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Strategi G-20 dalam mengatasi krisis keuangan telah dinyatakan pada kesepakatan KTT G-20 2008-2009 dengan adanya tiga pertemuan selama periode tersebut berlangsung (Washington, London dan Pittsburgh). Bersama dengan beberapa lembaga termasuk IMF, WB, FSB, OECD dan MDB, G-20 mampu menangani krisis tersebut baik di tingkat nasional maupun internasional. Pada saat yang bersamaan G-20 pun mampu mempertahankan koordinasi berdasarkan lima prinsip yang disepakati dalam KTT 2008 di Washington. Tulisan ini berfokus pada kontribusi G-20 sebagai alat koordinasi sekaligus aktor langsung dalam manajemen krisis, serta menyoroti peran negara-negara anggotanya. Deskripsi masalah ini akan dibagi menjadi empat bagian. Pertama, pandangan singkat tentang tujuan pembentukan G-20 dan penyebab krisis sebagai latar belakang tulisan ini; Kedua, kontribusi G-20 untuk penyelesaian krisis keuangan global; Ketiga, deskripsi hasil dari tiga kesepakatan G-20 (komunike) pada tahun 2008-2009 sebagai dasar dari strategi penanganan krisis keuangan global untuk G-20 dan lembaga internasional terkait; dan Keempat merupakan bagian analisis strategi G-20 yang kemudian menghasilkan prinsip-prinsip dasar manajemen krisis pada masalah yang diajukan dalam penelitian ini.The G-20 strategy in overcoming the financial crisis has been declared on the agreement of 2008-2009 G-20 Summit with three meetings over that period (Washington, London and Pittsburgh). In handling the crisis, the G-20 was in collaboration with several institutions including the IMF, WB, FSB, OECD and MDB. G-20 was able to make good efforts both nationally and internationally while maintaining coordination based on five principles agreed in 2008 Summit in Washington. This paper focuses on the contribution of the G-20, both as a coordinating tool, as a direct actor on crisis management, as well as the role of member countries. The description of these issues will be divided into four sections, First, a brief look at the purpose of the G-20's establishment and the causes of the crisis as the background of this paper; Second, the G-20's contribution to the settlement of the global financial crisis; Third, a description of three outcomes of the G-20 (communiqués) agreement in 2008-2009 as the foundation of the global financial crisis handling strategy for both G-20 and related international institutions; and Fourth, the analytical part of the G-20 strategy which then produced the basic principles of crisis management on the problems in this study.

What began as a downturn in the U.S. housing sector in mid-2007 soon mushroomed into a global financial crisis by September 2008. Why was the crisis triggered in the United States renowned for its resilient and innovative economic system? Why the crisis, which began with the implosion of a relatively small part of the U.S. housing market (the subprime mortgages) quickly morphed into a credit crunch, plunging the world economy in the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression? And, what explains the failure of both the market participants and public authorities to anticipate (at least initially) the depth and gravity of the crisis? In contrast to conventional explanations that see the crisis rooted in the procyclicality of the financial system, or the result of Wall Street greed and incompetence, this article provides a political-economy analysis of the complex series of events that lead to U.S. subprime meltdown. Specifically, the paper illustrates that the subprime crisis is fundamentally the result of massive regulatory failure in the United States. Although both market actors and regulators failed to properly assess the risks of complex assets, powerful lawmakers (both Republicans and Democrats) and regulators whose responsibility was to maintain due diligence against potentially destructive market failure, clearly failed in their responsibility.

Durante los últimos años, los bancos de inversión de Estados Unidos, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs y Morgan Stanley, habían logrado alcanzar beneficios inimaginables que superaron con creces a los obtenidos por los bancos comerciales tradicionales. Sin embargo, la crisis financiera de 2008 ha logrado derrumbar todo un modelo bancario surgido como consecuencia de la Gran Depresión del 29; esas instituciones financieras fueron creadas para inyectar liquidez al mercado hipotecario y proteger a los pequeños inversionistas. Con base en la revisión documental de fuentes secundarias, este trabajo describe la caída del modelo de inversión de los Estados Unidos tomando como punto de partida el origen y evolución de la crisis financiera de 2008. De lo anterior se evidencia la falta de confianza y credibilidad en el sistema financiero actual de los Estados Unidos. During the last years, investment banks in the United States, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, had reached unimaginable benefits that exceeded those of traditional commercial banks. However, the financial crisis of 2008 has collapsed a banking model emerged as a result of the Great Depression of 29; those financial institutions were created to inject liquidity to the mortgage market and to protect small investors. Based on the review of secondary sources, this paper describes the fall of the investment model of the United States since the origin and evolution of the financial crisis of 2008. It demonstrates the lack of trust and credibility in the current financial system of the United States. 28-37 marellano@mail.luz.ve

This bachelor paper called "The Recent Financial Crisis - Causes and Consequences" defines the concept of a financial crisis, types of a crisis and its examples in the first, theoretical, part. The second section is devoted to the description of this crisis' origins, the development in the United States and the situation in the US mortgage market. Additionally, specific tools of the mortgage market are depicted as well as the function of rating agencies and the regulation of the US financial market. The third part concerns itself with the proliferation of the crisis from the financial market into the real economy and also its diffusion across the whole world. Finally, the crisis' consequences in the EU member countries and the United States of America are compared.

Relatório de Projecto / Classificação JEL: G01, G21 O objectivo deste documento é explicar a origem da crise subprime e o seu impacto no sector bancário português. Procura-se sinteticamente enquadrar o aumento da procura por produtos financeiros de estrutura complexa, determinantes na propagação dos riscos de crédito pelo sistema financeiro, que conduziram à corrente crise, com reflexo no mercado financeiro. Foca-se a ausência de liquidez no mercado monetário interbancário, que dificultou aos bancos o financiamento via equity ou debt. Evocam se os principais motivos que originaram a acumulação de recursos por parte das instituições financeiras neste quadro de elevada incerteza e instabilidade. Procede-se a uma análise do sector bancário português, começando-se por apresentar o actual enquadramento macroeconómico adverso, enquanto principal desafio, e a ausência de uma bolha especulativa no mercado imobiliário, enquanto vantagem comparativamente com os E.U.A., Espanha, Reino Unido e Irlanda. Contudo, a economia portuguesa, tal como os restantes parceiros da União Europeia, vê-se envolvida na recessão. A contracção do ritmo de crescimento económico e o aumento da taxa de desemprego envolvem duas preocupações: o aumento das taxas de incumprimento e o abrandamento do ritmo de crescimento dos empréstimos, ambos percepcionados na análise dos dados disponíveis relativos ao sector bancário português. Numa tentativa de escalonar as cinco maiores instituições financeiras portuguesas, comparando-as com a média do sector bancário europeu, analisam-se os respectivos rácios de capital, níveis de alavancagem e gap de liquidez, concluindo-se acerca das suas necessidades de funding, risco de solvência e necessidades de aumento de capital. Finalmente, referem-se as medidas tomadas pelos Governos para conter e resolver as crises financeiras, dando particular enfoque às medidas adoptadas em Portugal. The purpose of this paper is to explain subprime mortgage credit crisis and its impact on the Portuguese banking system. We look at the underlying determinants of the mortgage credit crisis, discuss the roots of the market meltdown and its repercussions on financial markets. We also analyse the decrease of market liquidity, which makes it harder for banks to finance via equity or debt. We explain the reasons why financial institutions tried to accumulate financial resources due to the great deal of uncertainty. Focusing the analysis on the Portuguese banking sector, we start to discuss the weak global economic prospects as the main challenge and the absence of a real estate bubble in the Portuguese market in the past few years as an advantage comparing to other countries like U.S.A., Spain, U.K and Ireland. The Portuguese economy is caught up in a deep slowdown, as is every European Union country. Lower economic growth and higher unemployment bring two major concerns: higher default rates and slower loan growth, which are clearly showed through the analysis of available Portuguese banking system data. In an attempt to screen the five major financial institutions and compare them to the European banking sector, we show each company capital ratio, gearing ratio and liquidity gap and conclude the funding and solvency risk and the need to raise fresh capital. Finally, we cover the crisis containment and resolution policies, focusing on the Portuguese response to restore the banking system.

This dissertation analyzes key features of credit derivatives market, basic risks of the products and trends the market has experienced for several years since its inception, discusses regulatory issues of the market with regard to the Basel II treatment and key reasons for investors using credit derivatives. Dissertation also examines whether and how credit derivatives affected current financial turmoil, analyzes credit derivatives losses of selected institutions on the financial markets and compares them with total losses of these institutions. The main result of the work is that there was no substantial effect of the credit derivatives market on the current financial crisis. Dissertation also examines whether there is any connection between U.S. banks credit derivatives trades and their capital adequacy ratio. According to the analysis, there is no evidence for credit derivatives to essentially affect capital adequacy ratio of U.S. banks. A potential explanation for the higher values of U.S. banks' capital adequacy ratio may be that there are sophisticated risk management strategies banks have been implicating for many years.