Search

This paper examines the changing geo-political situation in the Asia-Pacific Region from an Australian defense policy perspective. The article focuses on China, the US, and Indonesia and examines Australia's strategic defense needs for the coming decade. The paper concludes by laying out four strategic defense options for Australia, 1. maintaining the US alliance, 2. going back to "fortress Australia," 3. towards Asian integrations, and 4. the "New Zealand" option. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that a key factor in Myanmar's new approach towards China since 2011 has been the Myanmar government's foreign policy goal to reintegrate itself into the international community. The success of this approach is dependent on Myanmar's rapprochement with the United States, which requires both domestic political reforms and a foreign policy realignment - a need to reduce Myanmar's dependence on China, particularly in the context of US-China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region. In the context of China-Myanmar relations, the factors that have influenced Myanmar's China policy since 2011 are growing anti-China sentiment in Myanmar, growing concern over China's interference in Myanmar affairs, and the rapprochement with the United States. Myanmar's China policy shift, in terms of direction, is by no means to seek to be independent of China, but rather for there to be an increased interdependence between the two countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Contexto Internacional is the property of Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro, Instituto de Relacoes Internacionais and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article challenges the simplistic view that U.S. leadership in East Asia is weakening relative to China's increasing ability to shape the regional order, which will force other states to choose between these two powers. Based on interviews with political elites, analysts, and academics in the United States, China, Japan, and Indonesia, we argue that the East Asian order transition is more complex and nuanced, especially when we examine views toward: (1) the Sino–U.S. rivalry for regional leadership; (2) whether Chinese initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative disrupt the current order; and (3) the preferred vision of regional order for each of the four countries. While there is hardly a consensus view about issues of regional order, it appears that in the short to medium term, China is not expected to substantially overhaul the existing East Asian order. Nevertheless, Beijing is likely to chip away at U.S. regional leadership and, in the long term, would presumably seek to create an order that would sustain its rise and maintain its regional preponderance. The responses of other regional stakeholders toward these developments would be vital in shaping the collective impact on the East Asian order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's rise in recent years has exacerbated Vietnam–China security tensions over maritime disputes in the South China Sea. To manage its security competition with China, Vietnam has simultaneously improved its security cooperation with the United States while maintaining a safe distance from it, in efforts to reassure China. This article attempts to explore the dynamics of the Vietnam's security policy towards the United States and China in the Post-Cold War era. The authors find that the combinations of Vietnam's Post-Cold War security policy towards the United States and China are shaped by its concerns over regime security with respect to the primary threats of infiltration by US democratic norms and of excessive anti-Chinese nationalism. The relative levels of both these risks lead to various combinations of Vietnam's security policies vis-à-vis the United States and China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The American ‘return’ to East Asia is currently characterized by a particularly high degree of competition with Beijing among the small and medium powers of Southeast Asia, where the recent Chinese ‘charm offensive’ achieved its most significant outcomes. This article, hence, aims to explore the nature and patters of this ongoing process of strategic repositioning put into practice by Myanmar within the political triangle with Washington and Beijing. Against this backdrop, we will draw upon the conceptualization of ‘hedging strategy’, which identifies a set of multidimensional ‘insurance policies’ adopted by small actors in their relations vis-à-vis great powers. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Leadership at the regional level has come under the spotlight not only in the post-Cold War context, but also more recently following the global financial crisis. Yet, leadership by states within region-building and regional associations as leaders vis-à-vis other regions or powers remains relatively new territory for analysis and consideration, even though the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has attracted both admirers and sceptics. This introductory essay is intended to achieve two principal objectives regarding this symposium addressing Asia-Pacific regional leadership. First, we seek to put the ‘Asia-Pacific’ in historical context and identify some of the forces that have not only shaped but also hindered its realization. Recognizing China's historical role and contemporary rise is important to understand the parameters within which ASEAN and its member states seek to define particular visions of regional identity and enact collective enterprises. The other key background consideration when thinking about contemporary leadership in the Asia-Pacific is that the United States is seemingly in decline. The Asia-Pacific's two most consequential powers – the United States and China – are pervasive considerations for any regional organization that aims to lead and promote cooperation to solve collective action problems. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article analyses, the complex relationship between Tehran, Beijing and Washington on the Iranian nuclear issue. Indeed, China's policy towards Iran has often been described as ambiguous, in supporting Washington, on the one hand, while protecting Tehran, on the other hand. In this article, we argue that, in fact, Beijing policy vis-a-vis Tehran depends on the state of its relationships with Washington. Indeed, a closer analysis shows that China is using Iran as a bargaining chip with the United States on, among others, two key security issues, i.e., Taiwan and the oil supply. The guarantee of a secured oil supply from the Middle-East in addition to a comprehensive policy of the US with regard to Chinese security interests in Taiwan as well as the use of smart sanctions against Tehran, which would thus take into account, to a certain extent, Beijing economic interests in Iran, are, indeed, the guarantee of Beijing's support to the US policy towards Iran. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regional powers such as China, India, Russia, and to a lesser degree Brazil and South Africa, now occupy a significant role on the world stage. The United States, while still enjoying superpower status, has taken note. At the same time, the transnational nature of the challenges facing the world will require multilateral and bilateral co-operation perhaps unprecedented in modern history. How will the United States respond to these new requisites within the context of this changed world? While it is too early to assess the Obama administration's foreign policy substantively, it looks to be adopting an approach emphasising the building of consensus and multilateralism in its international engagement. Moreover, there is reason to expect that it will actively seek a more constructive set of relationships with regional powers. United States domestic political constraints may yet hamper Obama in this new approach, as might the type of response the new administration receives from old and new powers to its overtures. Whether the changes are more in tone than substance remains to be seen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigated request and refusal strategies in the question-response sequences of interactions in routine press conferences held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China and the US Department of State on the topic of the North Korea nuclear crisis during a period of 5 months. All utterances by journalists were identified as requests, and instances of spokes- persons' non-compliance with requests were considered to be refusals. Findings demonstrated that: (1) request for specific information was the most frequently adopted strategy in both US and Chinese press conferences, but more clarification and confirmation questions were used in the US data and more questions for comments were found in the Chinese data; (2) in the case of refusals, direct refusals and reasons for refusal were frequent in the US data while avoidance and insufficient answers were prevalent in the Chinese data. The cross-cultural differences in the strategies of requests and refusals are discussed briefly in relation to different ideological and cultural assumptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]