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This article reviews the authors' earlier attempts to incorporate the theories of capital and investment into fisheries economics and argues that such dynamic analysis is now of immediate policy relevance. It also discusses some limitations to the earlier analysis and means of addressing them. It then goes on to point to two areas of potential future research, with the first of these being an expansion of work initiated by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and others on the economics of the required massive investment in hitherto overexploited capture fishery resources, giving particular emphasis to the consequences of non-malleable human capital. The second concerns intra-EEZ management of fishery resources and the growing need for greater application of game theory to the management of such resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the introduction of the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) regime, North Sea coastal states have cooperated in the management of shared stocks. Norway and the EU have jointly managed six shared stocks through the 1980 Agreement which includes the annual setting of total allowable catch quotas (TACs), quota shares and access agreements. This article first attempts to explain in a game theoretic context why cooperative management of shared North Sea fish stocks has been stable for more than 40 years. Brexit represented a shock to the cooperative agreement, and there are now three parties to the negotiations. The UK EEZ is important not only for British fishermen, but also for Norway and the EU27. The UK and the EU have agreed on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement which includes fisheries, but Norway and the UK have not yet reached a fisheries agreement. In the second part of the article we analyse the UK-EU fisheries agreement, the continuation of the 1980 Agreement, and the future fisheries relationship between the UK and Norway. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]