment of pressure vessel burst was expanded and placed in a dedicated chapter, resulting in a new name for the second edition of the Guideline. © 2011 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2011.

Vapor cloud explosions (VCEs) cause considerable problems in the chemical and petrochemical industries. They generate damaging levels of overpressure and the possibility of human injury/death, and building/equipment damage. Predicting the possible consequences of VCEs is important to ensure the safe design of existing and new structures. Prediction of the overpressures resulting from a VCE is typically done using simplified (empirical) models, phenomenological models, and computational fluid dynamics models. The focus of this article is on two of the most frequently used simplified prediction methods: TNO multienergy and Baker–Strehlow–Tang models. These models are compared in terms of structural response and vulnerability of damage caused by an explosion. © 2010 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2011

Quantifying the size of flammable vapor cloud hazards associated with an accidental release of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) into a spill containment system supported by narrow drainage trenches has posed a modeling challenge since the inception of the LNG industry. Early attempts to treat the vapors evolving from the trenches included using line-source Gaussian models, and the use of the DEGADIS model by modeling “segmented” trench elements and adding the contributions from each trench segment at a specified downwind distance. These approaches often are only reasonable for a select set of conditions (e.g., winds perpendicular to the trench) and have no ability to simulate many of the conditions that might result in a larger potential impact (e.g., winds blowing parallel to the trench).

Fire and explosion hazards in ammonia plants include releases of flammable materials. The distinction between fire and explosion scenarios is often whether the fuel ignites promptly upon release or has delayed ignition. Prompt ignition prevents formation of a flammable vapor cloud and, thereby, averts a VCE. Syngas contains a significant amount of hydrogen, a fuel that is easily ignited. Industry experience with accidental releases of syngas has been that it promptly ignites. Literature was reviewed for test and accident data for syngas and hydrogen to estimate the probability of prompt versus delayed ignition. No instances of syngas VCEs were found in literature; however, numerous test and accidents were reported for hydrogen. The probability of delayed ignition varied with the release conditions. A conservative estimate of the probability of delayed ignition was developed. © 2010 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2010

In order to analyze the influence of vapor cloud shape on temperature field effect of unconfined vapor cloud explosion (UVCE) and obtain creditable prediction method of explosion temperature effect, the transient temperature fields of cylindrical and hemispherical UVCEs with same methane concentration and mass were numerically studied by computational fluid dynamics (CFD) technology. According to numerical simulation results, the concepts of UVCE's temperature-near-field and temperature-far-field were proposed, the corresponding ranges were given, and the temperature attenuation laws and differences in corresponding regions with different vapor cloud shapes were presented. Through comparing with Baker fireball model, the accuracy and visualizability in acquisition of entire temperature effect based on numerical simulation were further validated. The functional relations among maximum temperature, horizontal distance, initial temperature and vapor cloud mass in temperature-near-field and temperature-far-field were deduced by means of data fitting, respectively. These conclusions provided quantitative basis for forecast and protection of UVCE disaster.

Effective safety measures to prevent and mitigate the consequences of an accidental release of flammable LNG are critical. Water spray curtain is currently recognized as an effective technique to control and mitigate various hazards in the industries. It has been used to absorb, dilute and disperse both toxic and flammable vapor cloud. It is also used as protection against heat radiation, in case of fighting vapor cloud fire. Water curtain has also been considered as one of the most economic and promising LNG vapor cloud control techniques. Water curtains are expected to enhance LNG vapor cloud dispersion mainly through mechanical effects, dilution, and thermal effects. The actual phenomena involved in LNG vapor and water curtain interaction were not clearly established from previous research. LNG spill experiments have been performed at the Brayton Fire Training Field at Texas A&M University (TAMU) to understand the effect of water curtain in controlling and dispersing LNG vapor cloud. This paper summarizes experimental methodology and presents data from two water curtain tests. The analysis of the test results are also presented to identify the effectiveness of these two types of water spray curtains in enhancing the LNG vapor cloud dispersion.

A few years ago, there was an explosion in a reactor at the XYZ Chemical Company. The reactor was a block copolymerization reactor where butadiene and styrene monomers were added in a semibatch manner. The heat of reaction was removed by means of a refrigeration system. The incident occurred when the reactants were not added in the sequence or quantity required. The resulting runaway reaction overpressurized the reactor system and caused an expansion joint to rupture. The hydrocarbons released formed a vapor cloud that exploded, causing the death of two workers, serious injury to three others, and significant damage to the facility. The contributing causes of the incident include: (a) lack of information about the hazards of the chemicals in the process, (b) lack of information about the equipment in the process and inadequate equipment, (c) inadequate or no PHA, (d) inadequate training, (e) confusing operating procedures, (f) failure to use management of change procedures, (g) failure to perform a prestartup safety review, (h) failure to have an adequate contractor safety program, and (i) failure to investigate previous near misses and incidents and take corrective actions. This article describes this accident, the root causes, and the major plant deficiencies. The following expresses my opinion of the events that led to this explosion as testified to in open court. Others may have different opinions. © 2009 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2010

The Baker-Strehlow-Tang (BST) vapor cloud explosion model is one of the most common methods used to estimate overpressures for the purpose of locating buildings in relation to process units. This model suffers from a problem common to all simplified explosion models: the user is required to pick the “strength” of the explosion using one or more simple parameters. In the BST model, the fuel reactivity, flame expansion, and obstacle density parameters are used to select a flame speed from a limited matrix of possible values. This article presents the Quest Model for estimation of flame speeds (QMEFS), a systematic approach to estimating flame speed that does not rely on the BST categories. It provides for a continuous range of flame speeds that can then be used with the existing BST blast curves to calculate the characteristics of the vapor cloud explosion. The QMEFS approach provides the user with a method for describing a vapor cloud explosion that is more detailed than the BST model, and establishes a more refined system for predicting the consequences of vapor cloud explosions. © 2008 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2009

The relative importance of the vapor cloud explosion (VCE) hazard has grown in recent years. Many of large disasters were attributed to the VCE. This article introduced an explosion accident of solvent vapor in a ring partition of floating roof in detail. Source of explosive materials and ignition reason were analyzed, and the blast equivalency in ring partition was estimated in the specific conditions. The case would provide a reference for preventing the similar accident.

© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. In this paper, a new method based on Fuzzy theory is presented to estimate the occurrence possibility of vapor cloud explosion (VCE) of flammable materials. This new method helps the analyst to overcome some uncertainties associated with estimating VCE possibility with the Event Tree (ET) technique. In this multi-variable model, the physical properties of the released material and the characteristics of the surrounding environment are used as the parameters specifying the occurrence possibility of intermediate events leading to a VCE. Factors such as area classification, degree of congestion of a plant and release rate are notably affecting the output results. Moreover, the proposed method benefits from experts' opinions in the estimation of the VCE possibility. A refrigeration cycle is used as the case study and the probability of VCE occurrence is determined for different scenarios. In this study, sensitivity analysis is performed on the model parameters to assess their effect on the final values of the VCE possibility. Furthermore, the results are compared with the results obtained using other existing models. publisher: Elsevier articletitle: A multivariable model for estimation of vapor cloud explosion occurrence possibility based on a Fuzzy logic approach for flammable materials journaltitle: Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries articlelink: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2014.11.003 content_type: article copyright: Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. ispartof: Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries vol:33 pages:140-150 status: published

In the early 1960s a number of sizable explosions and fires occurred in the oil and petrochemical industries. A light hydrocarbons plant in Louisiana suffered a vapor cloud explosion. This phenomenon, although it had occurred before, was largely unrecognized in industry. At about the same time, the process industries were moving toward the "jumbo" plants. Formerly, ammonia was produced in multiple plants of 100 to 300 tons/day capacity with multiple parallel lines of reciprocating compressors. However, in the early 1960s ammonia plants having capacities of 750, 1000, and 1500 tons/day with centrifugal machines were rolling off the designers boards. Large, single-train olefin plants, with capacities of 1.5 billion pounds per year, were also being designed and erected. As a response to these trends, a number of people from industry and insurance put together a symposium to explore ways to improve loss prevention in the process industries. This symposium contained six sessions and was held at the AIChE National meeting in Houston in 1967. Attendance was excellent and a committee was formed to prepare annual symposia on the topic. These symposia are still held at AIChE National meetings with the 40th Loss Prevention Symposium being held this year. This paper will discuss some of the highlights of these symposia and some of the people that have made them so successful over the years. Language: en

At approximately 1:20 p.m. on Wednesday, March 23, 2005 a series of explosions and fire occurred at the BP Texas City oil refinery during the start-up of an isomerization (ISOM) process unit. Fifteen workers were killed and about 170 other people were injured. Many of those killed were working in or around office trailers located near a blowdown drum and stack open to the atmosphere. The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) found that because of problems that began during the ISOM process unit start-up, a sudden, geyser-like release of flammable hydrocarbon liquid and vapor discharged from the atmospheric vent stack. This release created a flammable vapor cloud, which ignited, causing as many as five explosions and fire in and around the ISOM unit. CSB identified multiple possible ignition sources in and around the blowdown drum area, including idling vehicles; however, the exact ignition source remains unknown. CSB deployed a team of investigators to BP Texas City to conduct a root-cause investigation immediately after the incident. This team examined blast patterns to determine the explosion origin; reviewed the design of the isomerization unit equipment; and examined plant safety and operating procedures, past accidents, maintenance procedures, and oversight and inspection. Investigators also reviewed the adequacy of applicable regulations and industry standards for the placement of temporary structures such as trailers in refineries. This article presents the preliminary findings from the CSB investigative team regarding the technical and underlying causes of the incident and discusses three urgent recommendations issued by the CSB stemming from the BP incident. © 2006 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2006