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In this paper, we consider the concepts of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), neighborhood invader strategy (NIS) and global invader strategy (GIS) in single species with frequency-dependent interactions. We find some general relationships among the three concepts in matrix games. The main conclusion is that ESS and NIS are equivalent to each other and are both equivalent to local superiority; a strategy with global superiority must be a GIS; a GIS may not be equivalent to its global superiority in games with more than two players; and in any two-player matrix game a GIS is just equivalent to its global superiority. In two-player games, globally asymptotic stability in the replicator dynamics has also been shown. Equivalent conditions for the three concepts stated by payoff comparisons are given and are applied to examples involved.

This paper uses the data envelopment analysis (DEA) approach to solve the issue of allocating fixed costs among a set of decision-making units (DMUs) with two-stage network structure. Fixed cost allocation is a prominent issue that is encountered by organizations, and it is one of the most important applications of DEA. It exists not only in single-stage systems but in two-stage network systems, such as bank systems in real situations, which comprises the deposits process and lending process. However, branch banks often compete with one another out of self-interest. The objective of this paper is to design a fair allocation scheme for two-stage network systems and considering the noncooperative game relationship among DMUs. The idea of satisfaction degree and noncooperative game theory is integrated into the proposed allocation model. In the noncooperative framework, we define a DMU's payoff as the product of two substage satisfaction degree, and every member is noncooperative and selfishly seeks to maximize its own payoff. The allocation plan to DMUs and substages is determined by the final competition payoff. A real case is analyzed to illustrate the applicability of the proposed approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we study the dynamics of a two-team Bertrand game with players having heterogeneous expectations. We study the equilibrium solutions and the conditions of their locally asymptotic stability. Numerical simulations are used to illustrate the complex behaviours of the proposed model of the Bertrand game. We demonstrate that some parameters of the model have great influence on the stability of Nash equilibrium and on the speed of convergence to Nash equilibrium. The chaotic behaviour of the model has been controlled by using feedback control method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]