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• We analyze the drivers of sovereign rating phases via discrete-time Weibull models. • For speculative-rated sovereigns, reputation build-up as good borrowers is gradual. • The reputation of investment-grade sovereigns remains unchanged as time passes. • The length of both phases significantly depends on the country's economic conditions. • Better governance quality helps to reduce the duration of speculative-grade phases. Using long-term sovereign ratings data for a panel of 130 countries over the last three decades, we investigate the duration and determinants of sovereign rating phases through the lens of discrete-time Weibull models. We find that the likelihood of the end of the 'speculative-grade' phase increases as time goes by (i.e. there is positive duration dependence), but the 'investment-grade' phase is not duration dependent. Thus, for sovereigns rated as speculative, the build-up of reputation as good borrowers is a gradual process, whereas the reputation of investment-grade sovereigns solidifies and remains unchanged as time passes. However, the length of both phases significantly depends on the country's economic conditions. In particular, lower inflation, stronger growth and sounder fiscal policies shorten (prolong) the speculative- (investment-) grade phase. In addition, better governance quality helps to reduce the duration of speculative-grade phases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the presence of political cycles in Portuguese Governments' expenditures using monthly data over the period 1991-2013 for the main categories of government expenditures. The results indicate that Portuguese Governments act opportunistically regarding the budget surplus and that they favour capital instead of current spending near to the elections. Moreover, right-wing governments are more prone to reduce expenditures and deficits after the elections than left-wing ones. A deeper disaggregated analysis of the components of government expenditures corroborates these findings while disentangling other relevant patterns of political manipulation in Portugal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the presence of political cycles inside the Portuguese governments’ aggregate expenditures by using annual data for 10 expenditure components. The results indicate that the choice of the expenditure components to be increased during election periods by Portuguese governments generally relates to more visible items such as general public services, social protection and health care. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Building on a narrative approach to identify episodes of fiscal consolidation, data for a group of seventeen industrial countries over the period 1978–2009, and continuous-time duration models, we find evidence suggesting that the likelihood of a fiscal consolidation ending increases over time, but only for programmes that last fewer than six years. Additionally, fiscal consolidations tend to last longer in non-European than in European countries. Our results emphasize that chronic fiscal imbalances might lead to a vicious austerity cycle, while discipline in the behaviour of fiscal authorities is a means of achieving credible and shorter adjustment measures. Therefore, fiscal fatigue is likely to compromise the implementation and successfulness of fiscal consolidation programmes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy has been criticised for giving more attention to price stabilisation in Europe rather than encouraging higher growth and employment. It is now largely accepted that the Maastricht norms reinforced by the Stability Pact have imposed serious macroeconomic constraints on economic performance by not taking into account specific problems of the individual economies. An interesting issue to examine is how the Maastricht obligations and the Stability Pact restrictions have affected the process of real convergence between the European economies in the last two decades. The purpose of this paper is to test for convergence in living standards, productivity, investment and unemployment among the European countries. From this analysis and using panel data estimation techniques, it is possible to detect any significant influence (favourable or not) of the Maastricht rules on real convergence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]