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Rapidly growing distributed ledger technologies (DLTs) have recently received attention among researchers in both industry and academia. While a lot of existing analysis (mainly) of the Bitcoin and Ethereum networks is available, the lack of measurements for other crypto projects is observed. This article addresses questions about tokenomics and wealth distributions in cryptocurrencies. We analyze the time-dependent statistical properties of top cryptocurrency holders for 14 different distributed ledger projects. The provided metrics include approximated Zipf coefficient, Shannon entropy, Gini coefficient, and Nakamoto coefficient. We show that there are quantitative differences between the coins (cryptocurrencies operating on their own independent network) and tokens (which operate on top of a smart contract platform). Presented results show that coins and tokens have different values of approximated Zipf coefficient and centralization levels. This work is relevant for DLTs as it might be useful in modeling and improving the committee selection process, especially in decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) and delegated proof of stake (DPoS) blockchains., 5 figures

In this paper, we propose several solutions to the committee selection problem among participants of a DAG distributed ledger. Our methods are based on a ledger intrinsic reputation model that serves as a selection criterion. The main difficulty arises from the fact that the DAG ledger is a priori not totally ordered and that the participants need to reach a consensus on participants' reputation. Furthermore, we outline applications of the proposed protocols, including: (i) self-contained decentralized random number beacon; (ii) selection of oracles in smart contracts; (iii) applications in consensus protocols and sharding solutions. We conclude with a discussion on the security and liveness of the proposed protocols by modeling reputation with a Zipf law.

The fast probabilistic consensus (FPC) is a voting consensus protocol that is robust and efficient in Byzantine infrastructure. We propose an adaption of the FPC to a setting where the voting power is proportional to the nodes reputations. We model the reputation using a Zipf law and show using simulations that the performance of the protocol in Byzantine infrastructure increases with the Zipf exponent. Moreover, we propose several improvements of the FPC that decrease the failure rates significantly and allow the protocol to withstand adversaries with higher weight. We distinguish between cautious and berserk strategies of the adversaries and propose an efficient method to detect the more harmful berserk strategies. Our study refers at several points to a specific implementation of the IOTA protocol, but the principal results hold for general implementations of reputation models.