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Population aging has led to the establishment of Healthcare Real Estate Investment Trusts (HC-REITs) to boost the supply of nursing homes, but these initiatives have met with contrasting success in different countries. This paper bridges two strands of research on financialization, social welfare and the built environment, to explain the uneven geography of HC-REIT development in France, the UK and Japan. It argues that nation-specific processes of nursing home securitization are shaped by the interrelationships between three crucial factors: (i) the regime of retirement income, (ii) public policies dedicated to long-term institutional care and (iii) the power relations between the REITs and care providers themselves. Drawing on discussions with experts in these sectors, the paper demonstrates that liberal welfare states such as the UK have an especially attractive profile for Healthcare REIT investors due to the advanced state of financialized pension reforms, significant state disengagement in the provision of long-term care and REIT-friendly regulations that facilitate investment operations and leases. On the one hand, these tendencies are driving financial investors to satisfy a growing demand for retirement savings in niche markets such as Healthcare REITs. On the other hand, value extraction is being increasingly sought through the capture of care-dependent residents' home equity. By linking social benefit provisioning to later life housing accommodation, this article casts important light on current debates on the political economy of real estate financialization, while also emphasizing the need for continued state support for long-term institutional care. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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There is an ongoing debate within political economy on how finance affects capital–labour relations. Industrial relation scholars have demonstrated that financialization empowers capital and induces the liberalization of industrial relations. Additionally, meso and macro level studies show that finance reduced the labour share during neoliberalism. However, the literature is relatively limited and does not extend to the pre‐WWII period. Considering finance as historically integral to capitalism, this paper estimates the impact of finance on the labour shares of France (1911–2010) and Sweden (1891–2000). The results show that mortgage debt decreases the labour shares of both countries, thus, the financialization of households induces industrial discipline historically. However, the negative effect is substantially smaller in Sweden where housing finance is state‐led and bargaining coordination is centralized over the last century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Discussion Papers is the property of Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The discipline of comparative political economy (CPE) relies heavily on aggregate, country-level economic indicators. However, the practices of multinational corporations have increasingly undermined this approach to measurement. The problem of indicator drift is well documented by a growing critical literature and calls for systematic methodological attention in CPE. We present the case for a rocky but ultimately rewarding middle road between indicator fatalism and indicator faith. We illustrate our argument by examining two important cases—Sweden's recent export success and the financialization of non-financial corporations in France. A careful parsing of the data suggests corrections to common characterizations of the two cases. Swedish exports have been reshaped by intragroup trade among foreign subsidiaries of domestic corporations. The growth of financial assets held by French firms is attributable to the growth of foreign direct investment and to cumulative revaluation effects, while what remains of financialization is concentrated among the very largest firms. Based on these findings, we propose a methodological routine that parses data by zooming in on the qualitative specifics of countries, sectors, and firms, while using all available options for disaggregation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The term 'financialization' is often used to describe the major changes that occurred in the macroeconomic regimes of most developed and, to a lesser extent, emerging economies since the beginning of the 1980s. In the present paper, we propose a reappraisal of the notion of the cost of capital and subsequently argue that financialization in France has increased the cost of capital for nonfinancial corporations with new standards of financial profitability. We introduce a measurement for what could be called the over-cost of capital and describe how the evolution of this additional financial burden may explain the slowdown in the pace of capital accumulation, and thus the drop in French macroeconomic performance observed for the past 30 years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Taking as its focus the growth of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) in France, this paper explores the remaking of the French property market in both conceptual and concrete terms. In doing so, it reconstructs how public bodies of the national state, in interaction with domestic property companies, have reconfigured the French urban property sector by (i) introducing new market regulations and tax decrees; (ii) enabling French REITs to engage in property development; (iii) creating a REIT within the state; and by (iv) initiating the large-scale urban redevelopment project of Grand Paris in which French REITs manifest themselves as urban partners. By paying attention to the relative importance of national regulatory state power within, what is after all, a multi-scalar state system, the paper unravels how the introduction of REITs has shaped and reshaped (i) finance and property markets; (ii) the urban built environment; and (iii) the state apparatus itself. The paper concludes that the French state has created a financialized urban governance regime in which REITs, of which one is publicly owned, exercise considerable autonomy. As such, it makes a historical-analytical contribution to the debate on the financialization of urban development, and the role of the state in this process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2008 global financial meltdown has redirected attention to the entwinement of financial markets and the urban built environment. Against that background, recent works in urban political economy have focused on how city governments support the rent-maximisation strategies of landowners, thereby reinforcing 'the increasing tendency to treat land as a financial asset' (Harvey, [1982]2006). However, this perspective paradoxically understates the importance of market finance actors, neglecting to demonstrate how, in practice, such financial investors, who have been shown to adopt selective investment practices, shape urban redevelopment projects. In this article, the role of financial investors is analysed through a case study of a large-scale redevelopment project on the outskirts of the Paris city-region (city of Saint-Ouen). The analysis of negotiations over urban design and economic development issues -- raised by property developers seeking to fashion commercial properties as investment assets -- reveals the unevenness of a local authority's ability to implement an agenda that potentially diverges from the expectations of financial investors. Accordingly, given the growing importance of investors in the ownership of the built environment, the article considers urban redevelopment as the outcome of power relations that originate in the circulation of investors' expectations. These expectations are met through translating market finance categories (risk, return and liquidity) into elements of the urban fabric. This bears substantial consequences for policy-making, given the current context of austerity, as municipal authorities are increasingly constrained to rely on property markets. Urban redevelopment projects are thereby increasingly shaped to provide investment assets for financial investors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite experiencing an early and protracted neoliberal transformation, France has exhibited an acutely ambiguous stance towards neoliberal practice. This is illustrated by, for example, regular nationwide protests opposed to policies with an overtly neoliberal flavour, or the coexistence of heavy taxation and a profound financialisation of its economy. This article seeks to explain why neoliberalism successfully developed in France, despite such an ambiguity. The focus will be placed on the transformation of labour relations, which will reveal the important role played by both the technocratic elite and firm-level negotiations in legitimating neoliberal practice. It will be argued that while several relevant sociological explanations offer some valuable insights for making sense of neoliberalism's successful development in France, Antonio Gramsci's concept of 'passive revolution' provides a very fruitful basis upon which to capture the singularity of the French case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Financialization, even contested, is a major focus of contemporary urban studies. The growing interest of institutional investors in real estate investments has been the subject of in-depth analyses that have suggested the need to critically examine their weight in contemporary urban production. Have investors become the new masters of the urban fabric, to the detriment of historical players such as property developers or local authorities? This article informs the discussion by looking at developers at work and identifying how financial profitability calculations could have invaded their activities. Based on a qualitative survey conducted in France on practising or retired professionals, it shows that there has actually been a surprising degree of stability in professional practices over the past 50 years, even though the economic environment changed at the beginning of the 1990s. Since the origins of the property development sector in France, the real estate firms have had close ties with the financial industry and have been using financial instruments. This is why they were considered as 'financial natives', while employees at the operational level remain outside the scope of the colonization of organizations by financial quantifications. The specific nature of real estate work, particularly its political component, means that decisions lower down in these companies cannot be guided solely by financial ratios. The extent of the changes triggered by the massive arrival of financial investments has not been as great as it may seem, since developers appear to have maintained most of their ability to influence contemporary urban governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The privatization of France Telecom (FT) in 1997 led to the implementation of a profit-oriented financialization strategy. An unforgiving work environment was developed, which has unsettled many employees. Between February 2008 and October 2011, 69 employees took their own life. Many left notes blaming management for having privileged the interests of shareholders over those of employees. Through interviews with employees and professional practitioners associated with FT, we reveal that employees strongly resented the company's use of financialization policies to maximize shareholder value. Pursuit of such policies led to the de-institutionalization of socially prescribed norms that were applied commonly in Continental European workplaces. Feelings of anomie, disgrace, futility and isolation ensued among employees. This case highlights an important effect of a modern corporation's adoption of financialization policies. It points to the need to improve workplace sensitivities and the ethical dispositions of companies and their managers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revue Tiers Monde is the property of Librairie Armand Colin and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

For the purposes of understanding the causes and implications of the growth of financial markets around the world, I focus on a crucial aspect of the dramatic transformation of French capitalism over the last quarter of a century: the shift from a government-based financial system to a market-based one. I examine the causes and implications of the increasing role of financial markets in French capitalism on the basis of an analysis of the actors who issued securities on the country's financial markets. I show that the government's role as an issuer, and the deficits that drove its need for external funds, largely account for the development of these markets in the 1980s and early 1990s. In contrast, the dramatic growth of these markets from the late 1990s was primarily attributable to their use by French enterprises in pursuit of strategies of external growth, especially cross-border mergers and acquisitions. On the basis of my analysis, I challenge the argument that French corporate capitalism is now subject to the dictates of the financial markets but I also highlight the limits of the state's capacity to systematically shape the future of the French corporate economy. Instead, I argue that the existing French system can be better understood as one of managerial control in which senior corporate executives exercise considerable discretion in shaping the future of the companies they run. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]