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The magnitude of subsidies provided to the fishing sector by governments worldwide is immense—an estimated $35.4 billion USD per year. The majority of these subsidies may be impeding efforts to sustainably manage fisheries by incentivizing overfishing and overcapacity. Recognizing the threat these subsidies pose, the World Trade Organization has set a goal of reaching an agreement that would end fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity, overfishing, and illegal fishing. However, negotiations have been hampered by uncertainty around the likely effects of reforming these subsidies. Here we present a novel method for translating a bioeconomic model into an interactive online decision support tool that draws upon real-world data on fisheries subsidies and industrial fishing activity so users can directly compare the relative ambition levels of different subsidy reform options. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is in a unique position to deliver on Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 14.6 by reforming global fisheries subsidies in 2020. Yet, a number of unanswered questions threaten to inhibit WTO delegates from crafting a smart agreement that improves global fisheries health. We combine global data on industrial fishing activity, subsidies, and stock assessments to show that: (1) subsidies prop up fishing effort all across the world's ocean and (2) larger subsidies tend to occur in fisheries that are poorly managed. When combined, this evidence suggests that subsidy reform could have geographically-extensive consequences for many of the world's largest fisheries. While much work remains to establish causality and make quantitative predictions, this evidence informs the rapidly-evolving policy debate and we conclude with actionable policy suggestions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fuel forms a significant portion of the total expenditure for many commercial fishing vessels and in some cases, profitability can be dictated by fuel costs. In many nations, including the UK, these fuel costs are reduced by cost-reducing subsidies. There is evidence of growing support from various channels that public opinion is moving towards a reassessment of fuel subsidies. Analysis of the economics of the UK fishing fleet, using publicly available industry-supplied data, implies that the nominal annual value of fuel tax concessions for diesel is between £ 150–180 million per year (2009–2019). That support is largely provided to the most fuel-intensive fishing methods, such as mobile demersal trawls and dredges. Results show that, without the current fuel tax concession, several fleet segments would be deemed unprofitable. This paper outlines the current value of fuel tax concessions for fishing vessels and potential policy considerations for reform. • Foregone government revenue via fisheries fuel subsidies ranged between £ 150–180 m. per year. • UK fleet segments unprofitable without fuel subsidies assuming no changes in fuel use, engine efficiency or activity. • The most fuel intensive fleet segments are more likely to become unprofitable if fuel tax concessions were removed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies adopted in June 2022 is potentially a step forward for ocean sustainability. Yet, its success in removing fisheries subsidies contributing to illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and overfishing more generally, will depend on its scope, its effective interpretation, and broad implementation. Here we focus on Article 5.1, which, in its narrowest interpretation prohibits fishing subsidies in areas not covered by Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and Regional Fishery Management Organizations (RFMOs) but in its broadest interpretation prohibits subsidies for any unregulated fisheries in the high seas. This study finds that only ∼1.35% of the high seas are not spatially covered by at least one RFMO, and most of that area are frozen parts of the high seas with little to no fishing. This means that if Article 5.1 is interpreted to mean the area of the high seas not managed under RFMOs, then the effect of Article 5.1 will be minimal or non-existent even if the article is fully implemented. Many RFMOs, however, are only mandated to regulate a few species, such as tunas. Much of the potential impact of Article 5.1 thus could rest on the definition of the 'competence of a relevant RFMO,' which we argue should be defined based on both area and species of competence. To make the Article meaningful in terms of removing harmful subsidies that impact the sustainability of high seas fish stocks, additional clarifying provisions to Article 5.1 to reaffirm that it applies to both unregulated areas and species outside of the competence of relevant RFMOs are needed. • Article 5 prohibits subsidies provided to fishing outside national jurisdictions and the competence of RFMOS. • We find that only 1.35% of the area of the high seas are outside the geographical jurisdiction of RFMOs. • A geographical interpretation of Article 5.1 would achieve little for protecting fish against harmful subsidies. • Article 5 must be based on both species and areas not under the competence and relevance of RFMOs to reduce overfishing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Harmful fisheries subsidies contribute to overfishing leading to environmental and societal impacts. If only fisheries and ecosystems within the subsidising nations' jurisdiction were affected, then unilateral actions might be sufficient to help safeguard our ocean and the people reliant upon it. However, just as fish move between jurisdictions, so too do the subsidised fishing fleets that target them. As such, the impacts and solutions to subsidies-induced overfishing are often matters of international concern. Mapping the distribution and flows of harmful subsidies is therefore key to understanding these concerns, informing multilateral reform, and empowering impacted nations to strengthen the terms of access to their waters and resources. Here we quantify the amount of harmful fisheries subsidies that supports fishing in the high seas, domestic and foreign waters. We estimate that between 20% and 37% of all harmful fisheries subsidies support fishing in foreign waters or the high seas, that is outside the jurisdictions of the subsidising nations. We show that harmful subsidies primarily originate from nations with high-Human Development Index (HDI), strong fisheries management capacity and relatively sustainable fish stocks, yet disproportionately impact nations with low or very low-HDI, lower management capacity and more vulnerable fish stocks—40% of the harmful subsidies that support fishing in very low-HDI nations waters originate from high-HDI and very-high HDI nations. We show that Asia, Europe, and North America, are net subsidy sources; they provide more harmful subsidies to their fishing fleets than their respective ecosystems are impacted by; while Africa, South, Central America and Caribbean, and Oceania are net subsidy-sinks. This discrepancy between the source of harmful subsidies and the nations that are ultimately impacted is unsustainable and unjust. Prohibiting all harmful subsidies to distant-water fishing and fishing in the high seas—with narrow exceptions for Small Island Developing States—should be prioritised to support the advancement of sustainable and equitable fisheries worldwide. • We quantify the amount of harmful subsidies supporting fishing in the high seas, domestic and foreign waters. • Between 20% and 37% of harmful subsidies support fishing in foreign waters or the high seas. • Harmful subsidies unequally affect low or very low-HDI nations, with low management capacity and vulnerable fish stocks. • Asia, Europe and N. America are net subsidy sources; providing more harmful subsidies than their ecosystems are affected by. • Marine ecosystems within Africa, Oceania, South, Central America, and Caribbean, are net subsidy-sinks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Harmful fisheries subsidies have historically contributed to fleet overcapacity and continue to be allocated to the fishing industry to artificially maintain its profitability. However, in this contribution we show that removing harmful subsidies and reducing overfishing will help to recover the resource biomass, subsequently leading to increased levels of sustainable catches, income and well-being of fishers, and reduces inequities in income and consumption when fish stocks are not effectively managed. Maintaining harmful fisheries subsidies is socially and economically inefficient. Taking the example of the EU fishing fleet, one of the largest fishing fleets in the world, we use the total factor productivity to show that small-scale fishing fleet's productivity is almost two-fold in the North Atlantic and 16% higher in the Mediterranean and Black seas compared to large-scale vessels. This result is explained because the harmful fisheries subsidies disproportionately allocated to large-scale vessels introduce distortions in the efficient allocation of inputs. With critical WTO negotiations ongoing regarding the global rules on fisheries subsidies, the EU must take advantage of the opportunity to lead a desirable transformative change while also supporting developing nations to truly achieve global sustainable and equitable fisheries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

November 2021 could see members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) reach an agreement to prohibit harmful fisheries subsidies, culminating over 20 years of negotiation and discussion. This commentary highlights strengths and places where the current draft text can be improved to ensure the agreement truly contributes to sustainable and equitable fisheries. Overall, conditionalities and exemptions are better streamlined and defined, time periods to enter into compliance are allowed yet reasonably short, types of subsidies to be particularly avoided are clearly noted, and appropriate emphasis is placed on reducing impacts from distant-water and transboundary fishing fleets. Key places for improvement relate to unspecific language on supporting fisher incomes, the uniform handling of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fisheries (IUU), and transparency in distant water fisheries, issues partly stemming from historical definitions that are useful for some fisheries but may not capture the complexity of others. Capacity-enhancing subsidies should be avoided, and it is important to avoid further negative impacts on marginalized fisher populations. Given the importance of reaching an agreement without further delay, we urge members to proactively and inclusively formalize their fishing definitions and practices to prevent inequitable outcomes for vulnerable fishers during the implementation stage of a new agreement. A WTO agreement to prohibit harmful fisheries subsidies is an opportunity to catalyze the design and funding of improved and cooperative national and international fisheries policy and management strategies, to the benefit of fishers, global seafood production, and indeed all who hold relationships with our oceans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article calls on the World Trade Organization (WTO) to eliminate harmful fisheries subsidies to curb overfishing, biodiversity degradation and loss, and carbon dioxide emissions. Fisheries subsidies that cause harm include those that lower the cost of fuel and vessel construction, those that provide price support to keep market prices artificially high, and those provided to distant-water fishing fleets.

In line with Target 14.6 of the Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations (SDGs), the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been tasked with achieving a multi-lateral agreement on eliminating harmful fisheries subsidies. Despite almost two decades of negotiations and increasing public attention, an agreement remains elusive. There are numerous roadblocks to these negotiations, but one key issue is that there is no clear metric for the potential scale and relative impact of fishery subsidies. As such, much attention has been targeted towards the provision of large sums of subsidies to industrial and distant-water fleets, and the subsidies provided by the largest subsidising countries—the top seven together provide over 65% of the global total. This large percentage justifies the focus on these countries but doing so alone and without understanding the context within which the subsidies are provided, may ignore pervasive impacts of subsidies unrelated to their scale, such as their inequitable distribution. Using recently available data and various scaling analyses we developed a series of different subsidy metrics in order to broaden our understanding of the distribution of fisheries subsidies. We show that different global regions and individual countries could be considered as 'top' subsidisers, depending on the metric used. This highlights a potential issue of focusing on the absolute amounts provided as a de facto indicator of harm alone, which can detract from efforts by developing countries to redirect their harmful subsidies towards better support for their fishers and industries. Failure to eliminate harmful fisheries subsidies has ramifications across the SDGs and across global regions, regardless of the absolute amount of subsidies that are being provided therein. • Calculating subsidy intensity considers the economic context of subsidy provision and facilitates broader debate. • Different regions and countries could be considered 'large subsidisers' when considering subsidies as a proportion of catch. • Using different subsidy intensity metrics highlights that there is more to subsidisation than the absolute size of a subsidy. • Subsidy intensity metrics highlight the need for a multilateral agreement to eliminate harmful subsidies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is in the final stages of negotiating an agreement to prohibit harmful fisheries subsidies, thereby achieving UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 14.6. An effective agreement should be viewed as an opportunity for nations to proactively transition towards sustainable and equitable fisheries and pave the path for other SDGs. Supporting fishers does not require harmful subsidies, and we provide evidence-based options for reform that highlight equity needs while reducing environmental harm. Subsidy reforms need clear goals, co-design, transparency, and fair implementation. An agreement on SDG 14.6 could be a turning point for the oceans and for the well-being of those that depend on the oceans for livelihoods and nutrition. Responsible seafood production will require international cooperation not only at WTO, but among governments, fisher organizations, civil society, and the wider public. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The World Trade Organization's (WTO) has committed to achieving a multilateral and legally binding agreement to eliminate fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfished stocks, and to illegal, unreported, and unregulated fisheries. This agreement is due in December of 2019 and also represents UN Sustainable Development Goal 14.6. A strong agreement would benefit fishers and marine environments, represent a milestone for multilateralism and both international and national fisheries policy, and become the first global achievement of a SDG target. To help discussions and negotiations focus on real challenges, we briefly dispel five myths related to harmful fisheries subsidies. Harmful fisheries subsidies are not effective at competing with large fishing nations and worsen poverty in the long-term. The worst effects of harmful subsidies occur when management capacity is limited, and overexploitation and overcapacity in one region can impact others. Because most global stocks are already exploited at least at maximum sustainable levels, more fishing capacity is unnecessary. Turning away from harmful subsidies can enable new investments to benefit fishing communities, national economies, and marine ecosystems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The period from 2019 to 2020 is critical in determining whether the World Trade Organization (WTO), tasked with eliminating capacity-enhancing fisheries subsidies, can deliver to the world an agreement that will discipline subsidies that lead to overfishing. Here, following extensive data collection efforts, we present an update of the current scope, amount and analysis of the level of subsidisation of the fisheries sector worldwide. We estimate global fisheries subsidies at USD 35.4 billion in 2018, of which capacity-enhancing subsidies are USD 22.2 billion. The top five subsidising political entities (China, European Union, USA, Republic of Korea and Japan) contribute 58% (USD 20.5 billion) of the total estimated subsidy. The updated global figure has decreased since the most recent previous estimate from 2009, of USD 41.4 billion in 2018 constant dollars. The difference between these two estimates can be largely explained by improvements in methodology and the difference in the actual amount of subsidies provided. Thus, we consider direct statistical comparison of these numbers to be inappropriate. Having said that, the difference between the estimates suggest that the increase in fisheries subsidies provided in the preceding decades may have halted. Still, the bulk of harmful 'capacity-enhancing' subsidies, particularly those for fossil fuels have actually increased as a proportion of total subsidies. As such, for the benefit of marine ecosystems, and current and future generations of people, all hands must be on deck in helping the WTO reach a meaningful agreement to discipline subsidies that lead to overcapacity and overfishing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]