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Rights‐based fisheries management (RBFM) seeks to create market incentives to reduce competition, avoid overexploitation, and increase economic efficiency. Particularly for artisanal fisheries, however, assumptions of RBFM may not be met and its use needs to be carefully considered. This study applies an existing tool (SEASALT) to evaluate the strength of RBFM based on attributes of security, exclusivity, fish mortality, scale, responsibility, limitations, and transferability. Results for 17 fisheries in Mexico show a positive (nonsignificant) relationship between the strength of RBFM and stock status, and no effect on prices or landed value. Real‐world fisheries governance systems are much more complex than the simple linkages between attributes implied in SEASALT, but results highlight pre‐existing monitoring and enforcement capacity as essential for successful RBFM. Transitions to RBFM may strengthen this capacity, but likely cannot create it where it does not already exist. Based on our findings, RBFM strategies may benefit from group quotas with limited transferability to avoid negative social outcomes from consolidation or rent capture by intermediaries; this could potentially build on the latent capacity of traditional community associations common in many artisanal fisheries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]