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Labor market institutions (LMIs) could enable new firm entry by lowering burdens to attracting and retaining human capital or restrict new firm entry by increasing concerns of additional demands on ventures facing liabilities of newness and smallness. In this study, we focus on the LMI of the right of association, and whether its relationship with new business entry depends on the vertical ordering of bargaining (represented in the centralization of collective bargaining) or the horizontal synchronization of wage-setting (represented in the coordination of wage-setting). In a panel of 44 countries covering the period 2005–2019, we find that the right of association in the market sector is positively associated with new business entry; however, with increasing centralization of collective bargaining, the association becomes negative. Coordination of wage-setting does not significantly affect the relationship between the right of association and new business entry. The results are robust to accounting for both serial correlation and cross-sectional correlation in the panel regressions and carry implications for policymakers regarding the effects of LMIs on new business creation. Plain English Summary: Does the right of association influence new business entry? Labor market institutions (LMIs) in a country could be a double-edged sword for new businesses: LMIs can lower human capital competition among smaller and larger firms, but may also increase financial burdens on young and small firms in meeting higher wages and benefits. We find that the right of association in the market sector is positively associated with new business entry; however, with increasing centralization of collective bargaining, the association becomes negative. Coordination of wage-setting does not significantly affect the relationship between the right of association and new business entry. Thus, the principal implication of this study is that labor market institutions may be ex-ante considerations in new firm entry decisions, and the right of association in combination with strong centralization of collective bargaining may jointly lower new business entry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the position of the successive executive powers that have ruled over the occupied Palestinian territory toward the right of association, analyzing the regulations and practical measures they introduced. The governance of these authorities was undemocratic, resulting in abuses of legislative power with a view to constraining the right to assembly and to dominating NGO s, starting with incorporation and ending with dissolution. Despite an ongoing struggle for operational independence, NGO s have been under the control of the Palestinian ruling political parties in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip since 2007. Throughout this period, elected formal oversight bodies have been lacking. While Fatah monopolizes government of the West Bank, Hamas takes exclusive possession of the administration of the Gaza Strip; each party has fought against the NGO s aligned with its rival. The ruling regimes have also exploited shortfalls and gaps in some regulations in order to undermine and weaken the role of NGO s in issues of public concern. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Revista Catalana de Dret Públic is the property of Revista Catalana de Dret Public and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista de Derecho UNED is the property of Editorial UNED and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

For an attempt to establish an institutional content for personal autonomy, it is submitted that the reference to ‘community’ in Article 27 of the CCPR implies a certain form of organization. Persons who belong to minorities shall have the complete freedom to organize themselves in associations of various kinds in order to pursue common aims. The notion of ‘association’ includes, on the top of regular membership associations, a broader spectrum of private law entities, but the main point is that there shall be a freedom for a minority in the creation of non-governmental organizations, leading to personal autonomy as an organizational form. It is hence not necessarily so that all forms of autonomy are created on the basis of special legislation, endowing the autonomous character for the minority institution from top-down. A bottom-up creation of minority institutions can actually involve a right to personal autonomy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]