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One of the new ideas to reduce inequality and adjust the class gap is the "sharing economy" model. By creating "access instead of ownership", the sharing economy has provided the conditions for the low income deciles to use some life facilities in which there is a large class gap, and a part of the lack of consumption in the low deciles (caused by the lack of ownership) decreases.In this research, while introducing the "sharing economy" model in order to improve the inequality situation in the country, focusing on the issue of "trust" as the most important challenge of this economic model, an effort is made to design a mechanism to increase the level of trust in the sharing economy. , to provide the basis for inclusive and sustainable growth of this economic model in the country. For this purpose, by using the game theory and one of its sub-branches called mechanism design theory, a trust-building mechanism with the aim of increasing the level of trust in online accommodation sharing platforms. , the design and then the proposed mechanism is evaluated. The results of the evaluation show that the proposed mechanism in this research is "compatible with motivation", "individually rational", "efficient" and "has a balanced budget predicted in advance".

In fact, there are some problems in macro coordination, distribution structure and service efficiency in the purchase of large instruments and equipment. The reason is that the purchase demonstration does not play its due role in the allocation of resources. This article introduces the mechanism design theory in the field of economics, establishes the coordination mechanism of incentive compatibility and information interchange, carries out the comprehensive reform of elements sorting, process re-engineering and data driving to the demonstration work of equipment purchase, and then designs a four-in-one linkage path of "argumentation, budget, procurement and use". The practice shows that the demonstration reform of large instruments and equipment purchase based on the perspective of mechanism design theory is helpful to solve the problems of structural stagnation and low efficiency in the purchase of large instruments and equipment in universities, and promote the efficiency of capital use and management efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In spite of implementing widespread change programs to promote the banking system, from the law for usury free banking to privatization, banking system inefficiency is still one of the most important economic challenges in the country. Basic assumption of mechanism design theory to explain this failure is existence of destructive conflicts in the system. The purpose of this study is to diagnosis of these conflicts and to propose of approaches to resolve them. Therefore, a graph model, with a holistic view, developed to describe the behavior of main players in the banking system and analyzed its equilibrium states. The results showed that the existence of conflicts is one of the most important causes of inefficiency of the system in performing its expected functions. Main drivers of the conflicts are deviation in relative prices due to the Dutch disease and myopic in decision making in macro and middle levels of governance of the system. In this study, Inverse GMCR method was used to investigate the institutional functions required to conflict resolution. The results showed that monetary policy maker independence from government, reduction of government budget dependence on oil, clarification of life cycle costs (LCC) of macroeconomic policies, approaches to resolve these conflicts. Whatever country fails in implementing above approaches to correct deviation in relative prices, central bank should use its governance power more to control market forces in the banking system.

Jean Tirole, the Nobel Prize winner in Economic Sciences in 2014, who in November 2018 visited the Financial university in Moscow, presents one of the most striking examples of the evolution currently experienced by some modern economists. He started his career as an economist at the time of rapid development of theories of regulation and competition policy. It was also the time of intensive development of industrial organisation (industrial economy), and especially its branch oriented to the public policy issues — economic regulation, antitrust law, and, more generally, economic governance of law in defning property rights, enforcing contracts, and providing organisational infrastructure. The progress in these areas reflected two methodological breakthroughs: the game theory and the theory of mechanism design. The widening use of game theory in industrial economics led to the migration of its achievements into other branches of microeconomics, such as behavioural economics and corporate fnance. In 1978, Jean Tirole left for the uSA to get a PhD in Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). He began his formation as an economist. The article tells about Jean Tirole’s way from an engineer and mathematician to the world-class economist. The author has paid special attention to the traditions of the French economic science, which had a considerable impact on the main areas of scientifc interests of Jean Tirole. Tirole’s managerial skills allowed to build an entire scientifc school around him both at the university of Toulouse and the Jean-Jaques Laffont Foundation, and in the newly formed Institute for Advanced Research.

Game theory is an important analytical tool for measuring problems caused by behaviors that deviate from contractual ethics. However, the PPP literature still does little to explore this research topic. This paper analyzes and improves the equilibrium conditions of a renegotiation model of PPPs by introducing the asymmetry of information in the contract. To achieve this goal, the Mechanism Design Theory is used to demonstrate how the correct tracking of the investor directly influences the payoffs of the renegotiation. The study concludes that the lack of incentive constraints in the bidding document, as an ex ante condition, does not provide sufficient information on investor management capability. In this way, this information is only revealed in the renegotiation phase. Consequently, this contract failure results in high political costs to the government due to excessive subsidies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a novel approach for designing and optimizing maintenance service contracts through the application of mechanism design theory. When offering a contract to its customer, the maintenance service provider seeks to specify contract terms – such as price, service features and incentives – that maximize the provider's profit, satisfy customer needs, allocate risks effectively and mitigate moral hazards. Optimal contract design has to account for asymmetric information and uncertainties associated with customer characteristics and behaviors. We illustrate our mechanism design approach by applying it to the contract design challenge of a gas turbine manufacturer, which also provides maintenance services for its aircraft engines. In our solution approach, we compute an optimal set of contracts. The entire set is presented to the customer and is designed such that the customer will accept one of the contract alternatives without negotiations. In addition to eliminating the costs and delays associated with negotiations, this approach also reveals the customer's private information to the service provider, which the provider can use to its benefit in maintenance management and future contract renewals. Furthermore, we design and incorporate win–win incentive mechanisms into the contracts, which reward the customer for actions that reduce maintenance costs. We present a deterministic and a stochastic mechanism design model, the latter accounting for uncertainties associated with customer actions, engine performance, and maintenance costs during the contract execution phase. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The economics of information is a broad field covering all aspects of information including decision making, We briefly describe 4 methods used to model the decision-making process. This is not an exhaustive list of the methods used to value information, nor are differences between the methods clearly definable. Examples of previous studies using each methodology are presented, as are tradeoffs between the methodologies. Climate forecast issues are generally treated by economists as applied problems. Though applied studies are extremely important, we believe climate forecast issues have the potential for more innovative and rigorous treatment that could lead to theoretical advances in the economics of information. Several examples of researchable issues that we believe could lead to such advances (e.g. the use of climate forecasts in pollution trading; natural disaster mitigation) are then discussed. Maximum benefits can be attained from such a research process that involves policy-makers and end-users, as well as other scientists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]