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Türkiye, once distinguished as the sole Islamic society abolishing Islamic law, has undergone a transformative shift under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, veering towards Islamic law and a presidential system, diverging from its Western legal roots. To safeguard freedom of religion or belief, which is Islam, the establishment of an Islamic judicial system is imperative in a secular state. Islam is a comprehensive and perfect system that encompasses all aspects of human life. In promoting the upholding of fundamental human rights, especially the right to freedom of religion or belief, Türkiye can ensure that its legal framework supports the rights and beliefs of all its citizens, especially Muslims. This note critically examines the imperative for establishing an Islamic judicial court system. Tracing historical roots to the Ottoman Empire and Atatürk's secularisation efforts, the note also refers to legal, historical, and social dimensions. Emphasising the necessity for an Islamic court to address familial and financial disputes, it explores the intricacies of coexistence between Islamic principles and the existing secular legal framework. The discussion spans the interconnectedness of religiosity, the right to freedom of religion, and the implications of an Islamic judicial system on Türkiye’s legal, societal, and economic fabric. Drawing comparative insights from other secular nations, the article underscores the multifaceted considerations involved. Conclusively, it advocates for a nuanced approach that balances the preservation of Islamic values with the principles of justice and inclusivity within the Turkish legal system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Przeglad Sejmowy is the property of Kancelaria Sejmu and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Przeglad Sejmowy is the property of Kancelaria Sejmu and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The right to religion is well protected in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) as well as attendant legislation. Section 15(1) of the Constitution provides that all persons have the right to freedom of religion. Section 31(1) of the Constitution then goes on to state that persons who belong to a religious community, amongst others, may not be denied the right to practise their religion with other members of that community. Section 9(3) of the Constitution prohibits the state from unfairly discriminating against any person directly or indirectly on several grounds, which include the ground of religion. Section 9(4) of the Constitution on the other hand prohibits any person from unfairly discriminating against any other person on the ground of religion, amongst others. These constitutional protections resonate in both the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 and the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. Despite these protections, the right to freedom of religion is still a contested subject in the workplace, inter alia. The contestation intensifies when the right to freedom of religion results in an employee not being able to comply with one or more of the employer's workplace needs. Employers' who do not understand the balance that has to be struck between the employee's right to freedom of religion and its workplace needs will often find themselves on the wrong side of our labour laws if they dismiss an employee without having due regard to the employee's religion. This is what transpired in TDF Network Africa (Pty) Ltd v Faris 2019 40 ILJ 326 (LAC). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Araucaria is the property of Araucaria-Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofia, Politica y Humanidades and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of FORO: Revista de Ciencias Juridicas y Sociales Nueva Epoca is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In 2015 the South African judiciary was confronted with the issue of the so-called "right to die", when Robin Stransham-Ford applied to the High Court of South Africa (the North Gauteng Division) for an order to have his life terminated. Although the Supreme Court of Appeal set aside the order (on procedural grounds), the High Court's judgment paved the way towards renewed attention regarding the possible legalisation of euthanasia. A pertinent question arising from this is whether a medical practitioner may be compelled to participate in the administering of euthanasia. Bearing this in mind, this article argues for the protection of the rights of medical practitioners who conscientiously object to participating in the administering of euthanasia, especially where such an objection is based on religious beliefs. From this arises the necessity to investigate the rights applicable both to the medical practitioner and the patient (which focusses on the right to freedom of religion and personal autonomy), the weighing up against one another of the different meanings ascribed to such rights, as well as the postulation of a substantively competitive rationale against the background of the importance and sacredness of human life. This also overlaps with the importance of the endeavour towards higher levels of religious freedoms and consequently of plurality in democratic societies. Applying the proportionality test in the analysis whether a medical practitioner's rights may be reasonably and justifiably limited against the background of administering euthanasia also strengthens the argument for the protection of the medical practitioner's right to object conscientiously to the administering of euthanasia. This, together with the vacuum there is in substantive human rights jurisprudence related to this topic, suggests the importance of this article both for the South African context and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Laïcité has assumed centre stage in much of the public debate in France over a little more than a decade. As it retraces the main legal developments that this heightened debate has triggered, the present article underlines the radical transformation the French constitutional principle has undergone. It insists that the principle has assumed a meaning that radically contrasts with its Republican articulation in the law of 1905: it now applies to private individuals (and no longer commands only public authorities), has come to being equated with a commandment of religious neutrality (whereas it did not for most of the twentieth century) and is mainly applied to (if not targeted at) Muslim women. For all these reasons, it is argued that French laïcité can no longer be coined 'liberal'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Liberal debates on religious accommodation have so far focused on the nature of the interest upon which the right to freedom of religion is based. Liberals who oppose religious accommodation argue that there is nothing special about religious belief. Those who defend accommodation on the other hand seek to identify some property (such as conscience or deep commitments) that both religious and non-religious beliefs can share. The article seeks to develop an argument in favor of certain types of religious accommodation that is agnostic about the nature of religious belief and whether it is special in any sense. It argues that it is a mistake to think that the question of religious accommodation, as it arises in law, must necessarily turn on arguments about freedom of religion. The principle of fairness can justify legal duties to accommodate religious (and non-religious) practices, without the need to assess the character of the practice in question or the reasons for engaging in it. The article argues further that the principle of fairness can better explain why human rights courts uphold some claims for religious accommodation as reasonable, and not others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is not a constant. As human rights law has progressively acquired a conceptual status as a means of reconciling tensions, the substantive legal content of the right to freedom to manifest religion or belief has widened. This paper argues that the admittance of claims of religious morality within this expanded understanding of the right exposes the conceptual imprecision underlying the right and presents a complex challenge to human rights supervisory bodies to address such claims without undermining their founding objectives. The first part of the paper traces the historical treatment of the right to freedom of religion or belief as a means of understanding its evolving and multifaceted nature. Part II draws on this overview to develop a taxonomy of aspects of the right and, in particular, it suggests that claims of religious morality ought to be viewed and treated as a distinct facet. The final part of the paper examines a group of recent cases before the European Court of Human Rights to explore current judicial responses to such claims and considers the risks posed by claims of religious morality for the contemporary right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes preconditions of realization of the right to religious education in Lithuania during the period of compulsory education. The article consists of two parts. The essence of the freedom of thought, religion and conscience and their relation to religious education is discussed in the first part. The second part of the article analyses national legal framework related to compulsory education in the light of freedom of thought, religion and conscience. The states are required to ensure education of children according to religious convictions of their parents and needs of the children themselves. The Lithuanian legal regulation, however, allows certain ambiguities as to how effectively may the right to religious education be realised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]