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In this article, we look at the contested role of in-house lawyers in regulated organisations in the financial sector. A recent Financial Conduct Authority consultation on whether to designate the head of legal of banks, insurance companies and other financial firms as 'Senior Managers' and the decision which flowed from it, reflected a flawed view of lawyers as a neutral technocracy of mere legal technicians; we show how the FCA's decision is potentially damaging to the public interest and failed to take into account that in-house lawyers are often important decision-makers and influencers within their organisations. We put the case for an alternative view; that in-house lawyers are professionals, with agency that requires them to act in accordance with ethical norms and means they should be made more accountable for their conduct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modern financial regulation has predominantly been economically-driven,1 progressing from addressing market failures to making markets more competitive and work better.2 The UK Financial Conduct Authority is expressly mandated to pursue regulatory objectives that maintain market integrity and protect consumers (addressing market failures) and to promote competition (making markets work better).3 Both the FCA and its sister regulator, the Prudential Regulation Authority (for banks), have recently adopted innovative regulatory initiatives to promote technologically-driven innovation, aimed at making markets work better. These initiatives are also a response to the recent explosion of technologically-led financial innovation outside of the regulatory perimeter.In promoting financial innovation, we argue that the regulators have insufficiently focused on the need to govern financial innovation more generally. Although this concern may seem premature, the regulatory innovations are increasingly extending the perimeter for regulatory oversight of financial innovations. As the regulatory innovations have the potential to develop into more mature regulatory frameworks for governing financial innovation, we argue that regulators should manage the risks of their current approach and develop a regulatory strategy framework for balancing regulatory objectives and developing regulatory policy. We propose a framework anchored in rationality, consistency and accountability in governing financial innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article reports developments in the financial regulation in Great Britain. It highlights the Court of Appeal decision that complainants to the Financial Ombudsman Service (OS) would be able to accept a determination awarding them the statutory maximum award. The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) sets an uncompromising compliance standard for unacceptable payments from product providers to advisors in the retail investment sector.

The article discusses the developments in the financial services industry in Great Britain as of November 1, 2013. Topics include the decision of the Court of Appeal on the case Green & Rowley v. Royal Bank of Scotland PLC concerning interest rate swap, the concerns of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) on the impact of payments in service or distribution agreements on the Retail Distribution Review (RDR) objectives and the guidance consultation on inducements and conflict of interests.

The importance of “culture” has emerged as a key regulatory theme around the globe, as regulators, enforcement authorities and courts seek to promote cultural change in the financial services industry. These developments raise interesting and complex questions for firms around what is the “right” culture, how do you measure whether you have it, and whose responsibility is it to set the organisation's culture? Clifford Chance partners and representatives from the UK's Financial Conduct Authority discussed expectations of firms and what needs to be done, at seminars in March 2015. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The ongoing reform of the regulatory regime for the UK financial services industry is wide ranging and substantial. Whilst much of the attention has been grabbed by the introduction of the headline-inducing criminal offence of "reckless management" of a failed financial institution, much of the real impact of the changes will be felt as a result of other provisions. Two such provisions relate to the new power given to the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) to publish information about enforcement action at a far earlier stage, and the reversed burden of proof for "Senior Managers" under the new regime. It is in the detail of such provisions, however, where the full ramifications, and unintended consequences, of change may have been underestimated. One such consequence may be the impact which these two provisions may have on the attitude and approach of firms to settlement of significant enforcement actions taken against them by the FCA (and by the Prudential Regulatory Authority). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]