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It took Estonia more than four years to achieve de jure recognition from the United States. Therefore, it was surprising that American pressure was needed to appoint a plenipotentiary representative. Ants Piip became the first envoy with high hopes and, thanks to him, in 1924–1925 several agreements were signed between Estonia and the United States. Unfortunately, Estonian politicians were not satisfied with the results because no concessions were made regarding debt and no loan was granted. Unlike its neighbors, the Estonian legation did not remain in Washington, although Piip worked hard for a deal until the end of Estonia's independence in 1940. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article seeks to capture a facet of US – Baltic relations that for the most part has played out behind the public curtain. As such, the following chronicles key twists and turns, achievements and failures in American – Baltic intelligence relations. A substantial body of scholarship has already examined cultural, diplomatic, and security ties between these actors. The same cannot be said about intelligence bonds. This article attempts to redress this neglect in the literature. It argues that the Baltics, with their well-honed sense of Russian political affairs, have become valuable sources of intelligence for their key ally across the Atlantic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ron Asmus, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, liked to say that the Baltic states had to run a marathon to join NATO but could rely on the support of their American 'coaches.' Estonian diplomats have used the word 'babysitter' to describe their American colleagues. While it is true that the result of NATO enlargement was never inevitable, the uncertainties of the process were diminished by cooperation between candidate countries and the forces inside the US who pushed for enlargement. Without delving into their motives, this article traces the role of the US as 'coaches' and 'babysitters' in making the Baltic states' 'run' toward NATO a nearly perfect marathon, despite all the pitfalls and doubts along the way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article argues that in 1919 several US Peace Delegation members in Paris acted in accordance with the ideology of Wilsonian self-determination. However, US policy toward Estonia and the other Baltic states wavered between regarding them as part of eastern Europe to which national self-determination could be applied or, contrary to that, as part of a unified non-Bolshevik Russia. US economic policy and, in particular, its relief activity supported the striving for independence of the Baltic states. Wilson came to support the 'Russia option' for the Baltic countries in the summer of 1919. The successor Harding administration opted for the alternative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article approaches the history of Baltic-US relations from the point of view of International Relations scholarship and, more specifically, from the vantage point of the concept of international society. It provides an account of the process of Estonia's entry into international society with a particular focus on the role that the United States, as one of the great powers of the twentieth century, played in this process. Against this background, this article concludes that as a feature of the Baltic states' memories of entry, the history of Baltic-US relations remains vital to understanding their contemporary foreign policy outlook. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Departing from previous presidential administrations' internationalist and dysfunctional foreign policies, President J. R. Biden, Jr. has pursued a restrained Hamiltonian foreign policy since assuming office in January 2021. Appreciating that the United States' declining economic dominance threatens its hegemony, President Biden's foreign policy primarily focuses on augmenting America's global economic competitiveness. Moreover, the president's policy response to the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation's revisionist challenge to American international leadership centres on neo-containment. Finally, re-engaging the United States' economic and security networks demonstrates the president's perception that these networks are essential to American power and security. Perceiving President Biden's foreign policy as restrained Hamiltonian is central to interpreting the sole superpower's behaviour and impact on international security politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States' invasion of Grenada in 1983 represented the lowest point in Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan's relationship, with Thatcher incensed at what she perceived to be her ally's misuse of military force. However, in April 1986, Thatcher gave permission for the United States to use British-based aircraft for air strikes against the Gaddafi regime in Libya, a mission as tenuously grounded in international law as Grenada. How do we explain Thatcher's apparent change in approach to foreign policy, now placing strategic interests above her previous deference to international law, and what does this tell us about the role experience plays in a leader's foreign policy decisions? Drawing on insights from the ongoing behavioural revolution in International Relations, this paper argues that the experience Thatcher gained during the Grenada episode led to her support for US strikes against Libya. A process tracing approach using documents from the UK National Archives, as well as biographies and memoirs, tests this individual-level hypothesis against a rival structuralist explanation. This research shows how experience gained in office can influence a leader's future foreign policy decision-making and demonstrates the utility of process tracing methods for investigations into the role of experience in international politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do foreign rivals perceive and respond to heightened domestic polarization in the United States? The conventional thinking is that polarization weakens and distracts the United States, emboldening its adversaries. However, untested assumptions underlie this claim. We use two strategies to explore mechanisms linking domestic polarization and international rivalry. First, we field a survey experiment in China to examine how heightening perceptions of US polarization affects public attitudes toward Chinese foreign policy. Second, we investigate how US rival governments responded to an episode of extreme partisanship: the US Capitol attacks on January 6, 2021. Drawing on Integrated Crisis Early Warning System event data, we explore whether foreign rivals increased hostility toward the United States following the Capitol riots. Both studies fail to show robust evidence for the Emboldening Hypothesis. Extreme polarization has other negative consequences for American foreign policy, but we find no evidence that it makes adversaries materially more assertive toward the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article compares Russia's legal justifications for the use of force against Ukraine and past U.S. uses of force and the accompanying legal justifications for such force. Topics discussed include survey of six U.S. military operations, and any gaps or inconsistencies in the U.S.'s legal analysis, overview of Russia's stated justifications for invading Ukraine, and recommendations for a legal information strategy accompanying uses of military force.

The article shares reflections on the end of the Afghan war, which was referred as the forever war, and the limits of U.S. power. Topics discussed include discourses of declinism of the American empire, the geopolitical and military overreach of the U.S., and the decline of the West and rise of Asia/East. Also highlighted are the global perception of U.S. foreign policy and the new multipolar international system.

This Article argues that foreign affairs polarization in the United States is likely to result in increased judicial oversight in foreign affairs. The reasons are fivefold. First, increased polarization often leads to dramatic swings in foreign policy across electoral cycles, which is likely to disrupt the reliance interests of not only foreign states but also domestic private parties. Second, domestic private parties who can demonstrate that they have suffered concrete injuries to their reliance interests due to foreign policy instability may be more likely to overcome standing and other conventional obstacles to bringing claims. Third, in an era of polarization, government regimes may tend to encourage reliance by domestic private parties as a strategy to lock in policy and constrain the options of their successors. But when the government deliberately encourages reliance, it should bear the risks of foreign policy instability rather than domestic private parties. Fourth, courts are less likely to defer to presidential judgments in foreign affairs when they believe policy swings are motivated largely by partisan, rather than institutional, considerations. Fifth, on a more speculative note, there is a risk that the precedents and doctrines forged by courts in the resolution of low stakes private disputes involving reliance interests may then be deployed in cases where the stakes are much higher, such as controversies where parties are seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the President. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We treat U.S. foreign relations law as a discrete body of law--and it is. But it is not independent. To the contrary, it relies on the same institutional actors that govern more generally: the President, Congress, the federal judiciary, administrative agencies, and subnational governments. And far from being static, these institutions change radically over time in how they are constituted, in what internal rules they apply, and in what legal outputs they produce. The Trump Administration is a recent and painful example whose legacy continues to loom large, including on the Supreme Court. This symposium contribution considers what these broader institutional changes mean for foreign relations law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even as the Biden Administration's foreign policy unfolds, in 21st Century practice, foreign relations law seems to have largely become national security law. Virtually all foreign affairs issues have been reframed into national security terms. And because so much of foreign affairs law seems to have become justification for unilateral exercises of executive power, at times it seems almost like not law at all. This Keynote Address, based on a forthcoming book, describes the synergistic dysfunction among our national security institutions that has fostered these trends, explains why the major academic debates over foreign relations law have missed this most urgent issue, and suggests ways to slow the steady march toward executive unilateralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Survival discourse has emerged as a prominent theme in online discussions about the US–China trade war on the Chinese social media platform Zhihu. This study undertakes a critical discourse analysis of this emergent discourse by examining 80 answers (totaling 95,753 words) from Zhihu users within the broader context of the invocation of survival discourses in modern Chinese history. An intertextual method was adopted in this study, which helps us to better understand netizens' arguments in favor of the Chinese government's tough stance on the trade war with the US and the probable success of this strategy. The analysis reveals the historicity and intertextuality of these discourses, identifies strategies which are employed to support a tough stance on the trade war, and reflects on their implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though the slogan predates the Fourth UN World Conference on Women, 'women's rights are human rights' has become inextricably linked to US First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton's keynote address at the 1995 Conference in Beijing. The speech turned a line socialised by transnational feminist organisers into a State Department mantra with long‐lasting policy ripples still felt today. This article uses new sources from the Office of the First Lady to examine the intra‐departmental dynamics, policy architecture and domestic political considerations that shaped the content of the speech and the Clinton Administration's conception of women's rights as human rights. Early documents show that a focus on human rights was not inevitable, as other policy areas were better developed with more public support. But fear of rollback from previous international standards, external pressures from civil society, a desire to link foreign policy with domestic political aims and ultimately a strong backlash to American participation at the Conference on the basis of China's human rights record all elevated women's human rights as a US delegation priority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on an in-depth, qualitative case study about a conflict between governmental authorities from the United States and Switzerland over the regulation of Swiss banks, we introduce indirect compellence as a novel triadic and indirect mechanism through which coercion leads to institutional change. Hostage-taking being a prototypical example, indirect compellence is typified by a coercive actor who takes a third party hostage to gain influence over a targeted actor. In our case, it meant that U.S. authorities (coercers) compelled Swiss policy makers (targets) to erode the famed Swiss banking secrecy rules by threatening the targets to otherwise enforce U.S. law extraterritorially against Swiss banks and bankers (hostages). Our constructivist and target-centered perspective explains this type of coercive pressure in detail, and it also suggests that targeted policy makers judge and respond to it contingent on their political ideologies. Our study contributes to research on power and influence in institutional environments and to research on global business regulation and transnational governance. Most generally, it also expands scholarly understanding of triadic relationships. In contrast to Simmelian perspectives' focus on triads in which the third party is in a powerful brokerage position and frequently benefits as a tertius gaudens, our study suggests that the third party can also become a rather powerless tertius miserabilis who suffers rather than benefits from others' conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why does the United States either continue to support or turn its back on a friendly dictator once that dictator is faced with internal uprisings? This study argues that a US president's decision to either remain loyal to or abandon dictators when they are in trouble ultimately depends on the preservation of acquired influence (PAI). This argument is tested by considering three crises in which the White House was faced with a choice between prolonging support or abandoning established alliances with Batista in Cuba (1956–1959), Mobutu in Zaire (1990–1991), and Mubarak in Egypt (2011). In all three case studies, the PAI argument is found to account for observed variations in US foreign policy toward friendly dictators in trouble. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides an over view of the U.S. foreign policy. Topics discussed include the normative implications of recovering this all-too hidden dimension of judicial interventions; the U.S. Supreme Court case Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer on executive power; and an analysis of the foreign relations law.

Over the past six decades, the presidential transition scholarship has grown increasingly rich, yet little systematic attention has been paid to the foreign policy activities of the president‐elect. The idea that the United States has "one president at a time" may be a constitutional reality, but it is also a political fiction, more honored in the breach than in the observance. This article demonstrates how U.S. foreign policy operates along several simultaneous tracks during the formal transition period between the election and inauguration. We develop and illustrate a new framework for understanding the underexplored role and significance of the president‐elect as a foreign policy actor during the era of the "modern presidency." By refuting the notion that the president‐elect is a nonentity, this article lays the foundation for more active exploration of the foreign activities of presidents‐elect and their impact on U.S. foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A reassessment the nature of "alliances" and "alignments" since the end of the Cold War, both practically and conceptually, is long overdue. Treaty alliances have become partially obsolescent as new models of security cooperation, such as the 'strategic partnership', and other "minilateral" configurations, have emerged as preferred instruments of alignment. The evolving nature of alliance and alignment is nowhere better illustrated than in the metamorphosis of the venerable Hub-and-Spokes US alliance system in the Indo-Pacific. This article captures the changes occurring in the US alliance system from both a macro-level (structural) standpoint, before proceeding to the micro-level to evaluate individual alliance/partnership dyads to illustrate the complexion of the hub-and-spokes "plus" configuration of today. It argues that we are witnessing is a "reshuffling of the deck" in terms of traditional treaty allies – with Japan and Australia now forming the "core" of the system, with South Korea effectively confined as a "single-issue" alliance focused on the peninsula, and with Thailand and the Philippines (arguably) becoming increasingly "peripheral". But even as the original treaty-system contracts, Washington is seeking to "network" the original model through the acquisition of non-treaty strategic partnerships with key states such as India, Singapore, (and, more circumspectly – Taiwan), whilst also welcoming European engagement. This networking strategy is also designed to achieve second and third order effects through incentivisation of direct "spoke-to-spoke" security cooperation and through the concentration of allies/partners into minilateral formations. The resultant reconfiguration might be dubbed a Hub-and-Spokes "plus" model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historians now recognize the political significance the Protestant ecumenical movement of the early twentieth century. American ecumenists contributed to the architecture of international organization and were among the first to promote a global discourse of human rights, and ecumenical plans for world order were designed for the peaceful spread of national self-determination and to combat racial prejudice. Ecumenical missionaries were at the forefront in reconceiving race relations, globally as well as in the United States. But the overriding ecumenical concern was the creep of secularism, which, despite their modernism and liberalism, ecumenists saw as the root of all evil. In 1945, when forced to choose between their vision of world peace as secured through international organization and their desire for racial equality, ecumenists sacrificed the latter so as to protect religious liberty and advance the Protestant interest. Ironically, despite their longstanding criticisms, ecumenists had to accept the dictates of national sovereignty for the sake of religious universalism. The contours of the liberal international system that resulted from this compromise remain to this day. In addition to primary-source research, this article is based on a synthesis of a tsunami of recent secondary literature on liberal Protestant internationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses highlights of the 109th Capitol Hill conference hosted online by the Middle East Policy Council (MEPC) on July 29, 2022. Topics explored include the acknowledgment of the strategic importance of U.S.-Gulf relations by U.S. President Joe Biden, the impact of the increasing energy price volatility on economic recovery, and the cooperation between several countries such as the U.S., Canada, and Saudi Arabia on the launch of the Net-Zero Producers Forum (NPF).

Kuwait has forged a strong bilateral security alignment with the United States over the past three decades. But it has also pursued foreign policies that run counter to expressed American objectives and priorities in the Gulf and the broader Middle East. Why this happens can best be explained in terms of a combination of shifts in the overt US commitment to the partnership and changes in the level of threat in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was the product of aggressive “secondary sanctions”—innovative sanctions that put economic pressure on the target state by punishing states and entities that engage in transactions with the target state. Prior to the JCPOA, the United States used secondary sanctions to “outcast” Iran—isolate it from the international community. After Iran entered into the JCPOA, these sanctions were removed as a reward for its cooperation. In May 2018, however, the United States withdrew from the JCPOA and re-imposed the secondary sanctions in order to “re-outcast” Iran. But unlike the pre-JCPOA outcasting regime, the re-outcasting regime was not imposed in response to any violation of international law by Iran; instead, it was imposed for solely policy reasons. As a result, members of the international community condemned the use of secondary sanctions as politically motivated and illegitimate. Although the use of secondary sanctions is a relatively new phenomenon, it has become increasingly more prevalent since the Iran sanctions regime, serving as one of the main sources of pressure against nations such as Cuba, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela. In contrast to the growing prominence of secondary sanctions, however, the academic literature on the topic remains thin. This piece seeks to fill that gap. By comparing the pre-JCPOA outcasting regime with the re-outcasting regime, this piece provides a timely insight into the counter-productive consequences of imposing secondary sanctions for purely policy reasons. This piece highlights that without international law, secondary sanctions are viewed as illegitimate, which leads to defiance by states and creates a “chilling effect” that makes cooperation less attractive for the outcast. Thus, this piece proposes that the United States should only impose secondary sanctions in response to a state’s violation of international law in order to avoid undermining the power of these sanctions in the long run. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Concern about China's growing power is prompting the US to propose unprecedented spending in the Pacific Islands region. This article examines why and how the US seeks to advance engagement and explores implications for island nations. It traces the evolution of America's Pacific presence and analyses the Indo-Pacific Strategy which informs the new approach in fundamental ways. It argues that the strategy is problematic because it is driven by security concerns not shared by island leaders and increases the potential for conflict. It also suggests that the proposed policies are designed primarily to counter China, scattershot, and unlikely to address the priorities of the island nations themselves. As island nations are being drawn into a militarized strategy not of their making, the article proposes that it is time to recognize the dangers of a China-centric, transactional approach, and consider more appropriate ways for the US to build enduring regional relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the emergence of China as a global power and as a competitor of the U.S. and its implications for Euro-Atlantic security, adapted from remarks delivered to an IISS-Europe conference on the future of alliances. Topics discussed include the limitations in U.S. engagement in Europe and the Middle East as China's power increases in all its dimensions, the growth in economic and military power of China, and the response of the U.S. and China to the pandemic.

Religion is a topic that is taking precedence in the contemporary political landscape all over the world. Its previous exclusion from the topic of international relations has been overturned as scholars and policy makers alike have begun to realize its international pertinence. The goal of this project was to create a comprehensive literature review on the topic of religion and foreign policy in the Global North. This literature review examined 70 scholarly sources including policy briefs, journal articles, literature reviews, and books. In the literature examined, there was an emphasis on the American political landscape and its relationship with religion, with a particular focus on post-9/11 political rhetoric and the role of evangelical Christians in influencing policy-makers. There was also scholarship focusing on the discourse of religious freedom and how it varies between nations, as well as European approaches to the resurgence of religion globally. The literature review produced from this research project is comprehensive and detailed in its analysis of how religion is impacting international relations from various perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) diplomatic relations with China, and its search for greater autonomy through financial and political independence as its current Compact of Free Association with the United States comes up for review in 2023. The article draws on diplomatic histories overlooked in existing analyses of regional diplomacy in which Micronesians explore alternative options for how to best advance their collective future interests. These Micronesian narratives demonstrate that external powers and aid donors should not take their influence for granted, nor necessarily correlate their largesse with local respect. The priorities of Pacific nations are increasingly focused on mitigating the existential threat of climate change to their environments. Avoidable environmental damage to a reef in Pohnpei by the Chinese fishing vessel Ping Da 7 in late 2013 and subsequent refusals to remove the grounded vessel and clean up the damage provide just one example of the FSM having to review their external relations in response to differences between donors' promises and their practice. To maintain healthy relations with the FSM, this article argues that China and the United States need to respect and support the FSM as a sovereign nation with many compatible interests, but also occasional divergences in national priorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article compares and examines the U.S. foreign policy restraints offered by the Quincy Coalition and liberal internationalism. It discusses the aims of the Quincy coalition and how its visions and agendas are fatally flawed. It explores the insight of modern liberalism and internationalism which became the prime target of the Quincy schools. It points out that the restraints offered by the new liberalism are structured to address the central domestic and international problems.

The mortality experience for the cluster of US counties in the US-Mexico border region has not been well described. We calculated 2016--18 life expectancy for the border region (counties within 100 kilometers of the border), making key comparisons to the US overall and to nonborder counties in border states. Life expectancy from birth for the border region was 81.1 years, which was greater than for the US and for the nonborder counties of border states. However, the disparity in life expectancy between racial/ethnic subgroups in the border region was also greater, within a range of more than thirteen years. Although White, Black, and Asian residents of the border region could expect to live significantly longer than residents of the US and nonborder counties of border states, Hispanic and American Indian residents could not. Understanding the mortality experience via life expectancy can help public health professionals and leaders prioritize efforts to ensure that all border residents have an equal opportunity to live a long, healthy life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to the view that the rejection of human rights treaty membership has left the United States outside the formal international human rights system, the United States has played a key role in international human rights governance through congressionally mandated human rights monitoring and reporting. Since the mid- 1970s, congressional oversight of human rights diplomacy, which requires reporting on global human rights practices, has integrated international human rights law and norms into the execution of U.S. foreign policy. While the congressional human rights mandates have drifted from their original purpose to condition allocation of foreign aid, they have effectively embedded international human rights norms and law into congressional decision-making and the operations of executive branch agencies. Over the years, the reports issued pursuant to the mandates have also become an important international source of human rights fact-finding, influencing the ways in which courts, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international human rights institutions themselves interpret and apply human rights law. In this respect, congressional human rights reporting mandates--not congressional human rights treaty policy--have evolved as a driver of U.S. engagement with and interpretation of the protections of international human rights law. This Article draws on a variety of sources, including diplomatic correspondence, interviews with government officials, caselaw in domestic courts, and reporting by international human rights NGOs, to explore the effects of the congressional human rights reporting mandates. It demonstrates that what was designed as unilateral policy to enforce human rights has affected the construction of the U.S. human rights identity within the international system and the international human rights system itself. Operating separately and in parallel to targeted human rights sanctions legislation, the human rights reporting mandates demonstrate the active and effective participation of the United States in international human rights governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Socio-Technical Imaginaries (STI) approach in Science and Technology Studies (STS) has illuminated the central role of social imaginaries in shaping the politics of technology. Its emphasis on the multilinear forms of socio-technical development is a useful corrective to universalist explanations of technological change. However, STI lacks a clear account of how inter-societal interaction shapes the imaginaries of any given political community. Synthesizing STI with the theory of Uneven and Combined Development (UCD) can correct this shortcoming. UCD offers an ontology of universals and accompanying methodology of incorporated comparison, enabling STI to integrate inter-societal causality into its theoretical framework. A combined UCD and STI framework is examined in this paper through a focus on imaginaries of technological innovation in contemporary American foreign policy. Responding to the 'whip of external necessity', US foreign policy seeks to upend technological diffusion and impose global regulatory evenness on national forms of technological innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Primed by Amnesty International's reporting, inspired by interactions with a centrist exiled politician, and galvanised by a growing congressional human rights movement, in 1976 Representative Ed Koch introduced an amendment that ended military assistance to the Uruguayan government. The article demonstrates that Koch's efforts were part of a broader transnational campaign to end US support for the repressive Uruguayan government and how such a measure could be achieved despite executive branch resistance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The new Cold War has arrived in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the strategic level, Chinese economic and Russian military assertiveness have led the U.S. to think twice about its mistakes, which opened up a power vacuum in this strategic geopolitical realm. Until today, the U.S. has seemed to use three axes of alliances that have emerged as Israeli-based, flexible, and benefit-oriented alignments at the level of regional rivalry. These alignments, especially in the context of the Abraham Accords, are unfortunately expected to reinforce pre-existing divisions in the region unless a radical change occurs. This study examines how and why Washington must embrace the logic of alliance axes to shape the Eastern Mediterranean and explores the projected impact of the U.S.-initiated Abraham Accords on regional geopolitics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]