Search

On 3 April 1559, the long intermittent war which had begun in 1521 was finally terminated by the treaty signed at Le Cateau-en-Cambrésis. The significance of this peace has long been understood, somewhat simplistically, as a sort of ‘hinge’ between the Habsburg–Valois Wars and the epoch of the Wars of Religion. The details of the negotiations are well known, though the classic work of de Ruble largely ignores the problems of implementation insofar as they concern the north. On the surface, of course, there was no reason to suppose that the treaty would be any more durable than its predecessors; it had been the exhaustion of the great monarchies that had motivated a substantial effort at settlement and the continuation of that exhaustion, coupled with the descent of France into civil war after 1562, froze the agreements that were reached in 1559. It is also easy to forget that the political imperatives behind war dictated that fighting should be accompanied by frequent, even longlasting, negotiations for the conditions which would be conducive to ‘une bonne paix’, or stable settlement. What this meant for both sides, of course, was distinctly divergent, but both sides faced similar problems: how to achieve a stable relationship. This in turn meant agreement on the conflicting territorial and jurisdictional claims of the Valois and Habsburg monarchies, including Navarre, Savoy-Piedmont, French claims in Italy and, of course, the frontier between France and the Low Countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The towns of Picardy were confronted in a markedly direct way by the demands of the state and its military administration in the sixteenth century. The high levels of direct royal taxation which prevailed later in the reign of Louis XI were relaxed under his successors, but began to rise again in the semipermanent war conditions after 1521, though not steeply until the 1550s. In the course of this, the balance of taxation shifted from direct to indirect, and the exemptions of the towns were gradually abridged by new sorts of taxes and special loans. Picardy, though it had no estates to protect its interests, was relatively lightly burdened by direct taxes as a result first, of the need to conciliate interests, and then to offset the effects of war. The newer urban levies of the 1540s and 1550s, however, contributed to debts which aggravated the economic effects of war in the form of demands for military supplies. To explain the complex nature of these developments, it will be useful to examine the framework within which they were shaped. The administrative structures Though there has been much debate about the extent to which administrative frontiers in early modern France were clearly defined, there is no doubt about the massive complexity of the layers of administration which existed by the middle of the sixteenth century. Above all, this is the case in financial districts, which were bedevilled by arcane procedures and bewildering enclaves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Habsburg–Valois Wars outside Italy have failed to attract the attention of modern historians, in contrast to the formidable analysis brought to bear on the Religious Wars of the later sixteenth century or the Thirty Years War. It may be surmised that this results from the suspicion that conflicts generated essentially by dynastic rivalry are more trivial than those with some kind of ideological or economic impulse behind them. The Habsburg–Valois conflict, much of it inconclusive, might easily have attracted Veronica Wedgwood's verdict on the Thirty Years War as ‘the supreme example of meaningless conflict’. Yet it would be difficult to imagine the genesis of modern warfare without the lessons taught in tactics and fortification during the first half of the sixteenth century; nor would the instruments of Absolute Monarchy have been so substantially developed. For some regions of western Europe, this was the most devastating experience for centuries. Picardy was, during the first half of the sixteenth century, the most consistently fought-over region of France, and its history in that period is inseparable from war. After the generation of uneasy peace that followed the definitive restoration of royal government in the later fifteenth century, the forty-seven years from 1521 to 1559 saw twenty-eight years of war, all of which involved fighting of some kind and fifteen of which witnessed the mounting of major campaigns. The king appeared in person at the head of his armies in 1521, 1524, 1537, 1543, 1549, 1553, 1554 and 1558. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

That the public ethos and code of honour of the nobility remained predominant in early modern French society is now hardly open to challenge, though the implications for regional and national power structures are still being worked out. The nobility was a vast social order accommodating enormous differences of wealth, property, ability and interest; only a small proportion played a leading political role, though military activity continued to provide a function and some income for many more. The relationships which bound together this heterogeneous social group were partly expressed in terms of kinship, partly of the much-discussed notion of clientèle or patronage. Kristen Neuschel, in her study of Condé's circle in Picardy during the 1560s and her subsequent analysis of noble culture based on it, has argued, rightly, against simplistic notions of patronage. Individuals certainly inherited ties of loyalty to great magnates like the Bourbons or Guises, but such ties were not unconditional and, in a province like Picardy with many small fiefs held directly of the crown, feudal ties could be complex and contradictory. Neuschel, however, in viewing the nobility, like Arlette Jouanna, from the perspective of the intensely chaotic period of the Wars of Religion, has tended to exaggerate its independence and self-sufficiency as well as its own sense of an autonomous legitimacy outside the scope of the crown and of public power. The interdependence of the crown and the French nobility remained indissoluble until the end of the ancien régime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Picardy was the frontier province par excellence in sixteenth-century France and had come into being as a gouvernement essentially for purposes of defence. As a result, it suffered more systematic military operations than any other region of France in this period. Provence was invaded in 1523 and 1536 but was not a route amenable for invading armies; nor were the passes through the Alps into Dauphiné. Charles V's thrust into France via Saint-Dizier in 1544 was a dangerous but isolated campaign that illustrated the limitations of the war of movement in this period. Champagne was certainly a fortified frontier to the east but did not experience the intensity of operations or the scale on which Picardy was dominated by the actions of French and enemy forces. Picardy was the most obvious route of invasion into France and consequently its most fortified area. It was a region, therefore, in which, during the forty years between 1520 and 1560, the impact of war on the peasantry and townsmen made normal life at times virtually impossible. Yet it was possible to survive. The aim of this chapter is to discuss the extent of the impact of war on the countryside in the different stages of the Habsburg–Valois conflict and to trace the increasing ferocity of destruction over the decades. An attempt will then be made to explain how it was possible to survive and live with the problems brought by continuous military operations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1558, Jean d'Estouteville, sieur de Villebon and governor of Picardy, wrote to the duke of Guise that ‘il n'y a gouvernement en France où il y ait plus d'affaires qu'il a icy’. The importance of the lieutenant-général du roi in Picardy stemmed in part from the regular army stationed there and its massive augmentation in time of war. It has been suggested that this period of war tended to limit the scope of governors' powers in the interest of the crown. These powers will be examined in chapter 3, but there must be some doubt on the matter, since war arguably enhanced the political and administrative competence of governors as well as of other military officials. The lengthy tenure of the post in Picardy by princes of the house of Bourbon contributed to this augmentation but also complicated it. The post of governor was a ‘charge’ revocable at royal will, but this power was seldom invoked. However, the first half of the sixteenth century saw the rapid development of the post of deputy governor, appointed at first in times of emergency but later on a permanent basis. It has perhaps too easily been assumed that the deputy governors quickly eclipsed the real power of governors, often great princes preoccupied with court politics. This is not so clear from an examination of the affairs of Picardy, which reveal a continuing central role for the governors and a complex relationship with their deputies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]