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Freedom, one of the four postulates of the humanbecoming paradigm, is the focus of this article. Freedom is explored from a humanbecoming perspective and from the existential/phenomenological perspectives of Heidegger and Sartre.

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The present study aims to find out the existential elements in the Selected Characters of The Prologue to the Canterbury Tales by Chaucer. Further, the study analyzes the existential themes of freedom, choices, and bad faith as presented by the existential philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. The Selected characters are Friar, The Summoner, The Wife of Bath, and The Knight. Chaucer's The Prologue to the Canterbury Tales though written in the fourteenth century, has universal appeal. The themes, dilemmas, and conflicts presented through the fourteenth-century characters are for all ages. These characters have traces of being existential characters. Existentialism as a theory or philosophy emphasizes the importance of freedom and choices made by man. Chaucer's character which comprises of different classes, professions, and gender assert their sense of freedom in many ways and hence falls either into the category of being-in-itself or being-for-itself. Existentialism is used as a methodological framework for the textual analysis of the Prologue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political prisoners in the Islamic Republic of Iran are tortured to the point that they may be psychologically broken, confess to something against their will, and actively bring degrading effects upon themselves. Phenomenologists maintain that consciousness is thoroughly intertwined with the body. It is not that we have bodies but that we are our bodies. In light of this position, torturing the body thus allows the torturer to break the consciousness and freedom of the tortured. How can tortured individuals stand up again as authentic and free agents after their forced confessions? I will examine the relationship between tortured confessions and human freedom, basing my examination on the experiences of Iranian political activists. I argue that, although the victim's consciousness has been manipulated, the victim's freedom is as intact as it was before the tortured confession. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current article discusses the issue that the hero in Sartre's existentialist attitude lives alone and confused in an absurd world where moral foundations are not very important. He is forced to choose and by choosing values, he creates his desired ethics and by this means he invites others to those self-created values. In this way, Sartre gives a new meaning to the word hero. Sartre's hero becomes even more limited by the "other" with his terrifying decisions, the only way to save him is conscious self-deception. Although he knows that he is free and has to choose, and he is also familiar with the responsibility and commitment. The current research was carried out with a fundamental purpose and its main issue is to investigate the characteristics of the hero in Sartre's existentialism philosophy and the conditions of its emergence. In this research, in search of the conditions for the emergence of the hero from Sartre's point of view, it shows that originality is the result of practical actions in the situations in which Sartre's hero is placed, so it is connected with consciousness and freedom is the relationship of consciousness with the world. The research method is qualitative and in order to reveal the research problem, the Paris-Texas film has been selected and analyzed as a case of study based on the purposeful selection. The result indicates that every action of today's hero is original and self-determining because it was formed in freedom. He is nothing but what he makes of himself; This construction happens in the public sphere, so authenticity is no longer an individual action, but a conflict in social relations.

The current article discusses the issue that the hero in Sartre's existentialist attitude lives alone and confused in an absurd world where moral foundations are not very important. He is forced to choose and by choosing values, he creates his desired ethics and by this means he invites others to those self-created values. In this way, Sartre gives a new meaning to the word hero. Sartre's hero becomes even more limited by the "other" with his terrifying decisions, the only way to save him is conscious self-deception. Although he knows that he is free and has to choose, and he is also familiar with the responsibility and commitment. The current research was carried out with a fundamental purpose and its main issue is to investigate the characteristics of the hero in Sartre's existentialism philosophy and the conditions of its emergence. In this research, in search of the conditions for the emergence of the hero from Sartre's point of view, it shows that originality is the result of practical actions in the situations in which Sartre's hero is placed, so it is connected with consciousness and freedom is the relationship of consciousness with the world. The research method is qualitative and in order to reveal the research problem, the Paris-Texas film has been selected and analyzed as a case of study based on the purposeful selection. The result indicates that every action of today's hero is original and selfdetermining because it was formed in freedom. He is nothing but what he makes of himself; This construction happens in the public sphere, so authenticity is no longer an individual action, but a conflict in social relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We provide a phenomenological explanation of the particular function mental images play in the realization of enjoyment and their significance for human freedom on the basis of the idea, drawn from Sartre, that images are not things but rather a way consciousness behaves towards objects. The mental image's matter, which consists of affectivity, knowledge, and kinaesthetic operations, allows imagination to conjure up an unreal item to satiate a desire. However, by foreshadowing enjoyment in the imaginary, the mental image urges consciousness toward a change in the world that would make that enjoyment real. This is accomplished through the development of tools, which rely on the ability to overcome not just a given situation but also courses of goal-oriented behaviour that have already been prepared by the environment. Through this creation, consciousness exerts its freedom within reality, and marks the world as meaningful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article responds to Oscar Kawamata's thought-provoking criticisms of the conception of law student well-being that I previously advocated in this journal. Kawamata argues that my objective model of well-being is unrealistic and unhelpful from his perspective as a law student, proposing instead a subjective account grounded in Buddhist philosophy. While acknowledging Kawamata's valid concerns, I suggest that an idea of well-being with objective elements is still preferable to a purely subjective conception. Put simply, well-being does not just consist in changing your mind; sometimes, you need to change your life as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the traditional understanding of the look views it in terms of shame and oppression, I read Sartre's Notebooks for an Ethics with Beauvoir's Ethics of Ambiguity to argue that the look always gives me the world and inaugurates my freedom. Even the oppressor's look reveals that I am free and that my existence is conditioned by the existence of other free beings. Because the look gives me the world as the arena within which I act freely, it is a means of grace, and receiving it only in shame is bad faith. Although my existence remains unjustifiable and this grace cannot promise salvation, the look calls me out of shame to the pursuit of my and others' freedom, and this call is a gift. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The year 2020 began with the world being controlled by a thenunknown force. This unknown force would later be called a coronavirus or Covid-19. Not a single country would be free from infection by this virus. We are petrified with astonishment when confronted with this disease. Initially, after admitting the reality, we started struggling with and revolting against this virus. Time has led us to the consideration of our existence. This pandemic inclines us to revisit the major themes in existential philosophy discussed by Sartre in the Nausea and the philosophy of the absurd by Camus in The Myth of Sisyphus, The Plague, and The Stranger. The study addresses the concepts of anxiety, suffering, freedom, self-deception, absurdity, and choices. When confronted with the reality of the disease, we are shocked by an odd sensation like what Roquentin felt in his experience of nausea. This bizarre feeling brought an initial rejection, a self-deception followed by suffering, and a reflection of one's freedom. The concept of freedom leads us to certain decisions we make and the choices we are offered. The absurdity brought about by the pandemic is a reality that we must accept as it is. How would Sisyphus feel if he were living in the present? The struggle by Sisyphus can be our struggle now against a coronavirus. We feel condemned to roll a rock to the top of a mountain, a punishment that seems like 'futile and hopeless labor.' However, we are stronger than our rock. The paper presents a parallelism between oursuffering during the pandemic and the sufferings of Sisyphus and Roquentin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sartre's belief that God is dead does not imply that God has never existed or is not there now. It indicates that God does not have roles to play in people's lives, which generates and inspires humans' freedom and the consequent sense of responsibility. This unique association between the death of God, on the one hand, and freedom and responsibility, on the other, constitutes the spine of Sartre's No Exit (1989). Thus, this paper examines Sartre's No Exit (1989) in terms of his Being and Nothingness (1969) and Existentialism Is a Humanism (2007). The paper deciphers several scenes through which Sartre's freedom-oriented viewpoints are articulated, concluding that Sartre's characters in this play are entirely free due to their belief in the death of God. Yet, they are not ready to acknowledge their freedom due to its inevitable association with anguishing responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I examine the Lacanian concept of misrecognition (méconnaissance) by comparing it with the Sartrean notion of bad faith (mauvaise foi). I focus on Jacques Lacan's 1946 article 'Presentation on Psychical Causality' in which Lacan criticises organicist psychology for misrecognising the cause of madness to be essentially organic and consequently failing to distinguish between 'mad' and 'true' ideas. I argue that bad faith, discussed by Jean-Paul Sartre in Being and Nothingness in 1943—and referred to six times in the Écrits by Lacan—has essential similarities with misrecognition in the Lacanian sense. By juxtaposing these concepts, I argue that this early Lacanian text is marked by an existentialist attitude which views human reality—and madness—as meaningful and grounded in being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofia is the property of Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The commitment of literature stirred up controversy in the face of European cataclysm of the post-war period. The significance of literature in political spheres fell under suspicion. It came to be looked at as a passive, impractical activity that could not express the horrors of W WII. Jean-Paul Sartre, the leading literary figure of existentialism in France, faced with such criticisms, decided to investigate the role of the writer and the reader, and endeavored to open a gateway for writers to participate in their societies actively. This study is concerned with the first three chapters of the monograph including “What is Writing?,” “Why Does One Write?,” and “For Whom Does One Write?” The present analysis does not address Sartre’s Existential philosophy per se; however, it briefly examines the roots of Sartre’s conception of literature in continental philosophy and the critical responses to his work from the perspectives of Alain Robbe-Grillet and Theodor W. Adorno. This paper endeavors to give a clear insight into Sartre’s idea of commitment and the freedom of the writer, and what he introduced as “human right literature” as an antithesis to both Marxism and Capitalism.

The aim of the article is to investigate the issue of freedom as a political value, its relationship to the so-called reflexive freedom and its two historical forms: freedom as autonomy and freedom as authenticity. The introduction examines the problem of whether freedom belongs more to the domain of metaphysics or political philosophy, and discusses the ideas of existentialist understanding of freedom. The idea of negative liberty as the core of the liberal conception of justice is critically examined against the background of a summary of Honneth's ideas on reflexive, negative, and social freedom and its historical protagonists. The author emphasizes the weaknesses and the inability of the liberal concept of freedom and justice to solve mainly the problem of people with disabilities, global justice and issues related to species specificity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Essay deals with existential phenomenology, focusing on question its nowadays importance especially regarding freedom and authenticity in current society. The author describes development of existentialism on the background and with respect to the book At the Existentialist Cafe by S. Bakeweell, and states that there is increasing interest in what existential phenomenology means todays. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to describe the problem of God in Sartre's philosophy. Even if Sartre has always been on the side of atheism, God has undoubtedly been a very important issue in his thought, at least during the 1940s, with the studies on the onto-phenomenology of Being and Nothingness (1943) and on the ethics of Notebooks for an Ethics (1947-48). We would like to demonstrate that Sartre, like all existentialists, had to make a bet regarding the role and the existence of God in humans' world. This bet allowed him to think about God in a double way: the first path leads to the concept of God as the highest value of anyone, embedded in the being of everyone, of which we should get rid in order to be free; the second one brings to the hypothesis of the divinity of the mankind, i.e. of God thought as Humanity, a situation of ontological authenticity that opens the field of a true existentialist ethics. We will purpose to focus the attention of the theme of creation as the link between Sartrean ontology and his ethics: what should be a man, in order to be causa sui? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Aufklärung: Revista de Filosofia is the property of Aufklarung: Revista de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article is devoted to the North American Sartre Society, which was founded in 1985. The author as its co-founder develops his point of view presenting during panel discussion of Sartre’s relations with the United States on the 2015 meeting. He devoted a lot of papers and books to Sartre’s philosophy. Some of them are presented in the references. The author reflects at a somewhat deeper level on Sartre’s attitudes towards USA in the context of its history and international relations, saying about philosopher’s contradictions, the strategy and tactics of his self-disinvitation. The author traces Sartre’s transition from one myth of America to another in later life. Sartre’s initial experiential encounter with the American reality was by no means entirely positive, but he did like New York City, feeling a sense of freedom in the midst of its crowds that he retained as an important part of his picture of America when back in France. Freedom, an open future, almost unlimited possibilities, and a lack of a sense of history of the sort by which Europe is shackled. Several events of the postwar world history such as Korean war, then Vietnam war paved the way for Sartre’s most salient later attitudes towards America. Meanwhile, Sartre had accepted an invitation to present lectures at Cornell University in 1965. But after American massive bombing of North Vietnam in 1965 Sartre responded by disinviting himself from Cornell by way of protest. Recounting these events, the author of the paper recalls so-called “Cornell Lectures”, which were saved in unfinished manuscript form and have been given the title “Morale et Histoire”. A serious interest in American political life is shown on Sartre’s and Beauvoir’s visit to Cuba as guests of Fidel Castro and Sartre’s participation in Lord Bertrand Russell’s independent War Crimes Tribunal.

Usually associated with a view of freedom as absolute, Sartre’s philosophy seems particularly able to account for the indeterminacy that we experience today in most areas of human experience that have a normative dimension. Without denying that this is a plausible reading, it will be argued here that it is nevertheless a problematic interpretation. On this reading, existentialism seems unable to account for the fact that we are powerfully conditioned by a significant number of factors, which limit our freedom and, in certain situations, make emancipation a normative requirement. It is held here that this problem can be addressed and a less problematic interpretation of Sartre can be defended, once we start to acknowledge that in Sartre we have a variety of notions of freedom that can provide a robust account of our freedom, of authentic choice and of responsibility. Habitualmente asociada a una visión de la libertad como un concepto absoluto, la filosofía de Sartre parece especialmente capaz de representar la indeterminación que experimentamos hoy en día en la mayoría de las áreas de la experiencia humana que tienen una dimensión normativa. Sin negar que ésta es una lectura convincente, no obstante, se va a argumentar que es una interpretación problemática. Con esta lectura parece que el existencialismo es incapaz de representar el hecho de que estamos fuertemente condicionados por un número importante de factores que limitan nuestra libertad y, en algunas situaciones, hacen de la emancipación una necesidad normativa. En este artículo se defiende que se puede abordar este problema, y se puede defender una interpretación de Sartre menos problemática, una vez empecemos a reconocer que en Sartre se pueden encontrar una variedad de nociones de libertad que permiten ofrecer una explicación sólida de nuestra libertad, de elección auténtica y de responsabilidad. DOWNLOAD THIS PAPER FROM SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2622045

Autonomy and free will are essential conditions for moral agency: we aren't responsible for effects we couldn't choose or avert. Skeptics argue that the experience of free will is illusory; those defending it say that the conscious experience of intention and responsibility are sufficient evidence of free choice. This essay defends autonomy and free will from an alternate perspective: it affirms that choice has exhaustively material conditions but disputes the determinist claim that every choice is an involuntary step in a causal trajectory progressing blindly from nature's original conditions. There is a paradox: we are responsible for much we choose and do, though all that comes to pass has sufficient conditions. This is the virtue of soft determinism and its emphasis on autonomy: the sensibility evolving within us is often a barrier to other influences while a sufficient condition for one's choices and deeds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article explores youth activism in the US, not through the lens of collective action, but as the product of personal choices. By drawing on existentialism, and particularly on the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, this article proposes to shift the focus of the debate from youths’ collective action to the self - a conscious self that observes, perceives and makes sense of the surrounding world through personal experience. It is this conscious self that decides how, and whether, to intervene against the ‘wrong’ that the self experiences. In this perspective, it is not only the acts (of citizenship) that matter, but the conscious process through which the self chooses to become political. Such an understanding will ultimately help uncover not only how the undocumented act and how to conceptualise their acts but also how they perceive and experience their current status and who they want to become. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the lack of research on this subject produced in Romance Languages, the author Given the lack of research on this subject produced in Romance Languages, the author tries to find a possible meeting point between the philosophical systems of Fichte and Sartre in order to understand better their contributions to this theme. Disregarding a possible approach to these two authors through a receptive textual criticism of the former in the work of the latter, it is possible to identify points of convergence and coincidence between them. Subsequently, the paper focuses on the subject of freedom, firstly, from the Transcendence of the Ego and Being and Nothingness, and secondly, from the Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge and Nova Method. In this way, freedom is perceived as the cornerstone for both systems of thought and the bridge that shortens the distance between the Fichtean self and nonself and the Sartrean being-in-itself and being-for-itself.

In conceptualising and arguing for the 'existential unconscious' in the works of Sartre, this article contends that all empirical acts of the self relate to the self's being-in-the-world as an original and a-volitional project of being. The inclusion of the unconscious makes for a dialectical approach to freedom as authenticity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The occurrence of poor patient care is emerging as one of the most significant, challenging, and critical issues confronting contemporary nursing and those responsible for the provision of health care more generally. Indeed, as a consequence of the increased recognition of the manner in which nurses can be implicated in the occurrence of poor patient care, there has been sustained critical debate that seeks to understand how such healthcare failings can occur and, in particular, why nurses seemingly fail to intervene, raise concerns, and effectively respond to prevent the occurrence and continuation of such poor patient care. In seeking to contribute to this critical discussion, and in contrast to those 'situational explanations' that maintain that the failure to raise concerns is a consequence of the contextual factors and challenging conditions to which nurses can be subject in the clinical setting, this paper will provide a resolutely philosophical analysis of that failure. In particular, it will draw upon the work of Jean-Paul Sartre-the French philosopher generally regarded as one of the most influential thinkers of the twentieth century-in order to propose that his work can be productively recontextualized to provide a detailed, challenging, and provocative critical analysis of the occurrence and continuation of poor patient care and the role of individual nurse practitioners in such healthcare failings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This reflection is at the original tension of consciousness with its counterpart, that is, of consciousness as consciousness of something. On this pillar of Husserl's phenomenology, Sartre builds the structures for itself, in the second and third part of Being and Nothingness will frame the tension between human and nothing for itself and the in-itself as massif being. That awareness therefore becomes a consciousness of anything as reflected consciousness, allowing it to put in place in the ontological relation to being an absence in the full understanding of the human condition. In this perspective an ontology of human action as building personal always be postponed, that is, absent will be built. This reflection intended, therefore, a reading of the text linking intentionality as a pillar of phenomenology with the concept of absence as underlying tension between in-itself-itself. The text is divided into three stages: nothingness, absence and being; absence as creative negativity; the ontological act. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I reconsider the philosophical significance of Jacques Lacan’s reading of Freud in light of Jean-Paul Sartre’s early critique of Freudian psychoanalysis. Since direct comparisons between the work of Sartre and Lacan are sparse in the English literature, Betty Cannon’s comprehensive treatment proves to be an invaluable resource in opening up this line of inquiry. I claim that one reason for the limited attention given to comparisons of their work is the continued strength of the polemics between humanism and structuralism. Lacan’s structuralism is regularly indicted by humanists for failing to provide a conception of subjective responsibility in the way that Sartre’s humanism does. Taking Cannon’s critique of Lacanian psychoanalysis on this issue as a point of departure, I argue that a conception of subjective responsibility can be found throughout Lacan’s work, serving as a point of common ground upon which further inquiry—particularly of Sartre’s later work—might begin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In spite of the fact that many find Jean-Paul Sartre's account of la mauvaise foi puzzling, unclear and troublesome, he remains a recurring figure in the debate about self-deception. Indeed, Sartre's exposition of self-deception is as puzzling as it is original. The primary task of my paper will be to expose why this is the case and to thereby correct a recurrent misunderstanding of Sartre's theory of consciousness. In the end, will we see that Sartre offers the following theory: self-deception is to be accounted for by assuming that there are intrinsically self-deceptive epistemic states. The latter are self-deceptive in so far as they claim certainty while nevertheless being accompanied by an inbuilt and incorruptible awareness of being unwarranted. For Sartre, developing this rather peculiar account of self-deception, is, as we will see, not primarily intended as an end in itself. Rather, Sartre thereby hopes to illuminate the nature of self-awareness as (i.) epistemically super-secure, (ii.) pre-reflexive, (iii.) non-positional and 'embryonic' knowledge that (iv.) does not necessitate but can still ground epistemically super-secure reflexive knowledge, and (v.) that can replace Freud's notion of unconscious knowledge. As an account of self-deception, Sartre's suggestion, however, comes at a high price. Apart from the presuppositions Sartre makes in the theory of consciousness and intentionality, his account is deflationist with regard to local cases of self-deception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

O trabalho tem como objetivo investigar a questão da liberdade humana à luz da peça teatral Entre quatro paredes – Huis Clos –,escrita pelo filósofo existencialista francês Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980). Para o escritor, a existência humana está intrinsecamente relacionada à liberdade, dentro de uma concepção de ontologia do ser. A preocupação com a liberdade individual, presente nos primeiros escritos de Sartre, aos poucos, cedeu lugar à inquietação com uma ética de liberdade coletiva e sua consequenteresponsabilidade. Entender o conceito sartreano de liberdade no âmbito social-político do humano implica na luta por um constante vir-a-ser. Trata-se de buscar a possibilidade de mudança, por meio de uma prática libertadora e emancipatória da construção da dignidade humana.Abstract:The work aims to investigate the concept of human freedom and its relations based in the play ‘No Exit’ - Huis Clos – written by the french existentialist philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980). Sartre believed that human existence is inseparable of its own liberty – within the notion of the ontology of being. The concern with individual freedom, present in the early writings ofSartre, gradually gave way to an ethic of caring for collective liberty and its consequent responsibility. To understand the concept of Sartrean freedom in the social-political struggle for human implies a constant come-to-be. It means to seek the possibility of change through a liberating and emancipatory practice to build human dignity.

“Here I am—Jew, or Aryan, handsome or ugly, one-armed, etc. I am all of this for the Other with no hope of changing it.” Thus wrote Sartre in his Being and Nothingness. But was not Sartre the major advocate of existential freedom, with the tenet that “we are condemned to be free”—no matter what our situation might be? The question hence arises: How free are we from the facticity of situations, particularly ones in which we are subject to collective identification? How free are we to change the situations—places, environments, histories, others—that we inevitably belong to and which subject us to collective identities? How free are we from identification in terms of others? How free are we to transform such identification? These questions are of particular relevance given the harmful effects of collective ascriptions and the currently pressing demand to transform them. In an attempt to address these questions, I offer as alternative to Sartre’s concept of the “facticity of freedom” what I would like to call the “freedom of facticity”.

Freedom seems to be a fantasy for Heathcliff inWuthering Heightsaccording to some critics. Yet, in the light of Jean-Paul Sartre’s philosophical ideas on freedom, Heathcliff is always free and the whole novel delineates how a free man overcomes various obstacles through constant choices rather than how a man pursues freedom. This essay, employing Sartre’s relevant theory, will outline Heathcliff’s freedom, through which we might detect some hidden beauty of this controversial novel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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