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As Chinese investment in foreign land and agriculture expands dramatically worldwide, a growing body of research has emerged on the prevalence of land deals in Latin America and Africa. Southeast Asia, however, has only recently begun to receive significant attention in these discussions. A deeper exploration of the Southeast Asian context offers crucial insights into understanding the puzzle of global land deals (why, where, how they occur) more broadly. This paper frames this exploration via an overview of regional land deal trends – focusing particularly on China’s emergence as a prolific investor in the Global South, and why Chinese investment is increasingly targeting Southeast Asia, especially vis-à-vis expanding flex and boom crop production. This paper aims to provide a broader contextualization for recent Southeast Asian case studies, and to highlight why more research in the region is key in deepening our understanding of global land deal trends. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article aims to contribute to the exploration of the ways through which Malaysia—the fourth largest economy in Southeast Asia—has engaged Chinese investment to pursue industrialization. It does so by comparing and contrasting the different approaches by which two of the most important Chinese-financed automobile projects, Chery Automobile's assembly operations in 2008 and Zhejiang Geely's partial acquisition of local producer Proton in 2017, have been embedded into the Malaysian political economy. While Chery Automobile ended up with a conundrum of extremely low local sales, Zhejiang Geely has fostered mutually beneficial partnerships with Proton and its cohort of suppliers that are shaped by the industry's ethnopolitical directives. More recently, Zhejiang Geely has exported an increasingly larger proportion of vehicles from its Malaysian operations. The contrasting fate of these projects illustrates that while they are driven by Chinese money and technological know-how, they are not necessarily Chinese-dominated. It is domestic politics—the establishment of a functional politico-commercial coalition in particular—that matters in shaping the outcome and impact of Chinese investment in Malaysia. More importantly, the paper highlights how foreign direct investment and the supposed (positive and negative) externalities are intimately tied to local factors such as political institutions and ethnocentric directives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Assessment of the likely impact of Chinese OFDI on the ASEAN members of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) requires understanding of the evolution of Chinese policy, regulations and institutions. Utilizing recent developments in institutional theory, this paper examines the interplay between China's OFDI regulations and enterprise supportive policies. Liberalization of FDI regulations complements policies of technological catch-up and the development of regionally focused multilateral institutions. Evidence of an increasing level of Chinese OFDI since 2003, and of a larger share attracted to the BRI group, particularly the ASEAN countries, is consistent with the theorizing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Southeast Asian economic sentiments toward China tend to dither between competitive and cooperative instincts. Initial warmth among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members toward the China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is slowly giving way to project-related concerns as well as fears that "China is buying the world". This paper examines Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) in global and ASEAN contexts shortly after the start of the country's "going out" strategy. The analysis draws on country- and firm-level investment data. It shows that a handful of ASEAN economies have become more important to Chinese investors as their motivations, capabilities and needs evolve. Nonetheless, with the exception of three (Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar), ASEAN economies have not become "reliant" on Chinese investment post-BRI launch, once one considers the increased weight China carries as a foreign investor in the developing world. This is either because these countries generally do not rely on FDI, or because traditional foreign investors from industrialized economies and more advanced ASEAN member states are far more entrenched than Chinese investors in the host economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on data for actual and approved Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from 1989-2011, this paper explores the major trends in FDI in Myanmar, focusing on changes over time in the source and sector of investment. It argues that over the last decade Myanmar's inward FDI has become heavily concentrated in the extractive and power sectors, while investment in manufacturing, services and other secondary and tertiary sectors has been almost non-existent. This is mostly the result of a poor investment climate, including import and export regulations, a weak judicial system, currency controls and weak property rights. The paper shows that China, Hong Kong, South Korea and Thailand have been the main investors in Myanmar, while Singapore, India and Western countries invested little in the 2000s. This divergence is driven partly by the differing investment patterns of the source countries, yet also reflects commercial and geopolitical realities, sanctions and concerns over energy security. The paper then examines whether and how FDI can lead to economic development in Myanmar, and, closes by discussing the importance of recent political and economic reforms for rebalancing Myanmar's FDI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When ASEAN celebrated its fiftieth anniversary, it was asked if an organization founded on principles appropriate for the 1960s remains relevant today. Its critics point to the organization's recent failures to indicate that continued reliance on the "ASEAN Way" puts it on the road to irrelevance. Its defenders argue that the peace and stability that ensued since the Association's formation are testimony that the ASEAN formula works. Both conclusions are based on what commentators on either side of the debate believe ASEAN's role should be. This paper argues that an assessment should, instead, be based on what its members want it to do, expressed through policy announcements and documents like the ASEAN Charter. It should also consider the totality of its mandate from diplomacy to economics. Viewed in this way, the grouping has accomplishments to be proud of, but also some failures to regret. The 'ASEAN Way', upheld steadfastly by its member countries' leadership, has been instrumental to both its successes and failures. Overall, while ASEAN may not live up to the expectations of its critics, its achievements in some areas do suggest its continued relevance even under vastly changed circumstances, both domestic and external. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses foreign direct investment from Southeast Asia to China. With the exception of some government-linked companies, most investments from Southeast Asia have been dominated by the region's overseas Chinese businesses. In addition to cheap labour costs, large domestic market and growing economy, China has provided business opportunities to investors from Southeast Asia thanks to their geographic proximity and ethnic connections, at least during the initial investment period. However, the network effects seem to decline soon after. As the Chinese economy becomes more globalised and more competitive, the success of foreign investment in China will increasingly depend on business competency rather than ethnic relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study applies a comparative political economy approach to institutional theory by considering institutional convergence and geopolitics as determinants of Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). Using country-level data for a sample of Asian countries, including Bamboo Network countries or countries with prominent overseas Chinese business networks in Southeast Asia, and other countries identified in the Varieties of Capitalism literature, the dynamic panel analysis from 2007 to 2019 finds that Chinese OFDI is significantly positively affected by the interaction between greater formal institutional distance from China and a similar state-backed institutional configuration. Conversely, active territorial disputes with China and formal arbitral proceedings against this country have significant and negative effects. This study finds that Chinese OFDI in general and specifically the reversal of the Bamboo Network, or the flowing back of Chinese capital into Southeast Asian economies that initially invested in China's rise and integration into the global economy, are conditioned upon geopolitical tensions and convergence in terms of institutional configuration but not institutional distance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past few years, China has experienced a rapid development of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN.) In particular, the formation of CAFTA (the China--ASEAN Free Trade Area) will greatly encourage Chinese multinational corporations to "go out" and invest in ASEAN. However, the South China Sea disputes between China and several ASEAN countries have increased the political risks of China's FDI in ASEAN. This paper starts with an analysis of the political risks of China's FDI in ASEAN against the background of the South China Sea disputes, explains how to view and assess these political risks, and then comes up with a systematic and comprehensive mechanism for coping with the political risks of China's FDI in ASEAN against the background of the South China Sea disputes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analysis of data on flows and stocks refutes the argument that China and Southeast Asia are engaged in a zero-sum competition for foreign investment. Although Southeast Asia appears to have lost out to Chinese-manufactured exports in global markets, this has been balanced by substantial increases in exports of components to China itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this new age of globalization, regions attempt to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in order to achieve regionally balanced development. We revisit existing theories of regional development and FDI by analyzing recent data sets on FDI, employment, and trade in China, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. Using Chinese provincial data in 2004, 2008, and 2013 and applying panel estimations, our econometric results demonstrate that FDI remarkably influenced the concentration of employment in manufacturing, financial, and business services industries within the three Chinese macro‐regions. We also find that FDI is ever transient, always moving away from high‐cost to low‐cost production bases across different regions. This transient nature of FDI is spatially selective and biased, and not able to generate the trickle‐down effects to other neighboring regions. That is why FDI recently moved from China to Southeast and South Asia rather than from its coastal to inland regions. Furthermore, we show that this nature of FDI generally leads to polarization development for regions. As a synthesis or extension of the existing theories, we propose a leapfrog polarization pattern and strategy for vast developing countries in considering their regional development strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unlike the period before World War II, the Malaysian Chinese no longer look towards China as a home they will ultimately return to. This is seen in the flow of funds to China from the Malaysian Chinese. Before the war the motivation was patrimonial. The funds were in the form of patriotic bonds and collections and remittances that went to the home provinces of the Malaysian Chinese mostly in Fujian and Guangdong. Since the 1990s the funds flow has mainly been in the form of investment meant for gaining profit. This motivation was not different from that of business investors from other nations investing in China. It is important to demonstrate this motivation in order to allay suspicions by indigenous Southeast Asians that the Chinese who live in Southeast Asia are diverting funds meant for Southeast Asia to China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The importance of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a driver of economic development is no longer a secret. As a result, the competition to attract FDI is getting stiffer as any economy in the world is currently eyeing for FDI, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). With the emergence of China as a new attractive location for FDI, and as part of the alternatives to further enhance the attractiveness of ASEAN, this study analyses the role of institutional quality on FDI inflows into ASEAN. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our simulations of a global macroeconomic model suggest that China's WTO accession could create significant welfare losses in the ASEAN-4 if foreign direct investment (FDI) is significantly redirected away from these countries toward China, and if the ASEAN-4 countries are unable to implement policies to make up for the slower rate of technological diffusion from the reduced FDI inflow. If the ASEAN-4 do not fall behind technologically, then they will be able to find lucrative niches within the lengthened international manufacturing production chains. The ASEAN-4 must therefore strengthen their abilities to absorb new foreign technologies quickly and to engage in indigenous technical innovations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]