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Since the global financial crisis, non-reserve-issuing economies (NREs) have been highly sensitive to episodes of external pressures. With monetary policy independence constrained by this sensitivity, many NREs have utilized other policy instruments. This paper confirms the vulnerability of NREs to external shocks and finds that in some circumstances managing such shocks with multiple instruments can both lessen the policy response required from any one policy tool to financial and external shocks and increase the effectiveness of policies in stabilizing macro-financial conditions. Effectiveness however does not always imply appropriateness, which rests on an evaluation of potential trade-offs and unintended consequences.

The aim of this paper is to assess the consequences of banking crises for public debt. Using an unbalanced panel of 154 countries from 1980 to 2006, the paper shows that banking crises are associated with a significant and long-lasting increase in government debt. The effect is a function of the severity of the crisis. In particular, for severe crises, comparable to the most recent one in terms of output losses, banking crises are followed by a medium-term increase of about 37 percentage points in the government gross debt-to-GDP ratio. Measuring the increase in debt in this manner seems more appropriate than some of the measures used in the literature that have provided off-quoted and very large numbers for the run-up in debt. In addition, the debt ratio increased more in countries with a higher initial gross debt-to-GDP ratio and with a higher initial foreign debt-to-GDP ratio.

The aim of this paper is to assess the dynamic impact of banking crises on output for a panel of developing economies. Using an unbalanced panel of 159 countries from 1970 to 2006, the paper shows that banking crises produce significant output losses. Output losses are larger for relatively richer economies, characterized by a higher level of financial deepening and larger current account imbalances. Flexible exchange rates, fiscal and monetary policy, and liquidity support policies have been found to attenuate the effect of the crises. © 2012 Elsevier Ltd.

The aim of this work is to assess the impact of financial crises on output for 11 European transition economies (CEECs). The results suggest that financial crises have a significant and permanent effect, lowering long-term output by about 17 percent. The effect is more important in smaller countries, with relative higher dependence on external financing, and in which the banking sector noticed more important financial disequilibria. We also found that fiscal policy measures have been the most efficient tools in dealing with the crises, while the role of monetary policy instruments has been rather blinded. Exchange rate resulted to be more a propagator than a crises absorber, while the IMF credit has been found to have positive (but not significant) impact on growth performance. Finally, the effect for the CEECs is much bigger than in the EU advanced economies, for which we found that financial crises lowers long-term output only by 2 percent.

The Global Financial Crisis has reopened discussions on the role of the monetary policy in preserving financial stability. Determining whether monetary policy affects financial variables domestically—especially compared to the effects of macroprudential policies— and across borders, is crucial in this context. This paper looks into these issues using U.S. exogenous monetary policy shocks and macroprudential policy measures. Estimates indicate that monetary policy shocks have significant and persistent effects on financial conditions and can attenuate long-term financial instability. In contrast, the impact of macroprudential policy measures is generally more immediate but shorter-lasting. Also, while an exogenous increase in U.S. monetary policy rates tends to reduce credit and house prices in other countries—with the effects varying with country-specific characteristics—an increase driven by improved U.S. economic conditions tends to have the opposite effect. Finally, we do not find evidence of cross-border spillover effects associated with U.S. macroprudential policies.

Balance sheet recessions have been a drag on activity after the Global Financial Crisis, underscoring the important role of balance sheet adjustment for resuming sustained growth. In this paper we examine private sector deleveraging experiences across 36 advanced and emerging economies countries since 1960. We consider the common features and divergent experiences of deleveraging episodes across countries, and analyze empirically the impact of different aspects of deleveraging during the bust phase of leverage cycles on subsequent medium-term growth. The results suggest that larger and quicker unwinding of non-financial sector debt overhangs is associated with sizable medium-term output gains, and that policies should focus on facilitating up-front balance sheet adjustment.

Working Paper GATE 2009-20; International audience; The aim of this work is to assess the impact of financial crises on output for 11 European transition economies (CEECs). The results suggest that financial crises have a significant and permanent effect, lowering long-term output by about 17 percent. The effect is more important in smaller countries, with relative higher dependence on external financing, and in which the banking sector noticed more important financial disequilibria. We also found that fiscal policy measures have been the most efficient tools in dealing with the crises, while the role of monetary policy instruments has been rather blinded. Exchange rate resulted to be more a propagator than a crises absorber, while the IMF credit has been found to have positive (but not significant) impact on growth performance. Finally, the effect for the CEECs is much bigger than in the EU advanced economies, for which we found that financial crises lowers long-term output only by 2 percent.

The aim of this paper is to assess the consequences of banking crises for public debt. Using an unbalanced panel of 154 countries from 1980 to 2006, the paper shows that banking crises are associated with a significant and longlasting increase in government debt. The effect is a function of the severity of the crisis. In particular, for severe crises, comparable to the most recent one in terms of output losses, banking crises are followed by a medium-term increase of about 37 percentage points in the government gross debt-to-GDP ratio. In addition, the debt ratio increased more in countries with higher initial gross debt-to-GDP ratio, with a higher share of foreign debt, and with a lower quality of institutions (in terms of political stability and democracy). The increase in government debt is also a function of the size of the fiscal stimulus to counter the economic downturns and varies with the type of banking intervention policy used.

The aim of this work is to assess the short and medium term impact of banking crises on developing economies. Using an unbalanced panel of 159 countries from 1970 to 2006, the paper shows that banking crises produce significant output losses, both in the short and in the medium term. The effect depends on structural and policy variables. Output losses are larger for relatively more wealthy economies, characterized by a higher level of financial deepening and larger current account imbalances. Flexible exchange rates, fiscal and monetary policy have been found to be efficient tools to attenuate the effect of the crises. Among banking intervention policies, liquidity support resulted to be the one associated with lower output losses.

The aim of this paper is to assess the short- and medium-term impact of debt crises on GDP. Using an unbalanced panel of 154 countries from 1970 to 2008, the paper shows that debt crises produce significant and long-lasting output losses, reducing output by about 10 percent after eight years. The results also suggest that debt crises tend to be more detrimental than banking and currency crises. The significance of the results is robust to different specifications, identification and endogeneity checks, and datasets.

The aim of this work is to assess the impact of financial crises on output for 11 European transition economies (CEECs). The results suggest that financial crises have a significant and permanent effect, lowering long-term output by about 17 percent. The effect is more important in smaller countries, with relative higher dependence on external financing, and in which the banking sector noticed more important financial disequilibria. We also found that fiscal policy measures have been the most efficient tools in dealing with the crises, while the role of monetary policy instruments has been rather blinded. Exchange rate resulted to be more a propagator than a crises absorber, while the IMF credit has been found to have positive (but not significant) impact on growth performance. Finally, the effect for the CEECs is much bigger than in the EU advanced economies, for which we found that financial crises lowers long-term output only by 2 percent.