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Much research has in recent years been devoted to better our understanding of the intricate relationships between ecology and the evolutionary success of species. These explorations have often focused on understanding the complex interplay among ecological factors and evolutionary rhythms of the species in various environments. Central to these studies is the concept of the survival of the fittest, proposed by Charles Darwin, where evolutionary circumstances, often portrayed as social dilemmas, favour the welfare of self-interested over others. To further advance this line of research, we here develop a theoretical framework that features three interconnected traits in an evolutionary setting, namely: prey, predator and parasite, each adopting distinct strategies akin to a social dilemma and resembling a Rock-Paper-Scissors scenario. These traits, which we term strategic species, adhere to the eco-evolutionary game dynamics. We further extend our analysis by conducting a sensitivity assessment of the system's payoff parameters using the Sobol indices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Information was obtained through an interview with a headmaster and regional coordinator, revealing that the subject was manipulated within a game. The convergence of the research results shows collaboration in the game theory algorithm, which directs the subject to a decision determined by the scenario maker. Game theory is an incremental derivative model designed to minimize alternative complexity. The research employed a qualitative approach, incorporating historical research and focused interviews. This context applies to the subject, namely student alumni who are classified as idealists with substandard economic backgrounds. Conflict arises by implanting memories with the aim of prompting the subject participates in competing for his welfare through the state civil service appointment (ASN) via the government employees with employment agreements (PPPK)/candidates for civil servants (CPNS) test. Game modeling in the form of model schools with Ericsonian heterosuggestions places the subject to a prisoner’s dilemma situation. A weakness is identified when the game cannot be used to make decisions with different matrix orders. Game theory effectively instills belief in passion and subject free will in the final decision because the decision objectives differ between scenario makers, leading to the best alternative and the subject satisfaction factor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the current process of social and economic development, the cost of living and property management is continuously increasing. In order to maintain the normal operation of property management and provide high-quality services, it is necessary to adjust the property fees reasonably. If the property fees cannot be adjusted for a long time, it will have a detrimental impact on the development of the community. However, the traditional regulatory model has failed to accurately define the quality of property services, leading to information asymmetry and a lack of trust between the two parties, resulting in a deadlock in property fee adjustments. With the rise of intelligent management, a new direction for property fee adjustments has been provided. This article first analyzes the pricing dilemma under traditional regulation through game theory. Then, based on the theory of "Smart regulatory", it proposes the idea of constructing a "Smart regulatory" platform and explores the feasibility of this model using game theory and Matlab simulations. The study found that the "Smart regulatory" platform can resolve information asymmetry and encourage both parties to cooperate in the game. After the establishment of the platform, property fee adjustments are influenced by government supervision, government penalties, and the magnitude of property fee increase. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores asymmetric volunteer dilemma games in which players incur different costs for volunteering. Diekmann (1993) conjectures that a player with less cost is more likely to contribute at the equilibrium if it is risk dominant. We have re-examined this hypothesis theoretically and experimentally and found that even when focusing on risk-dominant equilibria, the explanatory power of the theory is not universal. An econometric comparison among several behavioral models including regret aversion shows that quantal response equilibrium best explains the data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The traveler's dilemma is characterized by a strict Nash equilibrium that is Pareto-inefficient. Even though a coordinated choice of more efficient options would be preferred by both players, any individual deviation from Nash behavior will induce a lower payoff. Yet experimental behavior reported in the literature demonstrates that deviations from Nash behavior toward Pareto-better outcomes are typical. An application of the sampling dynamics to this dilemma further justifies the non-Nash behavior. Due to the fact, that the sampling dynamics is not payoff-monotonic, even dominated strategies can survive the selection process. It is shown that for a generalized traveler's dilemma an interior equilibrium attracts almost all trajectories, given that there are sufficiently many options. The limit for infinitely many options is derived. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the optional prisoner's dilemma (OPD), players can choose to cooperate and defect as usual, but can also abstain as a third possible strategy. This strategy models the players' participation in the game and is a relevant aspect in many settings, for example, social networks or opinion dynamics, for example, during an election abstention is an option. In this article, we provide a formulation of the OPD where we consider irrational behaviors in the population, inspired by prospect theory. Prospect theory has gained increasing popularity in recent times because it can capture aspects such as reference dependence or loss aversion, which are common in human behavior. This element is original in our formulation of the game and is incorporated in our framework through pairwise comparison dynamics. Recently, the impact of the environment has been studied in the form of feedback on the population dynamics. Another element of novelty in our work is the extension of the game‐environment feedback to the OPD in two forms of dynamics, the replicator and the pairwise comparison. The contribution of this article is threefold. First, we propose a modeling framework where prospect theory is used to capture irrational behaviors in an evolutionary game with game‐environment feedback. Second, we carry out the stability analysis of the system equilibria and discuss the oscillating behaviors arising from the game‐environment feedback. Finally, we extend our previous results to the OPD and we discuss the main differences between the model resulting from the replicator dynamics and the one resulting from the pairwise comparison dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focusing on the behavior and outcomes, Prisoner's dilemma research rarely encompasses the examination of the effects of (un)awareness. To bridge the research gap, the aim is to outline the deviations that stem from the (un)awareness and to assess its impact on the in-game reasoning, outcome, and modeling. More precisely, through a thought experiment, the overview conceptually encompasses the effects of (un)awareness of game elements (actions, players, and payoffs), differing between awareness in a narrow and broad sense. The deviations due to (un)awareness of game elements show how the game can deviate from the proposed model, whereby unawareness and skewed awareness of the players bear the most prominent differences. Compiling the most notable deviations provokes second thoughts on game theory modeling. The findings on each deviation are shortly discussed and extended to two practical examples to illustrate possible implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Journal for Business, Economics & Ethics / Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts und Unternehmensethik is the property of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Human beings collaborate when organized in an unchanging network of social relationships and if the advantage of collaboration surpasses the entire cost of collaboration with all neighbours. Cooperation may be seen in community and natural systems when selfless action is rewarded despite the risk of exclusion. Trust between neighbours is crucial since cooperative behaviour spreads more rapidly and efficiently in environments with a high trust rating. In this paper, we introduce an alternative neighbourhood communication topology to enhance the level of trust between n prisoner's dilemma players and promote cooperative behaviour. The proposed topology allows players to communicate with their local neighbours and share their experiences within the universe of other players that are not locally connected. To understand the overall players' behaviour locally and globally, the topology is supported by a knowledge base accessible by all players. Our topology was tested against five other communication topologies over four 1000-game tournaments. The results show that our model outperforms other strategies in promoting cooperative behaviour among participating players in small and large populations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Computational social science is being scrutinised and some concerns have been expressed with regards to the lack of transparency and inclusivity in some of the researches. However, how computational social science can be reformulated to adopt participatory and inclusive practices? And, furthermore, which aspects shall be carefully considered to make possible this reformulation? We present a practical case that addresses the challenge of collectively studying social interactions within community-based mental health care. This study is done by revisiting and revising social science methods such as social dilemmas and game theory and by incorporating the use of digital interfaces to run experiments in-the-field. The research can be framed within the emergent citizen social science or social citizen science where shared practices are still lacking. We have identified five key steps of the research process to be considered to introduce participatory and inclusive practices: research framing, research design, experimental spaces, data sources, and actionable knowledge. Social dilemmas and game theory methods and protocols need to be reconsidered as an experiential activity that enables participants to self-reflect. Co-design dynamics and the building of a working group outside the academia are important to initiate socially robust knowledge co-production. Research results should support evidence-based policies and collective actions put forward by the civil society. The inclusion of underserved groups is discussed as a way forward to new avenues of computational social science jointly with intricate ethical aspects. Finally, the paper also provides some reflections to explore the particularities of a further enhancement of social dimensions in citizen science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates training in sports and argues (and demonstrates) that training (gametheoretically) works exactly as doping do. That is, the Nash equilibrium is, under reasonable assumptions, a Prisoner's Dilemma outcome. Furthermore, several other performance improving categories within sport are examined, and proven to behave similarly. Finally, a link to general competitive economic activity is examined and proven NOT (necessarily) to have similar characteristics. The article also discusses (initially) the Prisoner's Dilemma game and its lack of a sensible definition. Such a definition is proposed, although this proposition is not considered the main finding in the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In biological evolution, organisms that are more adapted to the environment tend to survive better, which can be explained in part by evolutionary game theory. In this paper, we propose an improved spatial prisoner's dilemma game model, which allows the focal player to access the strategy of other agents beyond their nearest neighbors with a specified probability. During the strategy update, a focal player usually picks up a randomly chosen neighbor according to a Fermi-like rule. However, in our model, unlike the traditional strategy imitation, a focal agent will decide to update their strategy through the modified rule with a specific probability q. In this case, the focal agent accesses n other individuals who have the same strategy as the imitated neighbor, where the information accessing cost needs to be paid, and then compares their discounted payoff with the average payoff of those n + 1 agents to make the decision of strategy adoption; otherwise, they only refer to their own payoff and their neighbor's payoff to decide whether the strategy spread happens. Numerical simulations indicate that a moderate value of n can foster the evolution of cooperation very well, and increase in q will also improve the dilemma of cooperators. In addition, there exists an optimal product of n × c to cause the emergence of cooperation under the specific simulation setup. Taken together, the current results are conducive to understanding the evolution of cooperation within a structured population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes two interpretations of the concept of belief hierarchies in Bayesian game theory: the behaviorist interpretation and the mentalist interpretation. On the former, belief hierarchies are derived from the players' preferences over acts. On the latter, they are causal mechanisms that are responsible for the players' choices and preferences over acts. The claim is that the epistemic program in game theory is potentially confronted with a dilemma regarding which interpretation should be adopted. If the behaviorist interpretation of belief hierarchies is retained, then Bayesian game theory cannot account for the players' reasoning that leads to the generation of specific belief hierarchies and thus to the implementation of a specific strategy profile in a game. If the mentalist interpretation is retained, then belief hierarchies appear to be unnecessarily and unrealistically complex objects and that as a result they fail to provide reasonable epistemic foundations for various solution concepts. In other words, neither interpretation seems to allow the epistemic program to fulfill all its aims. I suggest however that the mentalist interpretation can be arranged to escape this dilemma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social dilemmas are situations in which collective welfare is at odds with individual gain. One widely studied example, due to the conflict it poses between human behaviour and game theoretic reasoning, is the Traveler's Dilemma. The dilemma relies on the players' incentive to undercut their opponent at the expense of losing a collective high payoff. Such individual incentive leads players to a systematic mutual undercutting until the lowest possible payoff is reached, which is the game's unique Nash equilibrium. However, if players were satisfied with a high payoff -that is not necessarily higher than their opponent's- they would both be better off individually and collectively. Here, we explain how it is possible to converge to this cooperative high payoff equilibrium. Our analysis focuses on decomposing the dilemma into a local and a global game. We show that players need to escape the local maximisation and jump to the global game, in order to reach the cooperative equilibrium. Using a dynamic approach, based on evolutionary game theory and learning theory models, we find that diversity, understood as the presence of suboptimal strategies, is the general mechanism that enables the jump towards cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today, people rely heavily on infrastructure networks. Attacks on infrastructure networks can lead to significant property damage and production stagnation. The game theory provides a suitable theoretical framework for solving the problem of infrastructure protection. Existing models consider only the beneficial effects that the defender obtains from information gaps. If the attacker's countermeasures are ignored, the defender will become passive. Herein, we consider that a proficient attacker with a probability in the game can fill information gaps in the network. First, we introduce the link-hiding rule and the information dilemma. Second, based on the Bayesian static game model, we establish an attack–defense game model with multiple types of attackers. In the game model, we consider resource-consistent and different types of distributions of the attacker. Then, we introduce the solution method of our model by combining the Harsanyi transformation and the bi-matrix game. Finally, we conduct experiments using a scale-free network. The result shows that the defender can be benefited by hiding some links when facing a normal attacker or by estimating the distribution of the attacker correctly. The defender will experience a loss if it ignores the proficient attacker or misestimates the distribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Innovation and entrepreneurship education (IEE) is a powerful driving force to promote the transformation and development of college education and an effective way to broaden the employment channels. However, IEE has been used to train students in classrooms by college managers who do not systematically think of practical training for innovation and entrepreneurship talents. There are still many difficulties in the process of development of IEE that managers cannot ignore. The relevant models that could deeply analyze the connotation of IEE were established through the game theory that explained the game balance among government, universities, and students in the IEE process. A game theory model explained the external game behavior of universities and students and the internal game behavior between students. Another model analyzed the strategies of players pursuing maximum payoffs from the perspective of both sides of the game and the influences of these strategies on the players. The problems in the process of IEE development are concluded including imperfect management system, unscientific curriculum design, nonideal talent training and unprofessional teachers. Based on it, the development path of IEE is explored through the game concept. A scientific and leading system of management and evaluation is needed to put forward by strengthening the top-level design at the national level, and a win-win game situation between colleges and students will be achieved by the optimized education system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Exploring the emergence of cooperation in the populations of self-interested individuals is of huge challenge. Evolutionary game theory has been utilized to investigate the evolution of cooperation. In recent years, many researchers have paid massive attention on the evolution of cooperative behavior from the perspective of multiple games, especially the transition of games. Nevertheless, not only are the current interactive actions crucial, but also the historical interactive experience is fateful. Motivated by this, the persistence-based game transition mechanism is proposed and introduced to investigate the evolution of cooperation, where both the current pairwise strategies and the persistence of the pairwise strategies determine the game played in the next time step. Through analyzing the evolutionary results of strategies and games, we find that the cooperation can be facilitated by the enhanced network reciprocity as the persistence-based game transition makes mutual cooperators play games with weak dilemma more persistently. • A persistence-based game transition is proposed in multi-games. • In our model, both pairwise interactive strategies and the persistence of pairwise strategies determine the game transition. • The persistence-based game transition can facilitate cooperation through enhancing network reciprocity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We establish a game model in the setting of competing supply chains, where either supply chain contains a manufacturer (leader) and a potentially capital-constrained retailer (follower). Our work endeavors to pursue an economic-environmental coexistence of manufacturers' equilibrium emission-reduction investment strategies, and considers a realistic issue of retailer(s) capital constraint(s) leading to three scenarios: no retailers/only one retailer/both retailers financing (trade credit/bank credit). To comprehensively discuss the environmental performance of manufacturers' investments, the unit-emission index (UEI) and total-emission index (TEI) are introduced together. We find that manufacturers' investment strategies mainly depend on the product's original carbon emission, and retailers' financing decisions rely on the carbon tax rate. From the economic perspective, compared with retailers having no capital constraints, retailer(s) having capital constraint(s) can promote the emission-reduction investments of both manufacturers. From the environmental perspective, investments can inevitably reduce emissions if UEI is implemented, whereas investments possibly increase emissions if TEI is implemented because terminal demand is enlarged by the green sensitivity of consumers. Surprisingly, there exists a "Prisoner's Dilemma" if both manufacturers employ investments at a particularly low carbon tax rate. Admittedly, despite both manufacturers resorting to abandoning investments can crack prisoner's dilemma, such a crack shrinks the economic-environmental coexistence of manufacturers' investments, and hence manufacturers complying with prisoner's dilemma might result in "a fault on the right side." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An emerging computational paradigm, named federated edge learning (FEL), enables intelligent computing at the network edge with the feature of preserving data privacy for edge devices. Given their constrained resources, it becomes a great challenge to achieve high execution performance for FEL. Most of the state-of-the-arts concentrate on enhancing FEL from the perspective of system operation procedures, taking few precautions during the composition step of the FEL system. Though a few recent studies recognize the importance of FEL formation and propose server-centric device selection schemes, the impact of data sizes is largely overlooked. In this paper, we take advantage of game theory to depict the decision dilemma among edge devices regarding whether to participate in FEL or not given their heterogeneous sizes of local datasets. For realizing both the individual and global optimization, the server is employed to solve the participation dilemma, which requires accurate information collection for devices’ local datasets. Hence, we utilize mechanism design to enable truthful information solicitation. With the help of correlated equilibrium, we derive a decision making strategy for devices from the global perspective, which can achieve the long-term stability and efficacy of FEL. For scalability consideration, we optimize the computational complexity of the basic solution to the polynomial level. Lastly, extensive experiments based on both real and synthetic data are conducted to evaluate our proposed mechanisms, with experimental results demonstrating the performance advantages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, we examine how tradition and sustainability were preserved in Hahoe Village over the course of modernization, using the analytic narrative method. Combining historical and ethnographic narratives with game theoretic analysis, we try to understand the distinctive character of Hahoe Village, resulting from systems of norms, beliefs, and checks and balances between traditional, semi-traditional, and modern institutions for managing its tangible and intangible cultural and natural resources. In the game theory analysis, we assume that Hahoe Village's current condition resulted from repeated interactions between two groups of individuals: tradition-oriented agents and market-oriented agents. We formulate the payoff structure underlying responses to the social dilemma of managing Hahoe Village's common resources based on the affordability hypothesis and shared mental model hypothesis. We find that the preservation of Hahoe Village's traditions was closely connected to the successful institutionalization of tradition and sustainability through what can be termed the "tradition game." We specify the characteristics of Hahoe Village's sustainable institutions and argue that their sustainability gradually shifted from embedded sustainability to institutional sustainability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the prisoner's dilemma in the context of interactions between Libya's Tripoli- and Tobruk-led actors in the period between Gaddafi's 2011 ousting and the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement. In so doing, it reveals the extent to which Libyan decisions aligned with the game's principal outcome-maximizing strategy to ascertain authority and a non-outcome-maximizing strategy's conflict resolution-throughcooperation goal. In contrast to the game's assumptions, however, the findings convey how negotiations between the two players were driven by contextual factors, predominantly: Libya's historical makeup, internal-external links, and hydrocarbon control. This informs my contention that the complexities of the Libya case study demonstrate the limits of the prisoner's dilemma in illuminating the dynamics of a given political phenomenon. As a result, this account presents a novel Libya-specific blueprint of the prisoner's dilemma that highlights the limitations of this framework and concludes with a reflection on what this means for understanding this type of game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cooperative behavior can contribute to the development of society. Evolutionary game theory is a fundamental framework for studying cooperative behavior. This article explores the evolutionary dynamics of the three-faced strategy, which can demonstrate its different attribute behaviors according to different types of objects encountered by paying a certain role-switching cost. When three-faced individuals encounter cooperators, they will show defection behavior; when they interact with defectors, they will show punishment behavior; and when they meet the same kind, they will show cooperative behavior. The results show that the presence of three-faced individuals can effectively suppress defectors when the cost of role-switching is small or when the government gives relatively high incentives. Moreover, the moderate role-switching cost enhances the maintenance and emergence of cooperators. Additionally, as the system is in a stable state, which is full of three-faced individuals, the behavior displayed by the three-faced individuals at this time is consistent with that of the cooperators, which also promotes cooperative behavior in the population to some extent. • Three-faced individuals show three attribute behaviors based on different objects. • System stability with three-faced individuals prompts population-wide cooperation. • Three-faced individuals suppress defectors under certain conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use epistemic game theory to explore rationales behind cooperative behaviors in the finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. For a class of type structures that are sufficiently rich, the set of outcomes that can arise when each player i is rational and satisfies (m i - 1) th order strong belief of rationality is the set of paths on which each player i defects in the last m i rounds. We construct one sufficiently rich type structure to elaborate on how different patterns of cooperative behaviors arise under sufficiently weak epistemic conditions. In this type structure, the optimality of forgiving the opponent's past defection and the belief that one's defection will be forgiven account for the richness of the set of behavior outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The overexploitation of common pool resources is frequently associated with open access regimes in which each resource user operates independently of all other resource users. The outcome is a Nash equilibrium of the prisoner's dilemma. Restricted access regimes of the sort identified by Ostrom and colleagues typically ensure that individual resource users do not operate independently. Taking a quantum approach to the theory of games, we argue that the institutional arrangements involved in common pool resource management imply the "entanglement" of the strategies of resource users. For a very simple case — two firms exploiting a common pool fishery — we show that there exists an "entanglement" mechanism that assures the cooperative outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction/Main Objectives: This paper aims to explain Indonesia's water rights dilemma and propose a potential solution to solve it using the Coasian and game theory approaches. Background Problems: Developing a mechanism that supports the citizens (and farmers) in the area surrounding water plants, maintains firm productivity, builds social cohesion, and promotes environmental improvement remains an ongoing concern. Novelty: This study utilizes the Coasian and game theory approaches to solve Indonesia's water rights dilemma. Research Methods: This research employs a game theory simulation representing the Coasian strategy in handling externalities. Findings/Results: The implementation of Coasian bargaining might be promising in solving the water rights dilemma in Indonesia. The necessary condition is high farmer commitment during the bargaining process, and the sufficient condition is a reduction of transaction costs. Conclusion: The strategies in lowering transaction costs can be accomplished by establishing an independent multidisciplinary research team, involving a government element as a mediatory body, and creating an advisory firm. This research team would aim to close the gap in institutional deficiency. The government would have a significant role in reducing the transaction cost by defining, enforcing, and transferring property rights. Lastly, the advisory firm would help to focus all business activities, operationalize agreements, and conduct monitoring. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pastoralists in Western Mongolia face a range of challenges during their annual grazing cycle due to the simultaneous but conflicting needs for secure allocation rules and a high degree of flexibility. In this paper, I analyze the seasonal arrangements and corresponding strategies that households adopt to deal with unpredictable environmental conditions and the demands of supplying livestock with sufficient forage throughout the year. In contrast to game theory simulations, I argue that dilemmas are: a) often not a question of cooperating or not, but form continua of more or less; and b) socially embedded as people operate in a multitude of relationships that influence their decision-making. Therefore, sharing information in a manner that prioritizes the requirements of individual households while not jeopardizing social reputation is crucially important. Rhetorical skills play an important role in this regard, but there are also situations when herders blatantly ignore state law or local institutional arrangements and risk confrontation to ensure the survival of livestock leading to a situation where free-riding may at times become the dominant strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most games in the real world are asymmetric, and participants can have different conditions or strategies, depending on the available resources. In this work, the quantum prisoner's dilemma with two dilemma strength parameters is studied. Two examples of asymmetric strategy spaces are considered. We show that, most of the obtained Nash equilibria are not Pareto optimal. Therefore, the classical dilemma can still exist in the quantum regime with asymmetric strategy spaces. These results can be applied to real-world situations, when global issues requiring the interaction of agents from different environments exist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evolutionary game theory assumes that players replicate a highly scored player's strategy through genetic inheritance. However, when learning occurs culturally, it is often difficult to recognize someone's strategy just by observing the behaviour. In this work, we consider players with memory-one stochastic strategies in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, with an assumption that they cannot directly access each other's strategy but only observe the actual moves for a certain number of rounds. Based on the observation, the observer has to infer the resident strategy in a Bayesian way and chooses his or her own strategy accordingly. By examining the best-response relations, we argue that players can escape from full defection into a cooperative equilibrium supported by Win-Stay-Lose-Shift in a self-confirming manner, provided that the cost of cooperation is low and the observational learning supplies sufficiently large uncertainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditionally, epistemologists have distinguished between epistemic and pragmatic goals. In so doing, they presume that much of game theory is irrelevant to epistemic enterprises. I will show that this is a mistake. Even if we restrict attention to purely epistemic motivations, members of epistemic groups will face a multitude of strategic choices. I illustrate several contexts where individuals who are concerned solely with the discovery of truth will nonetheless face difficult game theoretic problems. Examples of purely epistemic coordination problems and social dilemmas will be presented. These show that there is a far deeper connection between economics and epistemology than previous appreciated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies on gaming have made fruitful progress in diagnosing the problem and offering prescriptions for its mitigation. However, little is known about the actual reform efforts to curb gaming and the effectiveness of these strategies. This study contributes to the existing literature by examining the challenges of and strategies for mitigating distortion of performance data in Chinese local government in the past decade or so. It argues that curbing pernicious gaming such as information distortion is an uphill battle because it comes with a heavy political cost. In China, tackling the root cause of information distortion would jeopardize the key function of performance measurement, which is to ensure local compliance with the policy goals set by the authorities at the upper levels. Therefore, information distortion is selectively tackled and also selectively tolerated. This is achieved by concentrating on reducing distortion of key performance data that is vital for policymaking through strategies such as strengthening the state's ability to collect raw data directly and building up accountability in the statistical system. This study shows that those engaged in fighting gaming must make a tradeoff between reaping the benefits of performance management and reducing its associated risks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Game theorists recommend the strategy of the Pax Romana: if you want peace, prepare for war. It is conditional aggressiveness. The better alternative is the conditional generosity that the European Union (EU) practices with great success. These strategies may belong to the game known as the repeated prisoner's dilemma: peace (or mutual cooperation) rests on a threat to punish; to that end, players should maintain their threat. In the repeated prisoner's dilemma, the best response to the strategy of "always cooperate" is to always defect. Yet, these strategies may belong to the game known as the stag hunt. In it, the best response to the strategy of "always cooperate" is cooperating with the other player through each round of the game. The game played by the European Union, we contend, is nearer to the stag hunt game than to the prisoner's dilemma game. Every European Union country recently (rightly, of course) recognizes peace as best--and thus as better than an attack on a defenseless neighbor that would lead to an immediate victory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Logistics providers have to utilize available capacities efficiently in order to cope with increasing competition and desired quality of service. One possibility to reduce idle capacity is to build coalitions with other players on the market. While the willingness to enter such coalitions does exist in the logistics industry, the success of collaborations strongly depends on mutual trust and behavior of participants. Hence, a proper mechanism design, where carriers do not have incentives to deviate from jointly established rules, is needed. We propose to use a combinatorial auction system, for which several properties are already well researched but little is known about the auction's first phase, where carriers have to decide on the set of requests offered to the auction. Profitable selection strategies, aiming at maximization of total collaboration gains, do exist. However, the impact on individual outcomes, if one or more players deviate from jointly agreed selection rules is yet to be researched. We analyze whether participants in an auction-based transport collaboration face a Prisoners' Dilemma. While it is possible to construct such a setting, our computational study reveals that carriers do not profit from declining the cooperative strategy. This is an important and insightful finding, since it further strengthens the practical applicability of auction-based trading mechanisms in collaborative transportation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mutualistic interactions between species are ubiquitous in nature and essential for ecosystem functioning. Often dozens or even hundreds of species with different degrees of specialisation form complex networks. How this complexity evolves is a fundamental question in ecology. Here, we present a new game theoretical approach to model complex coevolutionary processes and apply it to pollination networks. A theoretical analysis reveals multiple evolutionary stable network structures that depend on the availability of pollination service. In particular, we find efficient communities, in which a high percentage of pollen are transported conspecifically, to evolve only when plant and pollinator abundances are well balanced. Both pollinator shortage and oversupply select for more inefficient network structures. The results suggest that availability of pollination services is a key factor structuring pollination networks and may offer a new explanation for geographical differences in pollination communities that have long been recognised by ecologists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The neuropeptides oxytocin and vasopressin have been repeatedly implicated in social decision making by enhancing social salience and, generally, cooperation. The iterated and sequential version of the prisoner's dilemma (PD) game is a social dilemma paradigm eliciting strategies of cooperation versus competition.Aims: We aimed to characterise the role of PD players' sex, game partner type (computer vs. human) and oxytocin or vasopressin inhalation on the player's strategy preference.Methods: Participants (153 men; 151 women) were randomised to intranasal 24 IU oxytocin, 20 IU vasopressin or placebo, double-blind, and played the PD. We examined main and interactive effects of sex, drug and partner type on strategy preference.Results: We found a pervasive preference for a tit-for-tat strategy (i.e. general sensitivity to the partner's choices) over unconditional cooperation, particularly when against a human rather than a computer partner. Oxytocin doubled this sensitivity in women (i.e. the preference for tit-for-tat over unconditional cooperation strategies) when playing against computers, which suggests a tendency to anthropomorphise them, and doubled women's unconditional cooperation preference when playing against humans. Vasopressin doubled sensitivity to the partner's previous choices (i.e. for tit-for-tat over unconditional cooperation) across sexes and partner types.Conclusions: These findings suggest that women may be more sensitive to oxytocin's social effects of anthropomorphism of non-humans and of unconditional cooperation with humans, which may be consistent with evolutionary pressures for maternal care, and that vasopressin, irrespective of sex and partner type, may be generally sensitising humans to others' behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since mathematician John von Neumann and economist Oskar Morgenstern introduced the theory of games as a branch of modern mathematics into Economics, it has become rather prevalent, and it is even thought to be able to rewrite the whole microeconomics, that is to say, replace the frame of economic theory found by Marshall in "Principles of Economics". But this paper will show that there are two frauds in the "Prisoners' Dilemma", one of the classical models in the theory of games. One is the missing calculation of costs of "cooperative solution", the other is invalidity of "cooperative solution" when adopted to explain the phenomenon in economy or business field, because of misleading by the wrong definition of Monopoly. Oligarchs cannot increase the monophonic degree, even if they cooperate or collide to decrease the productions. But the fundamental problem of the prisoners' dilemma lies in ad hoc theory. There are transaction costs in cooperation, which is the key constraint. Some special ways (such as repeated game) to decrease transaction costs in special cases are not key factors. This problem exists in all models of the theory of games, so it is its Achilles' heel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Smartphone use changes the landscape of social interactions, including introducing new social dilemmas to daily life. The challenge of putting down one's smartphone is an example of a classic coordination problem from game theory: the stag hunt game. In a stag hunt game, there are two possible coordination points, one that involves big payoffs for both partners (e.g., working together to hunt large game like stag) and one that involves smaller payoffs for both partners (e.g., individually hunting small game like rabbits) but is safer because it does not require that your partner choose that option as well. This is similar to the challenges of putting down smartphones to have a face‐to‐face interaction: you and your interaction partner might both prefer the higher payoff option of having a face‐to‐face interaction, but neither of you wants to put down your phone and risk not having anything to do in the meantime. It is also discussed how new technological innovations are changing the payoffs of face‐to‐face conversation versus side‐by‐side smartphone scrolling. Insights that come from applying game theory to this "social media dilemma" are discussed here and potential solutions that come out of a game theoretic analysis are offered. Also see the video abstract here https://youtu.be/9esL578zM‐E [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use a novel experimental design to reliably elicit subjects' strategies in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma experiment with perfect monitoring. We find that three simple strategies repre‑ sent the majority of the chosen strategies: Always Defect, Tit‑for‑Tat, and Grim. In addition, we identify how the strategies systematically vary with the parameters of the game. Finally, we use the elicited strategies to test the ability to recover strategies using statistical methods based on observed round‑by‑round cooperation choices and find that this can be done fairly well, but only under certain conditions. (JEL C72, C73, C92) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose—This article analyzes negotiations between two opposing parties and explains why self-interest in a trust-deficient environment led to the failure of the Trump-Kim summit in hanoi. It posits that a strategy involving expectation management and compromise, accepting modest interim outcomes has the best chance of succeeding. Design/methodology/approach—A game theory framework called “The Prisoner’s Dilemma” is used to illustrate how exploitation to maximize zero-sum selfinterest is chosen above collusion for assured mutual welfare due to lack of trust. This framework is applied to U.S.–DPRK denuclearization summitry to explain the failure of the most recent hanoi summit. The principles of the Prisoner’s Dilemma are then used to suggest how denuclearization negotiation strategy between the U.S. and North Korea could be improved. Findings—From the hanoi summit, this article infers that since neither Washington nor Pyongyang were going to capitulate in the denuclearization bargaining, both hardened their stances and pressed for more nuclear disarmament and concessions than either was prepared to concede. As this diplomatic failure can be plausibly explained using the principles of the prisoner’s dilemma, the dilemma can also offer advice on how future denuclearization negotiations can make moderate but realizable progress, gathering momentum toward Complete, Verifiable and Irreversible Disarmament (CVID). Practical Implications—Interstate negotiations over such serious and impactful issues like nuclear disarmament should not be inadvertently disrupted by pressure for zero-sum gain maximization. Leaders should heed the lessons of the Prisoner’s Dilemma and accept that phased agreements involving moderately reciprocal compromises are a feasible route to a mutually acceptable end state. Originality, Value—The use of game theory and welfare calculations for nuclear disarmament is not new but its application for a recent event such as the hanoi summit provides a theoretical analysis that is more novel than a common journalistic approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) is a well studied framework for understanding direct reciprocity and cooperation in pairwise encounters. However, measuring the morality of various IPD strategies is still largely lacking. Here, we partially address this issue by proposing a suit of plausible morality metrics to quantify four aspects of justice. We focus our closed-form calculation on the class of reactive strategies because of their mathematical tractability and expressive power. We define reactive means as a tool for studying how actors in the IPD and Iterated Snowdrift Game (ISG) behave under typical circumstances. We compute reactive means for four functions intended to capture human intuitions about "goodness" and "fair play". Two of these functions are strongly anticorrelated with success in the IPD and ISG, and the other two are weakly anticorrelated with success. Our results will aid in evaluating and comparing powerful IPD strategies based on machine learning algorithms, using simple and intuitive morality metrics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many studies of a spatial game theory have been performed to maintain cooperators because defectors tend to survive in a classical spatial game theory; therefore, various models have been proposed. In this study, the abovementioned problem is tackled using the spatial prisoner's dilemma (SPD) by considering the memory. In the proposed model, all players have a defined memory length related to the strategy update. The strategy for individual players is updated differently from the SPD model only when there are neighboring players whose strategy is the same but whose scores are higher than their own score. Under such conditions, players update to a strategy that is different from the original SPD strategy by considering their own past strategy and by adopting an unlikely strategy. This study is based on the idea of changing own behavior when the situation is not good for players. Consequently, cooperators were easily maintained in the proposed model by forming characteristic spatial patterns. Moreover, the model was unlikely to be affected by a payoff matrix parameter. In the proposed model, all players have a defined memory length related to the strategy update. The strategy for individual players is updated differently from the SPD model under a certain situation. Players sometimes update their strategy with an unlikely strategy. Results show that the proposed model exhibits characteristic spatial patterns and cooperators can survive. • In the proposed SPD model, all players have a defined memory length related to the strategy update. • Players sometimes update to a strategy by adopting an unlikely strategy. • Cooperators were easily maintained in the proposed model by forming characteristic spatial patterns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to use game theory and ambiguity theory to show how "economically rational" vendors will behave in a procurement process that runs over more than one period. In light of that behavior, we have proposed "economically rational" counter-strategies on the part of purchasers. Design/methodology/approach: Based on a perception–expectation framework, a unique game-based approach is designed. The authors have proposed "economically rational" counter-strategies on the part of purchasers, which are premised on the theory of rational agency. Findings: Ambiguity in the procurement process is a bane for procuring principals and a boon for suppliers – for the former, it is an issue to be managed, and for the latter it provides an opportunity to extract "insurance rents" from the principals. The authors show that, under certain conditions, the contracting principal can be exploited by a rational, rent-extracting vendor. In particular, they show that there is an incentive for a vendor to delay the resolution of ambiguities in the contract until late in the procurement process, when the insurance rents are at a maximum. Originality/value: This study contributes to the current literature by highlighting an existing problem in the procurement process and describing it using decision theory under ambiguity in a game-like setting. Specifically, the authors use game theory in a unique way to deal with imperfect information coupled with ambiguity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]