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We model mental states as part of an equilibrium notion. In a mental equilibrium each player "selects" an emotional state that determines the player's preferences over the outcomes of the game. These preferences typically differ from the players' material preferences. The emotional states interact to play a Nash equilibrium and, in addition, each player's mental state must be a best response to the mental states of the others (in the sense of maximizing material payoffs). We discuss the concept behind the definition of mental equilibrium and examine it in the context of some of the most popular games discussed in the experimental economics literature. In particular, our approach allows us to identify the mental states (the psychology) that lead players to play various prominent experimental outcomes. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for mental equilibria to be sustained by material preferences. Finally, we discuss the concept of collective emotions, which is based on the idea that players can coordinate their mental states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this study is to identify and characterize the parts of an extensive form game that are 'relevant' to determining whether the outcome of a certain strategy profile is an equilibrium outcome. We formally define what we mean by 'relevant' and refer to the associated collection of information sets as essential. We apply this idea to a number of classic equilibrium concepts and discuss some implications of our approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We define and study games with upper bounds. In one of these games there are upper bounds on the possible payoffs for some coalitions. These restrictions require adjustments in the definitions of solution concepts. In the current paper we study the effect of the restrictions on the core and define and study the so-called truncated core. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose a method to associate a coalitional interval game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower and upper values of finite two-person zero-sum games. Associating with a strategic game a coalitional interval game we avoid having to take either a pessimistic or an optimistic approach to the problem. The paper makes two contributions to the literature: It provides a theoretical foundation for the study of coalitional interval games and it also provides, studies, and characterizes a natural method of associating coalitional interval games with strategic games. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose an elementary game form that allows to obtain the allocations proposed by any acceptable bankruptcy rule as the unique payoff vector of the corresponding Nash equilibria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we propose a new method to associate a coalitional game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower value of finite two-player zero-sum games. We axiomatically characterize this new method, as well as the method that was described in Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). As an intermediate step, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the value and the lower value of matrix games and finite two-player zero-sum games, respectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we analyze how to improve the benefits of n producers when: (1) each producer i faces a linear production problem given by max { c i x i: A i x i≤ b i, x i 0}, and (2) maintaining the production capabilities of each producer is mandatory. In order to maximize the benefits, the producers decide to trade their resources while ensuring their initial individual gains. We study the games which describe this non-centralized linear production situation when players do not cooperate (section two), when players cooperate and side payments are possible (section three), and when players cooperate and side payments are not possible (section four). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this note we show that the mathematical tools of cooperative game theory allow a successful approach to the statistical problem of estimating a density function. Specifically, any random sample of an absolutely continuous random variable determines a transferable utility game, the Shapley value of which proves to be an estimator of the density function of binned kernel and WARPing types, with good computational and statistical properties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inventory cost games are introduced in Meca et al. (1999). These games arise when considering the possibility of joint ordering in n-person EOQ inventory situations. Moreover, the SOC-rule is introduced and analysed as a cost allocation rule for this type of situations. In the current paper it is seen that n-person EPQ situations with shortages lead to exactly the same class of cost games. Furthermore, an alternative characterization of the SOC-rule is offered, primarily based on a transfer property which constitutes a special form of additivity. Necessary input variables for the SOC-rule are the (optimal) individual average number of orders per time unit in case there is no cooperation. Assuming that these average numbers are observable but not verifiable, we allow the players to select them strategically, while knowing that the SOC-rule will be (consecutively) applied as the cost allocation principle. Necessary and sufficient conditions are provided for the existence (and uniqueness) of a so-called constructive equilibrium in which all players make joint orders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A class of cooperative TU-games arising from shortest path problems is introduced and analyzed. Some conditions under which a shortest path game is balanced are obtained. Also an axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value for this class of games is provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Considers finitely repeated games in which players can make unilateral commitments regarding their sets of strategies. Assumption that each player can restrict his original set of strategies in a preliminary round of the repeated game; Indication that if n-person strategic game is repeated a large enough number of times and players can restrict their strategy sets in a preliminary round of the game.

In this paper, we modify the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma by adding an initial round in which the players have the option of simultaneously, unilaterally and publicly committing themselves, in an enforceable way, to a subset of their strategies. We show that when a large enough number of repetitions of the prisoners' dilemma follow this initial commitment round, then not only do the players have incentives to commit themselves to a limited strategy set, but there is also a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in which both players act cooperatively throughout the post-commitment stages of the game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Provides an overview of the papers presented in the journal "Annals of Operations Research," vol. 109, no. 13, series of 2002, which focused on game theory.

A new coalitional value is proposed under the hypothesis of isolated unions. The main difference between this value and the Aumann–Drèze value is that the allocations within each union are not given by the Shapley value of the restricted game but proportionally to the Shapley value of the original game. Axiomatic characterizations of the new value, examples illustrating its application and a comparative discussion are provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]